NOTES 1 Introduction 1. Doron, 2006; Reichmann & Nachmias, 2006 2. Buchanan, 1990 3. Mackerras, 1994; Sakamoto, 1999 4. Dunleavy & Margetts, 1995; Sakamoto, 1999 5. Finkel, 2003; Larkins, 1998 6. Lijphart, 1984, 1999; Peters, 1999 7. Mantzavinos, North & Shariq, 2004 8. Doron & Sened, 2001; Schneider & Teske, 1992; LÓpez, 2002; Sheingate, 2003; Christopoulos, 2006; Meydani, 2008 2 Institutional Change as an Interaction between Political and Social Players—The Role of Political Entrepreneurs 1. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 2. Knight, 1995 3. Selznick, 1949, 1957; Perrow, 1986 4. Selznick, 1957 5. Scott & Meyer, 1991 6. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 7. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 8. Colomer, 1995a, 1995b; Pridham & Vanhanen, 1994 9. North, 1986; Ostrom, 1986; Riker, 1980; Shepsle, 1986; Williamson, 1985 10. Buchanan, 1990; Doron & Sened, 2001; Gardner & Ostrom, 1991; Gavious & Mizrahi, 2003 11. Riker, 1980; Shepsle, 1986; Shepsle & Weingast, 1981; Weingast & Marshall, 1988 12. Moe, 1987: 291 13. De Haan & Siermann, 1995; Gastil, 1990; Scully & Slottje, 1991; Wittmann, 1989 14. Mantzavinos, North & Shariq, 2004 15. Gastil, 1990 184 Notes 16. Milgrom & Roberts, 1990 17. North, 1995; Nachmias & Sened, 1999 18. Mantzavinos, North & Shariq, 2004 19. Riker, 1980 20. Doron, 1988 21. Mantzavinos, North & Shariq, 2004 22. Dahl, 1961; Kingdon, 1995; Schneider & Teske, 1992; LÓpez, 2002; Doron & Sened, 2001 23. On social entrepreneurs see Offe, 1985; on economic entrepreneurs see Schumpeter, 1934; Salisbury, 1969 24. On the difference between fundamental ideology and operative ideology, see Naor, 1999; Seliger, 1977 25. See for example Weber, 1964; Kelsen, 1945; Edelman, 1994a, 1994b 26. Yishai, 1987 27. Doron & Sened, 2001 28. Doron, 1988; Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Kingdon, 1995; Doron & Lebel, 2005 29. Spector & Kitsuse, 1987 30. Doron, 1986 31. Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963 32. Cantril, 1963, 63; Doron & Lebel, 2005; Eliade, 1965, 174–177; Hirschman, 1970; Wallace, 1969 33. Spiller & Tommasi, 2007 34. Stewart, Watson, Carland & Carland, 1998 35. Hardin, 1982 36. Doron & Lebel, 2005; Nisbet, 1966; Offe, 1985 37. Breton &Breton, 1969; Calvert, 1992; Colomer, 1995a,b; Fiorina & Shepsle, 1989; Frohlich, Oppenheimer & Young, 1971; Salisbury, 1969; Wagner, 1966 38. Note that policy products are arrived at usually through rules, regulations, and court rul- ings, and in this respect we might claim that the legitimacy of the rules, prestige of the law system and the notion of stability as a function of the positive law, constitute the public product as defined in the works of Olson (1965) 39. Dahl, 1963 40. Jones, 1978 41. Sandler, 1992 42. Eliade, 1965; Doron & Lebel, 2005 43. Axelrod, 1984 44. Goode, 1957 45. Doron & Lebel, 2005 46. Downs, 1957 47. Doron, 1986; Fearn-Banks, 1996; Yishai, 1987; Millbrath, 1965 48. Blumer, 1971; Doron & Lebel, 2005; Spector & Kitsuse, 1987; Wolfsfeld, 1997 49. Arian, 1997 50. Olson, 1965 51. Hardin, 1982 52. Downs, 1957 53. Doron & Lebel, 2005; Yishai, 1987 54. Yishai, 1987 55. Berry, 1977; Eckstein, 1960; Hayes, 1981; McFarland, 1984; Ziegler, 1964 56. Hayes, 1981; Ziegler, 1964 57. Doron & Lebel, 2005 58. See also Riker, 1980; Sened, 1995; Shepsle & Weingast, 1981 59. Doron & Maor, 1989 Notes 185 60. Shepsle & Weingast, 1981 61. Doron, 1988; Laver & Shepsle, 1994; Tsebelis, 1990, 2002 62. Laver & Schofield, 1990 63. Policy evaluation studies highlight the built-in tension between objective policy that maxi- mizes effectiveness and social profit and subjective policy evaluation that reflects the private political interests of the decision-makers (Browne & Wildavsky, 1983; Rist, 1995; Nagel, 1994; Lipsky, 1980; Golden, 1990; Sabatier, 1986). 64. See also Deri, 1993; Deri & Sharon, 1994; Vigoda, 2002 65. Bendor, 1990; Breton, 1995 66. Bendor, Taylor & van Gaalen, 1987a,b; Miller & Moe, 1983 67. Kramer, 1977; Monsen & Cannon, 1965 68. Barzilai, 1998; Dotan & Hofnung, 2001 69. Kremnitzer, 1999 70. Arian, Nachmias & Amir, 2002; Kimmerling, 2004 71. Knight, 1995 72. North, 1995; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 73. Mantzavinos, North & Shariq, 2004 74. Buchanan, 1990 75. Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom, 1959; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 76. Doron & Lebel, 2005; Nisbet, 1966; Offe, 1985; Spector & Kitsuse, 1987 77. Begly & Boyd, 1987; Johnson, 1990; McClelland, 1987 78. Doron & Sened, 2001; Kingdon, 1995; Schneider & Teske, 1992; LÓpez, 2002; also as Adam Sheingate (2003: 191) mentioned, “one must understand how institutional complex- ity creates the conditions that make entrepreneurship possible. More important, a focus on complexity points to the characteristics of institutions themselves that provide the opportu- nities for speculation, the resources for creative recombination, and the assets entrepreneurs use to consolidate innovation into institutional change.” 79. Rahat, 2006 80. Herman, 1996 81. Migdal, 2001 82. Shafir & Peled, 2002 83. Doron & Adiri, 1994; Hazan, 1996 84. Sheffer, 1999 85. Doron, 1996b; Korn, 1998; Levi-Faur, Sheffer & Vogel, 1999; Rahat, 2000; Dowty, 1998 3 Political Entrepreneurs and Institutional Change: The Case of Basic Law: The Government (1992) 1. Buchanan, 1990; Gardner & Ostrom, 1991; Gavious & Mizrahi, 2003 2. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village, in Decisions, vol. 49, section 4, p. 221 (Hebrew) 3. Barak, 1993 4. Powell & DiMaggio, 1991 5. This task was usually assigned to the head of the party obtaining the most votes and thus Knesset seats in the current election. If the head of the majority party fails to form a gov- ernment, the task is given to the head of the next-largest party or some other Knesset member. 186 Notes 6. Note that a bill must pass three readings and votes in the Knesset before it is passed into law. 7. Arian, 1997; Arieli, 1992; Barzilai, 1992; Beilin, 1984; Gutman, 1994; Horowitz & Lissak, 1989; Eisenstadt, 1989; Rubinstein, 1982 8. Barzilai, 1992 9. The Commission released its interim report on the circumstances leading to the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War in 1974. 10. This Commission investigated the 1982 massacre of Lebanese refugees at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Phalangist militias during the Lebanese civil war. Arian, 1997; Eisenstadt, 1989; Shaham, 1998 11. Eisenstadt, 1989 12. A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended. It was led by Motti Ashkenazi, commander of Budapest, the northernmost of the Bar-Lev forts and the only one during the war not to be captured by the Egyptians. Anger against the Israeli government (and Dayan in particular) was high. Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry—the Agranat Commission—into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days. 13. The Histadrut (“Federation” [of labor]) was founded in December 1920 in Haifa as a Jewish trade union that would also provide services for members, such as an employment exchange, sick pay, and consumer benefits. The Histradrut became one of the most pow- erful institutions in the state of Israel, a mainstay of the Labour-Zionist movement. With the increasing liberalization of the Israeli economy since the 1980s, the role and size of Histradrut has declined though it still remains a powerful force in Israeli society and the nation’s economy. 14. The Dollar Account affair was a political scandal that broke in Israel in 1977, following the exposure of an illegal US Dollar bank account held by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his wife Leah. According to Israeli currency regulations at the time, it was ille- gal for citizens to maintain foreign bank accounts without prior authorization. In the wake of this disclosure, Rabin handed in his resignation from the party leadership and candi- dacy for prime minister, an act that earned him praise as a responsible person and a man of integrity. 15. Aharoni, 1991 16. Judicial review of the constitutionality of primary legislation was not explicitly defined in the basic laws, and has developed in Israel on the basis of the Supreme Court’s interpreta- tion of the constitutional documents. It is through this process that rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of election and freedom of protest have been established. Kretzmer, D.; The Path to Judicial Review in Human Rights Cases: From Bergman and Kol Ha’am to Mizrahi Bank. Mishpatim, 1997, 28, 359–385 (Hebrew). 17. Adam, 1995; Benvenisti, 2001; Dotan & Hofnung, 2001; Mizrahi & Meydani, 2003 18. Dror, 1989; Eisenstadt, 1989; Mautner, 1993 19. Lehman-Wilzig, 1991, 1992; Mizrahi & Meydani, 2003 20. Yishai, 1987 21. Shprinzak, 1986 22. Korn, 1998 23. In 1975, the municipal electoral system underwent major reform. According to the new sys- tem, local elections are held every five years, separately from national elections. In 1978, the new system in which voters cast a double ballot and were able to vote for both a candidate for mayor and for a party list on the city council was implemented for the first time. This led to the proliferation of independent lists and candidates on behalf of the national parties; see also Brichta, 1977. 24. Arian, Nachmias & Amir, 2002; see also Goldberg, 1994 Notes 187 25. Arian, Nachmias & Amir 2002: 103 26. Arian, Nachmias & Amir, 2002: 104 27. One Israeli party was formed by Labor Party leader Ehud Barak in the run-up to the 1999 elections with the aim of making the Labor Party appear more centrist and to reduce its sec- ularist and elitist reputation among Mizrahi voters. (Gesher was led by prominent Mizrahi politician and former Likud MK David Levy, and Meimad is a religious party.) 28. Arian, Nachmias & Amir, 2002: 108 29. Rae, 1967: 47–58 30. Laakso & Taagepera, 1979 31. Knesset Archive, 2001 32. Swirski & Fraenkel, 2001; see also Moalem & Frisch, 1991 33. The majority of Israelis own rather than rent their homes and apartments. 34. Swirski & Konor-Attias, 2000 35. Swirski & Konor-Attias, 2000 36. The 1984 election was inconclusive and led to a power sharing agreement between Shimon Peres of the Alignment (HaMa’arakh) and Shamir of Likud. Peres was prime minister from 1984–1986 and Shamir from 1986–1988.