Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2019-12 TAILOR-MADE TERRORISM: THE POTENTIAL RESURGENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PERSONALIZED TERRORISM TACTICS AGAINST KEY LEADERS Maicke, James A. Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64013 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS TAILOR-MADE TERRORISM: THE POTENTIAL RESURGENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PERSONALIZED TERRORISM TACTICS AGAINST KEY LEADERS by James A. Maicke December 2019 Thesis Advisor: Michael E. Freeman Second Reader: Craig A. Whiteside Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK Form Approved OMB REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED (Leave blank) December 2019 Master's thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS TAILOR-MADE TERRORISM: THE POTENTIAL RESURGENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PERSONALIZED TERRORISM TACTICS AGAINST KEY LEADERS 6. AUTHOR(S) James A. Maicke 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 10. SPONSORING / ADDRESS(ES) MONITORING AGENCY N/A REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) When people hear the word “terrorism,” images of the chaos caused by large, violent attacks and the horrific events of September 11, 2001, usually flood imaginations and captivate attentions. All of these events depict the very real threat of physical violence, death, and destruction perpetrated by terrorists against the masses. These attacks targeting the masses also dominate current strategic policy conversations and academic study. However, the power and utility of more focused and personalized terrorism tactics targeting key influential leaders remain widely unappreciated and undertheorized. If terrorists are constantly adapting and calculating operational risks versus rewards during their selection of tactics and strategy, whom will they choose to target and how? Will they target populations or the key individuals who control these populations? This work highlights the following indicators and observations that could lead to a future rise and resurgence of personalized terrorism tactics against key leaders: increased counterterrorism proficiency in a post-9/11 world, improved technologies/the power of media, and a historical blueprint of previous applications of personalized terrorism tactics. These factors serve as powerful motivators for pragmatic terrorists or terrorist organizations to change their target selections and tactics, but may not influence a radical ideologue. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF tailor-made terrorism, personalized, counterterrorism, terrorism tactics, terrorism, leadership PAGES targeting 81 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. TAILOR-MADE TERRORISM: THE POTENTIAL RESURGENCE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF PERSONALIZED TERRORISM TACTICS AGAINST KEY LEADERS James A. Maicke Major, United States Army BA, The Citadel, 2008 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS (IRREGULAR WARFARE) from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL December 2019 Approved by: Michael E. Freeman Advisor Craig A. Whiteside Second Reader Kalev I. Sepp Chair, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT When people hear the word “terrorism,” images of the chaos caused by large, violent attacks and the horrific events of September 11, 2001, usually flood imaginations and captivate attentions. All of these events depict the very real threat of physical violence, death, and destruction perpetrated by terrorists against the masses. These attacks targeting the masses also dominate current strategic policy conversations and academic study. However, the power and utility of more focused and personalized terrorism tactics targeting key influential leaders remain widely unappreciated and undertheorized. If terrorists are constantly adapting and calculating operational risks versus rewards during their selection of tactics and strategy, whom will they choose to target and how? Will they target populations or the key individuals who control these populations? This work highlights the following indicators and observations that could lead to a future rise and resurgence of personalized terrorism tactics against key leaders: increased counterterrorism proficiency in a post-9/11 world, improved technologies/the power of media, and a historical blueprint of previous applications of personalized terrorism tactics. These factors serve as powerful motivators for pragmatic terrorists or terrorist organizations to change their target selections and tactics, but may not influence a radical ideologue. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 A. DEFINING PERSONALIZED TERRORISM TACTICS ....................2 B. STRATEGIC LOGIC BEHIND THE RISE OF PTT .............................7 1. Logical Terrorist Adaptations ......................................................9 2. The Risks of Indirectly Targeting the Masses— Overcoming Ideology ...................................................................10 3. The Value of Correctly Targeting Key Leaders ........................12 C. RESEARCH QUESTION ........................................................................13 D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SIGNIFICANCE ......................................14 II. COUNTER-TERRORISM PROFICIENCY IN A POST–9/11 WORLD ......15 A. CT FOILS TERRORISM PLOTS .........................................................17 B. THE PARADOX OF TARGET HARDENING ....................................19 C. WHY CT PROFICIENCY AND TARGET HARDENING COULD FORCE TERRORISTS TO CHANGE THEIR TACTICS ..................................................................................................21 III. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE POWER OF MEDIA ................23 A. TECHNOLOGIES AND TACTICS AVAILABLE ..............................25 1. Hacking and Sextortion ...............................................................25 2. Artificial Intelligence ...................................................................28 B. THE REALITY OF FICTION ...............................................................29 1. Fictional Case Study #1: Black Mirror .......................................30 2. How Is This an Example of PTT? ..............................................31 3. Fictional Case Study #2: The West Wing ...................................32 4. How Is This an Example of PTT? ..............................................33 C. WHY TECHNOLOGY AND MEDIA COULD ENABLE A RISE IN PTT ............................................................................................34 IV. A HISTORICAL BLUEPRINT FOR PTT........................................................35 A. THE RIGHT TACTICS AND RIGHT TARGET: THE DUARTE KIDNAPPING ..........................................................................................36 B. EUROPEAN TERRORISM OF THE 1970s: MARXIST GROUPS AND FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE ..........................39 1. Right Tactics and Wrong Targets: Moro and Schleyer ...........40 2. Wrong Tactics and Right Target: Lord Mountbatten .............43 C. CONTEMPORARY PTT: ISLAMIC TERRORISM ...........................47 1. Taliban Night Letters and the Threat of Violence ....................47 vii 2. The Handling of Tribal Dynamics: ISIS Style ..........................50 D. HISTORICAL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................52 V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS ......................................................53 A. COMBATING PTT .................................................................................53 1. Protect Key Leaders ....................................................................53 2. Make the Situation Less Personal ..............................................54 B. RESEARCH FINDINGS .........................................................................55