See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/229067921 Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components Article in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · January 1989 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.56.1.5 CITATIONS READS 2,287 426 1 author: Patricia G. Devine University of Wisconsin–Madison 88 PUBLICATIONS 9,636 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Patricia G. Devine on 28 January 2015. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. All in-text references underlined in blue are added to the original document and are linked to publications on ResearchGate, letting you access and read them immediately. ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL COGNITION Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components Patricia G. Devine University of Wisconsin—Madison Three studies tested basic assumptions derived from a theoretical model based on the dissociation of automatic and controlled processes involved in prejudice. Study 1 supported the model's assump- tion that high- and low-prejudice persons are equally knowledgeable of the cultural stereotype. The model suggests that the stereotype is automatically activated in the presence of a member (or some symbolic equivalent) of the stereotyped group and that low-prejudice responses require controlled inhibition of the automatically activated stereotype. Study 2, which examined the effects of auto- matic stereotype activation on the evaluation of ambiguous stereotype-relevant behaviors performed by a race-unspecified person, suggested that when subjects' ability to consciously monitor stereotype activation is precluded, both high- and low-prejudice subjects produce stereotype-congruent evalua- tions of ambiguous behaviors. Study 3 examined high- and low-prejudice subjects' responses in a consciously directed thought-listing task. Consistent with the model, only low-prejudice subjects inhibited the automatically activated stereotype-congruent thoughts and replaced them with thoughts reflecting equality and negations of the stereotype. The relation between stereotypes and prejudice and implications for prejudice reduction are discussed. Social psychologists have long been interested in stereotypes edge of a stereotype is equated with prejudice toward the group. and prejudice, concepts that are typically viewed as being very This perspective has serious implications because, as Ehrlich much interrelated. For example, those who subscribe to the tri- (1973) argued, ethnic attitudes and stereotypes are part of the partite model of attitudes hold that a stereotype is the cognitive social heritage of a society and no one can escape learning the component of prejudiced attitudes (Harding, Proshansky, prevailing attitudes and stereotypes assigned to the major ethnic Kutner, & Chein, 1969;Secord&Backman, 1974). Other theo- groups. rists suggest that stereotypes are functional for the individual, The inevitability of prejudice approach, however, overlooks allowing rationalization of his or her prejudice against a group an important distinction between knowledge of a cultural ste- (Allport, 1954; LaViolette & Silvert, 1951; Saenger, 1953; reotype and acceptance or endorsement of the stereotype (Ash- Simpson & Yinger, 1965). more & Del Boca, 1981; Billig, 1985). That is, although one In fact, many classic and contemporary theorists have sug- may have knowledge of a stereotype, his or her personal beliefs gested that prejudice is an inevitable consequence of ordinary may or may not be congruent with the stereotype. Moreover, categorization (stereotyping) processes (Allport, 1954; Billig, there is no good evidence that knowledge of a stereotype of a 1985; Ehrlich, 1973; Hamilton, 1981; Tajfel, 1981). The basic group implies prejudice toward that group. For example, in an argument of the inevitability of prejudice perspective is that as in-depth interview study of prejudice in war veterans, Bettle- long as stereotypes exist, prejudice will follow. This approach heim and Janowitz (1964) found no significant relation between suggests that stereotypes are automatically (or heuristically) ap- stereotypes reported about Blacks and Jews and the degree of plied to members of the stereotyped group. In essence, knowl- prejudice the veterans displayed toward these groups (see also Brigham, 1972; Devine, 1988; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). This article is based on a dissertation submitted by Patricia G. Devine Although they may have some overlapping features, it is ar- to the Ohio State University Graduate School in partial fulfillment of gued that stereotypes and personal beliefs are conceptually dis- the requirement for the doctoral degree. This research was supported by tinct cognitive structures. Each structure represents part of a Presidential Fellowship and by a Graduate Student Alumni Research one's entire knowledge base of a particular group (see Prat- Award both awarded by the Ohio State University Graduate School. kanis, in press, for a supporting argument in the attitude do- Thanks are extended to Thomas M. Ostrom, chair of the dissertation main). Beliefs are propositions that are endorsed and accepted committee, and to the other members of the committee, Anthony G. Greenwald and Gifford Weary. as being true. Beliefs can differ from one's knowledge about an Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Patri- object or group or one's affective reaction toward the object or cia G. Devine, Department of Psychology, 1202 West Johnson Street, group (Pratkanis, in press). To the extent that stereotypes and University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706. personal beliefs represent different and only potentially overlap- Journal of personality ana social Psychology, 1989, Vol. 56, No. 1,5-18 Copyright 1989 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0022-3514/89/S00.75 PATRICIA G. DEVINE ping subsets of information about ethnic or racial groups, they conscious expectancy to develop and inhibit the automatic pro- may have different implications for evaluation of and behavior cesses. toward members of the ethnic and racial groups. Previous theo- rists have not adequately captured this distinction and explored Automatic and Controlled Processes: Implications for its implications for responding to stereotyped group members. Activation of Stereotypes and Personal Beliefs The primary goal of the three studies reported here was to ex- amine how stereotypes and personal beliefs are involved in re- The dissociation of automatic and controlled processes may sponses toward stereotyped groups. provide some theoretical leverage for understanding the role of This work challenges the inevitability of prejudice framework stereotypes and personal beliefs in responses to members of ra- and offers a model of responses to members of stereotyped cial or ethnic groups. In the model proposed, interest centers groups that is derived largely from work in information process- on the conditions under which stereotypes and personal beliefs ing that distinguishes between automatic (mostly involuntary) are activated and the likelihood that personal beliefs overlap and controlled (mostly voluntary) processes (e.g., Posner & with the cultural stereotype. There is strong evidence that ste- Snyder, 1975; Schneider* Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, reotypes are well established in children's memories before 1977). Automatic processes involve the unintentional or spon- children develop the cognitive ability and flexibility to question taneous activation of some well-learned set of associations or or critically evaluate the stereotype's validity or acceptability responses that have been developed through repeated activation (Allport, 1954; P. Katz, 1976; Porter, 1971; Proshansky, 1966). in memory. They do not require conscious effort and appear to As a result, personal beliefs (i.e., decisions about the appropri- be initiated by the presence of stimulus cues in the environment ateness of stereotypic ascriptions) are necessarily newer cogni- (Shiffrin & Dumais, 1981). A crucial component of automatic tive structures (Higgins & King, 1981). An additional conse- processes is their inescapability; they occur despite deliberate quence of this developmental sequence is that stereotypes have attempts to bypass or ignore them (Neely, 1977; Shiffrin & Du- a longer history of activation and are therefore likely to be more mais, 1981). In contrast, controlled processes are intentional accessible than are personal beliefs. To the extent that an indi- and require the active attention of the individual. Controlled vidual rejects the stereotype, he or she experiences a fundamen- processes, although limited by capacity, are more flexible than tal conflict between the already established stereotype and the automatic processes. Their intentionality and flexibility makes more recently established personal beliefs. them particularly useful for decision making, problem solving, The present model assumes that primarily because of com- and the initiation of new behaviors. mon socialization experiences (Brigham, 1972; Ehrlich, 1973; Previous theoretical and empirical work on automatic and P. Katz, 1976; Proshansky, 1966), high- and low-prejudice per- controlled processes suggests that they can operate indepen- sons are equally knowledgeable of the cultural stereotype of dently of each other (Logan, 1980; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Blacks. In addition, because the stereotype has been frequently Neely, 1977; Posner