SKILL-BASED RELIABILISM _______________________________________ A Dissertation presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School at the University of Missouri-Columbia _______________________________________________________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy _____________________________________________________ by DANIEL C. MARSHALL Dr. Paul Weirich, Dissertation Supervisor May 2014 © Copyright by Daniel C. Marshall 2014 All Rights Reserved The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined dissertation entitled SKILL-BASED RELIABILISM presented by Daniel C. Marshall, candidate for the degree of doctor of philosophy and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. Professor Paul Weirich Professor Peter Markie Professor André Ariew Professor George Smith DEDICATION τῇ καλλίστῃ (To the prettiest one) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The initial seeds of this dissertation were planted during my first semester of graduate school, and many have helped nourish this sapling over the years. I am very greatly indebted to my advisor, Professor Paul Weirich, who read several drafts of each chapter, and gave many comments, suggestions, and criticisms that proved very valuable. It is not an exaggeration to say that this dissertation would not have been possible without him. I am also indebted to my committee members, Professor Peter Markie, Professor André Ariew, and Professor George Smith, who provided invaluable comments during the defense and also contributed ideas that went into the structure of this project. Finally, I greatly benefited from discussions with my fellow graduate students, including (but perhaps not limited to – my memory is somewhat vague in parts), Kok Young Lee, Lynn Chiu, and Chris Gadsen. Thank you all. ii Table of Contents Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………... ii Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………….. iii Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………. vii Chapter 0: Introduction ……………………………………………………………. 1 1. Reliabilism, and Three Problems Facing It ……………………………. 1 2. An Evolutionary Dead-End: Proper Functionalism ………...……...…. 4 3. A Third Way: John Greco's Achieving Knowledge ………………..…. 10 4. A Skill-based Solution to the Generality, and Some Implications of It 15 4.1 Skill-based Reliabilism and the Justification Problem ………... 17 4.2 Skill-based Reliabilism and the Strange and Fleeting Process Problem …………………… 21 Chapter 1: Functionalism Without Proper Function …………………………….. 22 0. Introduction ……………………………………………………..……. 22 1. 'Design' Plans and Selected Effects ………………………………..…. 25 2. Objections to the Selected Effect Theory of Function ……………......... 30 3. Boorse's General Goal Contribution Account of Function …………..... 38 4. Function and Virtue ………………………………………..…………. 45 Chapter 2: A Skill-Based Solution to the Generality Problem …………...………. 53 0. Introduction ……………………………………………………………. 53 1. The Generality Problem, and Previously Proposed Solutions to It ...…. 57 1.1 A Quick Solution to the Generality Problem (Token Reliabilism) …………………………………...…... 59 iii 1.2 A Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem ……..... 61 1.3 The Tri-Lvel/Statistical Relevance Solution to the Generality Problem ………..…………………………. 66 1.4 A Simple Solution to the Generality Problem …………..…... 73 2. Two Theories of Skill-Learning …………………..…………………... 77 2.1 Adams' Open-Loop Theory of Motor Learning .……………… 78 2.2 Anderson's ACT* Theory of Cognitive Architecture …..…... 82 3. A Model of Skill-Learning ………………………..…………………. 85 3.1 Learning and Selection Mechanisms ………………..………. 86 3.2 Maintenance Mechanisms and Simple Control Programs ..… 88 3.3 Activation Mechanisms …………………………………..... 92 4. A Skill-Based Solution to the Generality Problem ……………………. 93 4.1 The Activation Type and the Activation Mechanism ……..… 93 4.2 Selection and Learning Types ……………..………………... 97 4.3 Maintenance and Production Types ………………………….... 102 5. Conee and Feldman's Adequacy Conditions ……………………..……. 106 6. Conclusion ……………………………………………………….......... 112 Chapter 3: Absolute Reliability and Epistemic Strength ……………………..…. 114 Section 0: Introduction ………………..……………………………..…… 114 Section 1: On the Shoulders of Giants …...………………………………. 120 1. The Evolution of Goldman's Theory of Justification ………………..... 120 1.1 "What is Justified Belief?" (1979) ………………………..…. 122 1.1.1 The Benevolent Demon ………………………..…… 125 iv 1.1.2 The Lying Parent …………………………………... 126 1.2 Epistemology and Cognition (1986) ……………………..…... 129 1.2.1 "Normal Worlds" Reliablism ……………………..... 130 1.2.2 "Non-Undermining" Condition …………………..… 131 1.2.3 Primary Justification vs. Secondary Justification 134 1.2.4 Post-Mortem …………………………..…………… 139 1.3 "Strong and Weak Justification" (1988) …………………..…. 141 2. Contextualism ………………………………………………………..... 145 Section 2: A Rough Account of Epistemic Strength ………………..…..... 158 1. From Normal Worlds Reliability to Absolute Reliability, and from Strength of Epistemic Position to Epistemic Strength ………......... 159 2. Simple New Evil Demon Problem Cases …………………………..…. 162 3. Sensitivity to Defeat and the Rule of Belief ………………………….... 165 Section 3: A More Refined Account ……………………..…………........ 167 1. A Regress of Adaptive Mechanisms ………………………………….... 167 2. The Extended Activation Type ……………………………..………… 178 3. 'Demonic' Interference with Skill-Learning …………………................ 180 Section 4: The Nature of Epistemic Strength and the 'Demonic' Creation of Epistemic Agents …………………..… 185 0. Introduction …………………………………….……………………. 185 1. Reasons for the Impossibility of Maximally Strong but Unjustified Beliefs ………………………………..……………... 192 2. The Artificial Brain-in-a-Vat and the "Heaping" Strategy …..………… 202 3. Swampman and the "Splitting" Strategy ……………………….……... 208 v Section 5: Conclusion ………..……………………………….................. 211 Chapter 4: Strange and Fleeting Process Problems ………………………..……… 212 0. Introduction ………………………………………………….……....... 212 1. The Case of the Autistic Twins and Environmentally Sensitive Control Programs ……..……………… 213 2. The Careless Math Student, and the Possibility of Multiple Output Activation Mechanisms ………………………..……………………………………. 225 3. The Possibility of Socially Extended Learning Mechanisms ………..…… 230 4. Norman the Clairvoyant ……………………………………………….... 239 Chapter 5: Concluding Remarks ………………………………………………..… 244 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………….… 256 Vita ……………………………………………………………………………… 260 vi SKILL-BASED RELIABILISM Daniel C. Marshall Dr. Paul Weirich, Dissertation Supervisor ABSTRACT Reliabilism, at its most general, is the claim that a belief has some positive epistemic status (typically justification or knowledge) only if it was formed by a reliable belief-forming process or mechanism. One important problem facing reliabilism is the Generality Problem. The Generality Problem arises because reliability is generally taken to be a property of a type of mechanism or process, and a given token process belongs to as many different types as it has properties. The Generality Problem consists of the task of specifying in a principled manner which of the multitude of types a given belief- forming token-process belongs to is the one whose reliability is relevant to the epistemic project. In this dissertation, I will propose a solution to the Generality Problem. My proposed solution is based on a model of skill-learning which I have developed based on the theories of motor-learning provided by John A. Adams and Richard A. Schmidt, and a theory of cognitive architecture (which focuses on cognitive skills) provided by John R. Anderson. This model is most directly applicable to cases where beliefs are formed by acquired cognitive skills, but it can easily be extended to apply to cases involving innate cognitive instincts, and, with some degree of difficulty, to cases involving belief formation through a process of deliberation. vii I will develop my proposed solution to the Generality Problem in two stages. In the first stage, I will propose a “rough draft” version of the solution. According to this rough draft version, the mechanism type that is relevant to the epistemic project is a mechanism’s activation type. A belief-forming mechanism of a given activation type consists of an activation mechanism which is responsible for activating ‘a’ belief-forming program that is stored at a certain address. This belief-forming program is, at least typically, acted on by learning, selection, and/or maintenance mechanisms, which constrain the degree and manner of how the program can vary from time-slice to time- slice and from world to world. Any belief-forming program (or version of the same program) that is activated by the same activation mechanism belongs to the same activation type. This rough draft solution is incomplete in two ways. First, it provides no way of specifying the epistemically relevant type a given activation mechanism belongs to. Secondly, it provides no obvious reason to think that this type, out of the multitude that a given belief-forming process-token or mechanism-token belong to, is relevant to the epistemic project. These two issues are addressed by a more refined version of my proposed solution, which claims that the type a belief-forming mechanism belongs to which is relevant to the epistemic project is its extended activation type. This type is also identified on the basis of the activation mechanism, but this proposed solution recognizes that the epistemically relevant type of the activation mechanism itself can be specified by some underlying adaptive mechanism