Informal Logic X.2, Spring 1988 Admit No Force But Argument MICHAEL J. WREEN Marquette University Much has been written in recent years I about informal fallacies, and many people, this author included, have wanted to get The article I have in mind appeared in beyond what has been rightly, even if these pages in 1980, and is by Charles somewhat pejoratively, called the standard Kielkopf. Kielkopf thinks, as do I and a treatment of them. Even so, detailed discus­ number of others, that textbook treatments sions of the individual fallacies (or better, of ad baculum are superficial; but, unlike putative fallacies) found in contemporary most of us who share the view, he's gone logic texts are, with the exception of petitio on to offer a diagnosis: the superficiality is principii and argumentum ad hominem, due to "a failure to distinguish between relatively few in number. reading a conclusion primarily as a descrip­ Consider, for example, argumentum tion as opposed to reading it primarily as ad baculum, or appeal to force. Argumen­ a prescription."3 Consider, he says, the tum ad baculum is a fallacy, logic texts following reconstructed argument: often claim, and consists in appealing to Lifting the sanctions [against Zimbabwe­ force in order to prove a point. Somewhat Rhodesia] would be regarded as a more rigorously, the fallacy is said to be hostile act towards Afro-Arab nations. committed if, and only if, "an arguer Afro-Arab nations can produce serious poses a conclusion to another person and economic and political problems for tells that person either implicitly or ex­ the U.S. and Britain in response to plicitly that some harm will come to him hostile acts. or her if he or she does not accept the con­ (Therefore), the U.S. and Britain should clusion" I-that or something similar not lift their sanctions against usually does duty as a definition. But Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 4 besides an example or two of the so-called fallacy and some passages in exercise The conclusion here is certainly sets-passages said to commit the everything I could wish for, since Kielkopf, fallacy-there's little to report on ad unlike the authors of so many logic texts, baculum. The professional literature on has correctly identified not only the conclu­ the argument-type is scant, in other sion of the particular argument under con­ words,2 and so I hope I'll be forgiven for sideration here, but also the proper form of doing what I'm about to do here, namely conclusions of argumenta ad baculum in criticize a recent piece-a good recent general: a 'should' or 'ought' statement, piece-on the argument-type. My excuses with some particular individual or group as are, first, that the piece is a good one the subject of the 'ought' or 'should.' and, second, that I hope to contribute Realizing that that's the form of the con­ something to the ongoing discussion clusion of such arguments itself goes a long of ad baculum and, perhaps by implica­ way toward understanding them and, more tion, other (so-called) informal fallacies importantly, correctly evaluating them. The as well. primary evaluative question to ask of such 90 Michael J. Wreen arguments, given that this is so, will thus Thus I think Kielkopf's reconstruction of be: Do the premises support the particular the argument's premises, though a decid­ 'ought' or 'should' statement being argued ed improvement on textbook treatments of for? That question certainly can't be ad baculum-where all too often no answered by determining whether the per­ reconstruction of premises or conclusion is son offering the argument is threatening so­ offered at all-can itself be improved upon. meone, or appealing to force in some way. (Not that I think that an ad baculum necessarily involves a threat or an appeal II to force; but why I think as much is a tale better told elsewhere. 5) It can be answered What's the verdict on the argument, only by determining, as usual, the eviden­ then? According to Kielkopf, tial relation between premises and a superficial analysis is offered if it is merely conclusion. claimed that the Afro-Arab foreign ministers Moreover, Kielkopf shows a good have argued fallaciously because they understanding of the premises of argumenta threatened the U.S. and Britain. The ad baculum. Good but not perfect, I think. relevance, or irrelevance, of their threats to Even better would be to have whether we should lift the sanctions depends upon how we read the conclusion. If the V. S. and Britain lift the sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, their This is the key to Kielkopf's diagnosis, doing so would be regarded [by then: the conclusion of the argument is am­ biguous, and whether the argument is various nations] as a hostile act, and is so probably lead to serious economic fallacious hangs on how the ambiguity and political problems for the V.S. and resolved. Britain. If we read the conclusion as telling us that The V.S. and Great Britain do not want as a matter of sociological fact our standards such problems; (or better) such or conditions for justifiable lifting of the problems would be an evil the V. S. sanctions have not been met, the appeal to force is fallacious. The fact that we will suf­ and Britain would suffer. fer if we act as if our conditions for lifting as the argument's premises; for then, with the sanctions have been met is not a rele­ a premise like my first, action (in this case, vant reason for concluding that these con­ ditions have not, in fact, been met. So, when the V.S. and Britain's lifting sanctions 'The sanctions should not be lifted' is read against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) and state of as primarily descriptive in the way just sug­ affairs (economic problems of an gested, the ministers' appeals to force are unspecified nature for the U.S. and Britain) fallacious; thcy argue fallaciously in giving are distinguished, but the relation between them while we would reason fallaciously by them captured in a conditional statement. accepting them. Still, the conclusion can be Similarly, the valuational nature of ad read as primarily prescriptive. When [so read], it directs us primarily to act in a cer­ baculum is made explicit by the second tain way, viz., not to lift the sanctions premise, itself a valuational statement, and regardless of whether ... our conditions have one concerning not the action but the state been met. On the primarily prescriptive of affairs mentioned in the preceding reading ... attention focuses on an action with premise. Finally, the inductive nature of ad some probability of being performed. .,. baculum is made evident by the Clearly, what someone else may do to us reconstruction-an important fact, I think, if we act in a certain way is relevant to whether or not we act in that way. The since even if all ad bacula are fallacious, threats of those foreign ministers provide our criteria for thinking so shouldn't be, in relevant reasons for. .. not acting. They do fact have never been, deductive criteria. not argue fallaciously by offering us such No Force But Argument 91 threats nor do we think carelessly if we heed could offer-many have offered, in the past, such reasons, viz., threats. I feel sure-just such an argument. But a second person isn't needed for another Basically, what's being argued here is reason, I think: an argumentum ad baculum that 'The sanctions should not be lifted' isn't can be directed to languageless creatures, well warranted if read descriptively, but that or at least some of them, at least if the no­ it is well warranted if read prescriptively. tion of offering an argument is construed The importance of the distinction between relatively broadly. Upon seeing you ap­ descriptive and prescriptive readings, proaching him with a rolled-up magazine moreover, extends far beyond the case at in hand and anger in eye, Old Bowser, paws hand, Kielkopf thinks, for the results just placed on the top of garbage can, would achieved here can be generalized, further certainly know that he should get a move defended, and applied not just to all ad on. If we think of offering an argument as bacula, but to all arguments with a certain simply offering a reason, or reasons, for a sort of normative conclusion: conclusion, where such offering is concep­ In general, a normative type of conclusion: tual or concept-laden in nature, we can say x should be done, can be read as primarily that the furry one knows that you're argu­ descriptive or... primarily prescriptive. ing (in effect) "Get away from that garbage Read descriptively such a conclusion claims can, and do it fast, or I'll swat you." An that the action x meets certain, usually appeal to his (limited) reason has been unstated and vague, standards. When read descriptively we look to the premises for made, and he knows as much, understands reasons for thinking that. .. action x meets the argument (again in his limited way), these standards. Read prescriptively such a and, we'll say, even acts accordingly. Old conclusion directs us to do x or, if we are Bowser knows that the ad baculum is a good giving the argument, directs our intended one. Not every threatening gesture made in audience to do x. When read prescriptively the direction of every creature need be con­ we look to the premises for reasons for do­ strued as an ad baculum, though, as not ing x; we want consideration of the premises to move us or our audience, i.e., to be a every such gesture is concept-laden.