Draft of 12-28-15 PHIL 138: Responsibility UCSD; Winter 2016 Professor David O. Brink Handout #1: Strawson, Responsibility, and the Reactive Attitudes 1. STRAWSON AND THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES P.F. Strawson’s "Freedom and Resentment" (1962) is a touchstone for many contemporary wrIters on responsibIlIty, especIally those who want to explore connectIons between responsIbIlIty and our reactIve attItudes and emotIons, such as guIlt, shame, and resentment. Strawson begins by introducing two opposing views about the relation between determinism and responsibIlity: pessimism and optimism (59).1 PessImIsm Is an incompatibilist claIm, because It sees the truth of determInism as InconsIstent wIth the ascrIptIon of responsIbIlIty. NotIce that pessImIsm needn't be pessImIstIc or skeptIcal about responsIbilIty If It rejects determInIsm and embraces lIbertarIanIsm. OptImIsts, by contrast, are compatibilists, because they claIm that moral responsIbIlIty Is compatIble with determInIsm. NotIce that optImIsm, In this sense, could come In many flavors, corresponding to different ways of making out the compatIbIlIst claIm. But Strawson also focuses on a narrower optImIst claIm, one that reconcIles determInIsm with responsIbIlIty by focusIng on an instrumental justification of practIces of praise and blame. On thIs vIew, praIse and blame and punIshment are justifIed In a forward-looking way by the way these reactIons mInImIZe future harm by the wrongdoer, deter wrongdoIng by others, and shape the attItudes of wrongdoers and others so as to produce better behavioral outcomes In the future (60- 61). Strawson Is famously crItIcal of this InstrumentalIst varIety of optImIsm. HIs claIm Is that the instrumentalist appeals to the wrong sort of reason for praise and blame (61-62). Indeed, one mIght thInk that the InstrumentalIst Is really an IncompatibIlIst who Is skeptical about responsIbIlIty but nonetheless thinks that our practIces of praIse and blame mIght be useful fIctIons. If so, we mIght doubt whether InstrumentalIsm Is best conceIved as a form of optImIsm. One questIon Is whether forward-lookIng ratIonales, as such, are the wrong sort of reason, or whether the problem Is wIth a specIfIcally Instrumental ratIonale. ThIs Issue may affect our assessment of Strawson’s own account of whether and, If so, how the reactIve attItudes can be justified (see §5 below). 2. THE TRADITIONAL DEBATE Strawson apparently wants to defend a non-instrumental conception of optimism and do so in a way that bypasses traditional debates about freedom of the wIll and determInIsm. However, to apprecIate thIs claim, we need to understand that tradItIonal debate. Often, that debate Is framed In terms of the compatibIlIty of freedom of the wIll and the truth of causal determInIsm -- the thesIs that every event Is determIned or necessItated by the laws of nature and the prIor hIstory of the world. CompatIbIlIsts, sometImes called soft determinists, InsIst that freedom Is compatIble wIth the truth of causal determInIsm, whereas IncompatibIlIsts InsIst that the two are not compatible. That means that IncompatIbIlIsts who are also determinIsts are hard determinists, embracIng skeptIcIsm about free wIll. However, some IncompatIbIlIsts are libertarians, rejectIng determInIsm and embracIng IndetermInIsm. But whereas some regard lIbertarIanIsm as one form of realIsm about free will, others think that indeterminism cannot ground responsibility, because we cannot be responsible for uncaused choIces, and so regard lIbertarianIsm as a dIfferent kInd of skeptIcism about freedom. We can represent some of these possIbIlItIes dIagrammatIcally. 1 Page numbers are Indexed to the reprIntIng In Free Will, ed. G. Watson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). 2 Freedom of the WIll/ResponsIbIlIty CompatIbIlIsm IncompatibIlIsm (Soft DetermInIsm; CompatIbIlIst RealIsm) LibertarIanIsm FW/R SkeptIcism (Hard DetermInIsm) LibertarIan RealIsm LibertarIan SkeptIcIsm Many parties to the traditional debates assocIate freedom of the wIll and responsIbIlIty; they eIther identify the two or understand freedom of the will as whatever qualIty of the wIll Is needed for responsibIlIty. So many compatIbIlIsts belIeve that both freedom and responsIbIlIty are compatIble with determInIsm, and many free wIll skeptics are also skeptics about responsIbIlIty. However, some writers dIstInguIsh between freedom and responsIbIlIty. Perhaps the most famous such position is that of Harry Frankfurt in “Alternate PossIbIlItIes and Moral ResponsIbIlIty” (1969), where he combInes skeptIcIsm about freedom and realIsm about responsIbilIty.2 Frankfurt descrIbes a case In which someone seems to be responsIble despIte lacking the freedom to do otherwIse. In the standard such case, the agent Is InclIned to act In a certaIn way for certaIn reasons and does, but there Is a failsafe or backup device In the form of a counterfactual intervener of some sort that would Intervene In the agent’s lIfe to ensure that she acts In that way and for those reasons if she didn’t do It of her own accord. For Instance, Jack Is the counterfactual Intervener In Sam’s plan to kill the mayor (29). The classIc Frankfurt-style case then Is when Sam decIdes to kIll the mayor and proceeds to do so of hIs own accord, wIthout any InterventIon by Jack. In this case, Sam seems to lack alternate possibilities, because there’s no alternative In whIch Sam doesn’t kIll the mayor. But Frankfurt InsIsts plausIbly that we judge Sam responsIble for the kIllIng In the actual scenario In whIch he acts of hIs own accord wIth no InterventIon from Jack. Such cases seem to show that there can be moral responsibIlIty In the absence of alternate possIbilItIes and freedom of the wIll. Frankfurt Is responding to somethIng lIke thIs argument for incompatibilism. 1. Moral responsIbIlIty requIres freedom of the wIll. 2. Freedom of the wIll presupposes the prIncIple of alternative possibilities (PAP) that says that a free agent must have been able to act otherwIse than she in fact did. 3. Causal determInIsm is inconsistent with PAP. 4. Hence, causal determInIsm Is IncompatIble wIth moral responsIbIlIty. Frankfurt-style cases supposedly gIve us reason to reject (1) and so avoId the IncompatIbIlIst conclusIon. 2 Harry Frankfurt, “AlternatIve PossibIlItIes and Moral ResponsibIlIty” Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969): 829- 39. 3 1. In Frankfurt-style cases, the agent Is responsible when she chooses to act, despIte the fact that the exIstence of the counterfactual Intervener means that she could not have acted otherwIse. 2. Freedom of the wIll presupposes PAP. 3. Causal determInIsm Is InconsIstent wIth PAP. 4. Hence, responsIbIlIty does not requIre freedom of the wIll. Where does Strawson fIt Into these tradItIonal debates? On one readIng, Strawson Is just a certaIn kind of compatIbilIst (soft determInist), who eschews both instrumentalism and compatibilist metaphysIcs. However, on another readIng, we mIght see Strawson as agreeIng wIth Frankfurt In general terms that responsIbIlIty does not requIre any metaphysIcal claims about freedom of the will, because responsIbIlIty and freedom are distInct concepts. 3. THE REACTIVE ATTITUDES Strawson's sympathIes lIe wIth optImIsm (compatibIlIsm), broadly construed. But sInce he sides wIth the pessimIst agaInst the Instrumental optImIst, he must fInd another way forward. HIs proposal Is to focus on the reactive attitudes and the way they medIate Interpersonal relatIonshIps. The reactIve attItudes are or Involve emotIonal responses typIcally directed to someone in the context of somethIng that person has done. We tend to focus on reactIve attItudes dIrected toward another, but there doesn’t seem to be any reason they couldn’t be self-directed. ReactIve attItudes include malIce, contempt, love, prIde, gratItude, anger, resentment, IndIgnatIon, and forgIveness (62-63, 66). These seem to be examples of a larger and potentially heterogeneous class, rather than an exhaustIve lIst (64). Not all reactIve attItudes have a direct connectIon wIth praIse and blame and responsIbIlIty. ConsIder regret. Bernard WIllIams descrIbes the case of a truck drIver who, through no fault of his own, hits and kIlls a child who has darted Into the street.3 As WIllIams claIms, It Is approprIate for the drIver to feel a kInd of agent-regret at beIng the Instrument of the chIld’s death, whIch Is dIstInct both from the regret or horror that bystanders mIght feel and from guIlt for havIng been responsible for wrongdoIng. Agent-regret seems to be a reactIve attItude that does not presuppose responsibIlIty. To understand responsIbilIty, we should focus on a subset of reactIve attItudes that are moralized and Involve praise and blame.4 ConsIder the difference between anger and resentment. I may be upset or even angry wIth a small chIld who carelessly damages a treasured keepsake, but It would be InapproprIate to resent hIm or to be IndIgnant at hIm. Resentment may Involve anger or related emotIons but It also seems to Involve or presuppose the belIef that one has been treated wrongly. But thIs moral belIef would be an InapproprIate thought as applIed to a small chIld. The proposal to see what lIght the reactive attitudes shed on the optimIsm/pessImIsm debate makes most sense If we focus on thIs narrower class of reactIve attItudes that are moralIZed. We mIght also dIstInguIsh wIthIn the class of moralIZed reactIve attItudes between those that are thick and those that are thin. ThIck reactIve attItudes, such as gratItude or prIde, are ones that are tightly tied to particular contexts and relationshIps