View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Wolverhampton Intellectual Repository and E-theses THE INFLUENCE OF THE BOER WAR (1899 – 1902) ON THE TACTICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULAR BRITISH ARMY 1902 – 1914 SPENCER JONES BA, MPhil. A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the University of Wolverhampton for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy June 2009 This work or any part thereof has not previously been presented in any form to the University or to any other body whether for the purposes of assessment, publication or for any other purpose (unless otherwise indicated). Save for any express acknowledgements, references and/or bibliographies cited in the work, I confirm that the intellectual content of the work is the result of my own efforts and of no other person. The right of Spencer Jones to be identified as author of this work is asserted in accordance with ss.77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. At this date copyright is owned by the author. Signature: Date: 1 Abstract This thesis examines the influence of the Boer War 1899 – 1902 upon tactics and training in the regular British Army 1902 – 1914. The work argues that several key lessons drawn from South Africa became the tactical cornerstones for infantry, artillery and cavalry throughout the pre-First World War period and shaped the performance of the B.E.F. during the early battles of 1914. The experience of combat against well armed opposition in the Boer War prompted the British Army to develop improved tactics in each of the three major service arms. For example, infantry placed new emphasis on dispersion and marksmanship; cavalry improved their dismounted work and reconnaissance skills; and artillery adopted methods of concealment and strove to improve accuracy and co-ordination. Across the army as a whole, the experience of combat lead to an overall downgrading of the importance of drill and obedience, replacing it instead with tactical skill and individual initiative. In addition, the thesis also examines the impact of the Boer War upon overall British Army doctrine and ethos. The process of reform prior to the First World War was marked by wide ranging debates upon the value of the South African experience, and not all lessons drawn from the conflict endured, with tactical restructuring being further complicated by changes of government and financial restrictions. Nevertheless, key lessons such as dispersion, marksmanship, concealment and firepower were ultimately retained and proved to be of great value during initial clashes against the Germans in 1914. Additionally, the Boer War caused the British to place new emphasis upon overall training of the individual, allowing advanced tactical skills to be inculcated more easily than had been possible in earlier years. However, the short duration of the conventional period of the Boer War meant that there was less opportunity to derive operational lessons for future employment. Furthermore, the colonial policing role of the British Army and the likelihood of small scale deployments meant that developing an operational doctrine was of less immediate value than ensuring flexibility and tactical skill. This meant that the British Army took a somewhat skewed developmental path in the 1902 – 1914. The process of reform ultimately produced a highly adaptable force that was tactically skilled, but which was ill-prepared for the operational complications posed by large scale deployment. While the Boer War was the principal factor in driving reform during the 1902 – 1914 period, there were additional influences at work, including examples from the Russo-Japanese War 1904 – 1905 and various ideas drawn from the armies of the continent. However, this thesis argues that while these outside influences contributed to ongoing debate, they did not offer any particular fresh ideas and were therefore of less importance than the Boer War in shaping British Army development. 2 Contents Introduction and Literature Review......................................................................5 Chapter One: Doctrine and Ethos ......................................................................30 Chapter Two: Infantry........................................................................................59 Chapter Three: Artillery.....................................................................................96 Chapter Four: Cavalry......................................................................................138 Conclusions.......................................................................................................172 Bibliography......................................................................................................184 3 Acknowledgements My thesis would not have been possible without the support and assistance offered by a number of individuals. In particular, my supervisory team of Prof. John Buckley and Dr. Stephen Badsey have been excellent throughout my studies, offering sound guidance and timely advice. Their support throughout was unstinting and invaluable. I would also like to extend my thanks to a number of other academics who have contributed to my studies. These include Dr. Howard J. Fuller for reading drafts of my work and providing a great deal of encouragement; Dr. Nicholas Evans for supplying an electronic copy of this own thesis at extremely short notice and taking the time to discuss his research with me; and Prof. Fransjohan Pretorius, who offered a number of tips and inadvertently caused me to realise that I required a considerable amount of extra work before my thesis could even approach completion! Away from academia, I would like to thank my friends, who have been rocks of support throughout the course of my studies. While there are too many names to list in full, I would like to offer particular thanks to Rich, Leeann, Andy and Jon for always being ready to listen, sympathise and, above all, encourage. Last but by no means least, I would like to express my gratitude to my parents, for offering timely financial assistance and endless moral encouragement. During the most difficult periods of my research, their love and support ensured that I did not abandon my studies. 4 Introduction and Literature Review The 1902 – 1914 period was one of the most critical in the history of the development of the British Army to that date. In the twelve years between the end of the Boer War and the outbreak of the First World War, the army underwent vast and important organisational and tactical reforms that ultimately produced, in the words of historian John Dunlop, “...incomparably the best trained, best organised, and best equipped British Army which ever went forth to war.” 1 The Boer War 1899 – 1902 played an important part in creating this elite force. The shock of battlefield defeat dispelled the aura of complacency that had settled over the British Army during the years of easy victories against crudely armed foes during the Victorian era. Faced with determined and well armed opponents in unusual climatic conditions, the British were forced to confront the key tactical problem of how to cross the fire swept zone in an age of smokeless ammunition and magazine rifles. The shock of new conditions led to a series of disturbing defeats in the early part of the war. Although the army was ultimately able to adapt and overcome the Boers, the duration and cost of the war led to public outcry and searching introspection within the military. Furthermore, the hostile attitude of continental powers such as France, Germany and Russia during the war left Britain feeling especially vulnerable. In this respect, the conflict in South Africa provided the key impetus to undertake a thorough overhaul of the British Army in the years following the end of the conflict. However, while many historians have identified the Boer War as being a catalyst for change and reform in the British Army, this has tended to focus upon organisational level reform, as characterised by the creation of the Territorial Army and the General Staff. 2 Other writers have commented upon the tactical skill demonstrated by the British in 1914, but have neglected or referred only in passing to the role of the Boer War in developing the army to this level. 3 Some historians have even seen the South Africa experience as a negative influence. 4 The comparative lack of detailed study of the influence of the Boer War upon tactics in the 1902 – 1914 period represents a gap in the historiography. This in turn has led to recent historical studies of the B.E.F. of 1914 offering only vague assertions that the Boer War had played a role in tactical reform. 5 Therefore, it is the aim of this thesis to analyse the extent to which the bitter conflict in South Africa shaped the tactical and operational development of the British Army 1902 - 1914. 1 Dunlop, John, The Development of the British Army 1899-1914 (Methuen, London, 1938) p.305 2 Teagarden, Ernest, Haldane at the War Office: A Study in Organization and Management , (New York, Gordon Press, 1976); Tyler, J.E., The British Army and the Continent 1904-1914 (London, Edward Arnold & Co, 1938); Bryce Poe II, “British Army Reforms 1902 – 1914” in Military Affairs 31(3), 1967, pp.131 - 138 3 For example, Terraine, John, Mons: The Retreat to Victory (Ware, Wordsworth Editions, 2000 reprint) 4 Searle, G.R, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought 1899-1914 (Oxford, Basil