Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories ORGANIZING FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT Evaluating India’s Experience in Three Case Studies Shyam Saran States are increasingly confronted with various unexpected emergencies that affect the welfare of their citizens. In liberal democracies such as India, the added challenge of intense media scrutiny often complicates the handling of crisis situations. Therefore, it is prudent to have institutional mechanisms such as a crisis management group in place to respond promptly and efficiently to crises and remain engaged until tensions recede to more manageable levels. Such mechanisms need well-rehearsed drills that can be implemented with- out delay and with designated officials and agencies preassigned their respec- tive responsibilities. Additional officials/agencies may be brought in as needed. Having such mechanisms in place also ensures constant evaluation and learn- ing. The absence of such mechanisms or bypassing them when situations arise may negatively impact appropriate crisis handling. It has also been seen that an overarching national security doctrine that could provide a template for a whole-of-government approach — something modern crises demand — is a fundamental prerequisite. This approach has so far been missing in India, lead- ing to a pervasive reliance upon ad hoc means for dealing with crises. This essay first unpacks India’s systems and institutions of crisis management and then evaluates their role in three cases from India, one of crisis manage- ment success and two of crisis management failures. India successfully handled a hostage situation involving three Indian truck drivers in Iraq in August 2004 but employed incoherent and uncoordinated responses toward two other crises — one involving a major terrorist attack on India’s commercial capital Mumbai in November 2008 and a later attack in January 2016 on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot. The author selected these cases because he was personally involved in the first as India’s foreign secretary and was a close witness during the Mumbai incident as part of the Prime Minister’s Office. For this reason, there is substantial information provided for the first case, less for the second, and only anecdotal details in the third, as the author witnessed it from outside the government decision-making process. The essay distills several important shortcomings related to personnel, priorities, and governance revealed in the cases that need to be addressed. Finally, the essay reflects on the importance of Ambassador Shyam Saran, Senior Fellow at the Center for Policy Research, is a former Foreign Secretary of India. 57 OrganizingforCrisisManagement transparent evaluative assessments like the Kargil Review Committee Report and its continued relevance today for more effective Indian crisis management in the future. Crisis Management System in the Indian State The Indian state has a well-established crisis management system both at the central and state levels. At the center, there is a Crisis Management Group (CMG) headed by the Cabinet secretary, the senior-most civil servant in the country. The CMG has a standing membership that includes senior officials of key ministries, intelligence agencies, and armed and paramilitary forces. As foreign secretary, the author was invited to participate whenever there was an external dimension to an emerging threat or a crisis that unexpectedly erupt- ed. Similar CMGs exist at the state level, where it is the chief secretary — the senior-most civil servant at the state level — who heads the group and whereto all key government functionaries are represented. In both cases, there may be additional functionaries or other senior officials from different ministries and agencies of the government that may get co-opted depending upon the nature of the crisis. For example, in case of an epidemic the head of the Directorate General of Health Services may be invited; if there is a hijacking situation, the head of the Directorate General of Civil Aviation may be called upon to assist the CMG. The state chief secretary or his representative may be invited to attend the center-level CMG if the crisis takes place in a particular state or involves res- idents of that state. In addition, depending upon the specific situation, a specific ministry or agency may set up its own CMG on an ad hoc basis under a senior official to help coordinate responses to a crisis at its own level. For example, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) does this quite often when evacuating its citizens from theatres in the Persian Gulf affected by violence. In turn, the Cabinet secretary remains in close touch with the Prime Minister’s Office, particularly the national security advisor (NSA) and the principal sec- retary to the prime minister. The Cabinet secretary will also directly brief the prime minster on the unfolding situation. There is also a Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), which is headed by the prime minister but includes the external affairs minister, the defense minister, the home minister, and the finance minister as permanent members. Other ministers may be invited depending upon the nature of the crisis or emergency. The Cabinet secretary is the secretary of the CCS. The NSA also attends the CCS meetings. If necessary, the CCS may ask the heads of the intelligence agencies and the chiefs of the three armed forces to brief its members. The CCS meets to consider, at the apex political level, any serious threat to national security. The inputs from the CMG then feed into the deliberations of the CCS. CCS deci- sions are Cabinet decisions, and the Cabinet secretary will issue them as formal documents of the Cabinet. 58 Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories It is important to note that the Cabinet secretary does not need any permission from any other authority to convene the CMG and may convene it whenever the situation demands it. However, he would apprise the prime minister and the NSA that he has done so and work in close consultation with them. The NSA may attend the CMG meetings as an invitee, but decisions taken at the CMG are with the authority of the Cabinet secretary. These decisions are executed promptly since all heads of key executing agencies are represented in the group. This also ensures the assignment of accountability in case of any lapse. The Cabinet Secretariat headed by the Cabinet secretary maintains an up-to- date directory of all key functionaries of the government, including their tele- phone numbers, mobile numbers, and official and residential addresses. The same is repeated at the state level where the chief secretary’s office will maintain similar directories. Therefore, it is easy to contact all members of the CMG and any special invitees whenever it must be convened. The Cabinet Secretariat is a repository of the minutes of all its previous meetings and standard drills, which may have evolved to deal with particular categories of crises. For example, an anti-hijacking drill drawn up after very extensive and detailed deliberations provides considerable detail on how the state apparatus should respond in case of the hijacking of an Indian aircraft. The importance of having such drills — meant to be regularly updated to reflect recent events, developments in technology, and experiences in other countries — is that most operational issues do not require ad hoc decisions when an emergency arises. The NSA and the political leadership are then free to deal with larger issues that go beyond the handling of the crisis itself. The management of media coverage of a rapidly evolving situation — account- ing for the highly competitive and constant TV reporting in a country with a very assertive free press — is an essential part of crisis management. There are certain standard procedures that have already been implemented. For example, locations of terrorist attacks or any other calamity are required to be cordoned off by local police immediately, and the press is kept at the outer perimeter at all times. Press statements are made only by designated press spokesmen both at the central and state level and the CMG usually collectively decides the content of such statements. In cases with an external dimension, the MEA will normally take on the responsibility of conducting such briefings. In addition, there may be off-the-record briefings given to senior editors and journalists to confiden- tially provide them background on a particular situation. India’s crisis management system is a well-established institutional structure with carefully crafted protocols and procedures. It is designed to deal with emergent security threats and crises once they erupt. The operational drills permit immediate responses so that senior security and the political leadership can then deal with larger issues and focus on elements for which existing drills 59 OrganizingforCrisisManagement may be inadequate. In theory, executing agencies know their respective re- sponsibilities, reducing to a minimum turf battles and the scope for ad hoc and sometimes ill-considered actions. The detailed meeting records of the CMG and the CCS permit careful evaluation and learning for the future and become the basis for modifying and improving existing drills. However, these drills are not always followed and discretionary actions are more often the rule rather than the exception despite having these mechanisms in place. Indian Crisis Management across Three Cases Three cases — the 2004 Iraq hostage crisis, the 2008 Mumbai crisis, and the 2016 Pathankot attack — reveal how Indian policymakers have both opted and neglected to use established crisis management institutional architecture and the resulting consequences. Case One: Iraq Hostage Crisis On July 21, 2004, news emerged from the Indian Embassy in Kuwait that an Iraqi militant group calling itself the Holders of the Black Banners had taken hostage three Indian nationals employed by a Kuwaiti transport company, Kuwait and Gulf Link Transport Co.
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