Quantum information theoretic approach to the mind{brain problem Danko D. Georgieva,∗ aInstitute for Advanced Study, 30 Vasilaki Papadopulu Str., Varna 9010, Bulgaria Abstract The brain is composed of electrically excitable neuronal networks regulated by the activity of voltage-gated ion channels. Further portraying the molecular composition of the brain, however, will not reveal anything remotely reminiscent of a feeling, a sensation or a conscious experience. In classical physics, addressing the mind{brain problem is a formidable task because no physical mechanism is able to explain how the brain generates the unobservable, inner psychological world of conscious experiences and how in turn those conscious experiences steer the underlying brain processes toward desired behavior. Yet, this setback does not establish that consciousness is non-physical. Modern quantum physics affirms the interplay between two types of physical entities in Hilbert space: unobservable quantum states, which are vectors describing what exists in the physical world, and quantum observables, which are operators describing what can be observed in quantum measurements. Quantum no-go theorems further provide a framework for studying quantum brain dynamics, which has to be governed by a physically admissible Hamiltonian. Comprising consciousness of unobservable quantum information integrated in quantum brain states explains the origin of the inner privacy of conscious experiences and revisits the dynamic timescale of conscious processes to picosecond conformational transitions of neural biomolecules. The observable brain is then an objective construction created from classical bits of information, which are bound by Holevo's theorem, and obtained through the measurement of quantum brain observables. Thus, quantum information theory clarifies the distinction between the unobservable mind and the observable brain, and supports a solid physical foundation for consciousness research. Keywords: brain, conscious experience, qualia, quantum information, Holevo's theorem Highlights • Psychological inner world remains private and unobservable from a third-person perspective. • Physiological brain activity due to electric excitations of neuronal networks is observable. • Quantum information theory makes a distinction between physical states and observables. • Unobservable quantum information built in quantum brain states comprises consciousness. • The observable brain is constructed from bits of information constrained by Holevo's theorem. arXiv:2012.07836v1 [q-bio.NC] 13 Dec 2020 ∗Corresponding author Email address: [email protected] (Danko D. Georgiev) Preprint submitted to Progress in Biophysics & Molecular Biology August 2, 2020 1. Introduction The essence of consciousness is experience (Nagel, 1974, 1987, 2012). Through conscious experiences such as the perceived colors of the rainbow, the pleasant sound of a musical instrument, the fresh smell of the sea breeze, or the wet touch of the water, we access the surrounding physical world and become aware of our own bodies (Georgiev, 2017). The introspective access to our conscious experiences is privately reserved only for us from a subjective, phenomenal, first-person perspective, and it is denied to others who happen to observe us from an objective, third-person perspective (Nagel, 1974, 1987, 2012). It is an empirical fact that the very process of observation of someone else's brain does not elicit in us experiences that are identical with those experienced by the observed brain (Georgiev, 2020). Consequently, we do not have at our disposal an objective method to determine whether any other living or non-living physical system is conscious or not. The unobservability of conscious experiences does not prevents us from being able to specify the particular subject whose experiences we are talking about, or to characterize the physical circumstances under which certain conscious experiences are elicited (Georgiev, 2017, 2020); for example, dolphins' double sonar experience of reflected ultrasound waves used for hunting prey or orientation in their natural habitat (Starkhammar et al., 2011; Branstetter et al., 2012; Jensen et al., 2013; Ridgway et al., 2015; Ladegaard et al., 2019). But this is the most we can do. We are unable to describe in words and communicate to others what it is like to have those experiences. Thus, conscious experiences are fundamentally unobservable and their phenomenal qualia are incommunicable (Georgiev, 2020). Since we have direct access to our own conscious experiences, we know that there is at least one conscious entity in the physical universe. From our shared evolutionary ancestry with other humans or animal species (Darwin, 2006; Dawkins, 2004; Stringer & Galway-Witham, 2017; Hublin et al., 2017; Chan et al., 2019), we also have solid scientific grounds to maintain that we are not the only conscious entity in existence. Therefore, the primary aim of a physical theory of consciousness is to provide criteria that will allow unambiguous specification of which physical systems are conscious and which are not. Once the conscious mind is physically identified, the physical laws will regulate how the mind affects the world (Georgiev, 2017). It should be noted that consciousness, conscious experience, conscious state, mental state and mind are used interchangeably throughout this work. A mental process (conscious process) is a process that involves a sequence of mental states (i.e. dynamically changing conscious experiences). The seat of the human mind is the brain cortex. Cortical electric activity is mainly due to excitation of principal pyramidal neurons, which comprise over 70% of all cortical neurons (Fig.1). Pyramidal neurons were designated as the `psychic cells' of the brain by the father of modern neuroscience Ram´ony Cajal since their electric activities instantiate feelings (Goldman-Rakic, 2002). Substantial medical evidence supports a cohesive relationship between the brain cortical electric excitation and the conscious mind because direct electric stimulation of the brain cortex elicits sensations (Bosking et al., 2017b; Hiremath et al., 2017; Yoshor et al., 2007), whereas discrete cortical lesions impair cognitive abilities or change the way one experiences the world (Chen et al., 2017; Hadid & Lepore, 2017; Sajja et al., 2017; Lau & London, 2018). For example, direct electric stimulation of the visual cortex through implanted electrodes that deliver digitized signals captured by a camera is capable of restoring the vision in blind patients whose eyes were injured by trauma (Dobelle, 2000; Bosking et al., 2017a; Lewis & Rosenfeld, 2016), while various injuries to the occipital lobe of the cortex produce blindness (Hadid & Lepore, 2017; Chen et al., 2017; Sajja et al., 2017). Apparently, the mind and the brain are not identical, because anesthetized brains do not generate conscious experiences. In the course of general anesthesia consciousness is erased by the pharmacological action of the anesthetic drug, yet the experimenter may stimulate with visible light the open eyes of anesthetized animals and still evoke electric potentials by pyramidal neurons located in the primary visual cortex (Lamme et al., 1998; Imas et al., 2005; Sellers et al., 2015; Hudetz & Imas, 2007). Similar experiments in anesthetized human subjects showed evoked electroencephalographic (McNeer et al., 2009) or electrocorticographic (Nourski et al., 2017) responses under auditory stimulation. If mind states were related to brain states through one- to-one correspondence (logical identity relation), it should not have been possible to turn mental states on or off using general anesthetics, because the brain states would have always remained mental states. Thus, the mind{brain problem is to explain how the unobservable conscious mind and the observable brain relate to each other: do they interact or does one unilaterally generate the other? 2 brain cortical neurons rose EEG conscious experience Figure 1: The mind{brain problem. Neither the brain cortex whose anatomy can be observed during an open skull surgery, nor the cortical electric activity recorded by electroencephalography (EEG) resemble the visual conscious experience elicited by observation of a red rose. Explaining the physical relationship between the observable brain and the unobservable mind has troubled philosophers for centuries. Modified from Georgiev(2020). The unobservability and incommunicability of conscious experiences has been marshaled as evidence for the nonphysical nature of consciousness (Robinson, 1976; Jackson, 1982, 1986; Sprigge, 1994; Chalmers, 1995, 1996; Zhao, 2012) and the alleged inadequacy of physics to answer questions related to our mentality and sentience (Nagel, 1965; Kim, 1998; Campbell & Bickhard, 2011). Such a view is often grounded in the principles of classical physics according to which everything inside the physical world is observable, governed by deterministic physical laws, and causally closed in regard to its time dynamics with respect to non-physical entities (Susskind & Hrabovsky, 2013). Classical reductionism fails because reductive identification of unobservable consciousness with observable physical properties is logically inconsistent. According to the postulates of classical physics (including classical mechanics, electromagnetism, and Einstein's theory of relativity) all existing things are physical and all physical entities are observable. In other words, by logical contraposition, it follows that