Notes 1 Birth of a Nation 1. This list includes: the UN Secretary-General’s legal adviser, high-level UNFICYP military personnel and also the UN Under-Secretary General for Special Political Affairs. This earlier research providing background to political and security issues is combined with more recent (transcripted) interviews with officials in the banking, legal and political establishment closest to the events surrounding the bail-in negotiations of 2013–2013. See John Theodorides, ‘Legal Aspects of United Nations Peace Keep- ing Operations with Special Reference to Cyprus and the Middle East 1964–1979’ The subject of a LLM Thesis in Public International Law The University of Manchester, December 1979. 2. EOKA is an acronym of Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston,orthe ‘National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters’. 3. Kyriacos Markides, ‘Social Change and the Rise and Decline of Social Movements: The Case of Cyprus’, American Ethnologist, I (1974), pp. 309–330. 4. Treaty of Establishment 16th August 1960. See http://www.mfa.gr/ images/docs/kypriako/treaty_of_establishment.pdf 5. For more background see http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/special- research-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-4474149.php?print=true 6. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/page-3-the-law.en.mfa 7. UN Charter Article 1(2) 8. See Polyvious Polyviou, Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960–1980, London: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc, 1981), p. 14ff. 9. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Moran%20-%20UN%2064%20-%20pt2. html 10. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Moran%20-%20UN%2064%20-%20pt2. html 11. Paragraph 129 of the Report of the Secretary General, March 1965. 12. S. A. De Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (London: Steven and Sons, 1964), p. 285. 13. Op. cit., p. 296. 14. For more on this see http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/patrick%20chp% 204%20pt%202.html 15. The fighting in Nicosia during December 1963 is outlined in the 21– 31 December issues of the Cyprus Mall, Cyprus Bulletin, and the Special News Bulletin. Secondary sources include: Stephens, 1966, pp. 181–185; C. Foley, 1964, pp. 168–171. 16. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/Ball%20-%2064.html 17. Joseph S. Joseph, ‘Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics’, (London: St Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 66. 145 146 Notes 18. The General Assembly adopted on 18 December 1965 Resolution 2077 (XX), for which see http://www.hri.org/Cyprus/Cyprus_Problem/ UNdocs/gad2077.html 19. UNFICYP was established by Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) 20. Galo Plaza report 1965 para. 72, http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/ galo%20plaza%20-%20pt%203.html 21. Galo Plaza report 1965 para. 73, http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/ galo%20plaza%20-%20pt%203.html 22. Galo Plaza report 1965 para. 153, http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/ galo%20plaza%20-%20pt%203.html 23. Polyvios Polyviou, Cyprus In Search of a Constitution: Constitutional Negotiations and Proposals, 1960–1975 (Nicosia, 1976). 24. Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espi- onage and the Turkish Invasion (London: I. B. Tauris, 1999), offers a dissenting opinion in considerable detail. 25. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/what-jim-knew-and- henry-did/148781.article 26. In July 1974 a low level shuttle diplomacy by Joseph Sisco, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs to Athens and Ankara failed to do more than avert open warfare between Greece and Turkey and failed to halt the invasion. 27. Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (eds.), Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001) ,p.13. 28. Polyviou, p. 48. 29. http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.html 2 Forever Divided? 1. William Mallison, Cyprus: A Modern History (London: I.B Tauris, 2005), p. 81. 2. Eric Solsten (ed.), Cyprus: A Country Study (Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1991), pp. 35–37. 3. Alexandros Nafpliotis, Britain and the Greek Colonels: Accommodating the Junta in the Cold War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012). 4. U.S. critics of the coup included then-Senator Lee Melcalf, who criticised the Johnson Administration for providing aid to a ‘military regime of collaborators and Nazi sympathisers’. 5. Solsten, p. 32. 6. Andrew Borowiec, The Mediterranean Feud (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983). 7. http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911440,00.html 8. Christos Kassimeris, ‘Greek Response to the Cyprus Invasion’, Small Wars and Insurgencies, XIX (2008), pp. 256–273. 9. UN Resolution 186 (1964), extended and modified after the invasion under Resolution 383 (1975). 10. S/11900; S/11568; S/11717; S/11789/ S/12253 (UN Security Council Resolutions for 1975). Notes 147 11. Transcript of interview held June 2nd 2014. 12. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/20/newsid_3866 000/3866521.stm 13. Art 1V of the Treaty of Guarantee, ‘In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserve the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present treaty.’ 14. Even if unilateral was permitted under the Treaty, it would have been of a temporary nature to restore constitutional order. Concerted action by all three guaranteeing powers was the rightful way forward in exercising the terms of the treaty. 15. Specifically the North Atlantic Treaty, the foundational agreement of NATO, signed in Washington, D.C. on 4th April 1949. 16. The nearest Greek Airforce base in Crete was 400 miles from Cyprus giving it a distinct military disadvantage. 17. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/what-jim-knew-and- henry-did/148781.article 18. In a letter to the editor published in The Economist, Feb 1975, the author argued that the Turkish Cypriots were the minority numerically but were the ‘majority’ in respect of fire power because of the Turkish army dominance. 19. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/what-jim-knew-and- henry-did/148781.article 20. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/what-jim-knew-and- henry-did/148781.article 21. AKEL only held power as part of a coalition until being elected to govern in its own right in 2008. 22. For which see Craig and O’ Malley. 23. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal: The Concluding Volume of His Mem- oirs (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999). See also Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger (London: Verso, 1997). 24. http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/features/what-jim-knew-and- henry-did/148781.article 25. Notable under the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, ratified in August 1920. For more on this see Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sèvres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919–1920 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1974). 26. Meltem Muftuler-Bac and Aylin Guney, ‘The European Union and the Cyprus Problem, 1961–2003,’ Middle Eastern Studies, XXI (2005), pp. 281–293, quote on p. 285. 27. Commission of the European Communities opinion on the Applica- tion by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, Com (93) 313 Final. Published 30th June 1998. 28. Report of the UN Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 28 May 2004(S/2004/437), Paragraph 61. Talat refers to the strong involvement of Greece and Turkey in the negotiations of core 148 Notes security issues like the presence of Greek and Turkish troops, an interna- tional force or the Treaty of Guarantee. 29. Annex 1X, ‘Coming into Being of the New State of Affairs’, Article 6, p. 138 specifies the new steps in the relationship with the EU of the unified state, ‘Upon entry into force of the Foundation Agreement, the Co-Presidents shall through the attached letter inform the European Union of the coming into being of the new state of affairs and the commitment of the United Cyprus Republic to assume all rights and obligations arising from the Treaty of Accession. The Co-Presidents shall also request the European Union to endorse the Foundation Agreement and to accommodate its terms in line with the principles on which the European Union is founded and adopt special measures for the Turkish Cypriot State. They shall furthermore request that the final outcomes will result in the adaptation of primary law and ensure legal certainty and security within the European Union legal system for all concerned.’ Published online at http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/AnnexIX/AnnexIX. pdf 30. Op. cit., Article 1.1, p. 137. 31. Nathalie Tocci, ‘Reflections on Post-referendum Cyprus’, The Inter- national Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs (2008), published online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/ 03932720408457082 32. Varnava, A., & Faustmann, B (Eds.) (2011) Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond. London: I.B. Tauris & Co. It should be noted here that the Turkish military had always been more involved than the diplomats in outlining the core demands of the Turkish side. This is not surpris- ing as it reflects the influence held by the Turkish military on domestic politics although increasingly less so in recent years. 33. http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/AnnexIV/AnnexIV.pdf 34. Coughlan, R. ‘From Corporate Autonomy to the Search for Territorial Federalism’, in Guy, Y. (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Com- pleting Claims in Multi-Ethnic States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 35. Mumtaz Soysal ‘Mistakes and Deception’, published in Turkish centre- left newspaper Cumhuriyet, 2nd April 2005. 36. This heralded a period (albeit a short-lived one) when the ‘doves’ in the TRNC were in the majority. 37. It would be 14 years before the reductions in Turkish troops was scaled down to 3000.