39187 '17111 SUPPLEMENT TO The London Gazette OF FRIDAY, 3oth MARCH, 1951 Registered as a Newspaper MONDAY, 2 APRIL, 1951 OPERATIONS IN ASSAM AND BURMA FROM 23RD JUNE, 1944 TO 12TH NOVEMBER, 1944. NOTE.—A set of maps for this Despatch is on separate sale at Is. Od. net. This set of maps also covers ths operations described in the other Army and Air Despatches of the Burma Campaign from 16th November, 1943 to 12th September, 1945. The following Despatch was submitted to the of the Imphal Plain"; this Despatch deals Secretary of State for War on the 14th with "Our subsequent successful offensive" August, 1945, by GENERAL SIR GEORGE which drove the enemy back, not merely across J. G1FFARD, G.C.B., DJS.O., A.D.C., Com- the Indo-Burmese frontier, but across the mander-in-Chief, 11 Army Group, South- Chindwin River, and opened the way for the East Asia Command. re-conquest of Central Burma. PART I.—OPERATIONS. 3. In the operations I am about to describe, the Japanese retreat began as a well-planned Introduction. and orderly withdrawal. Gradually, as our 1. My first Despatch* covered the period pressure grew, the pace of the withdrawal in- from the formation of 11 Army Group, 16th creased until the enemy forces were split up November, 1943, to the re-opening of the into small, disorganised parties. Hungry, Kohima - Imphal road on the 22nd June, 1944, harassed, beaten; abandoning their wounded, when at 1245 hours, at Milestone 109, the lead- their guns and their transport, and even desert- ing troops of the 2 British Division (33 Corps) ing in small, but increasing numbers; the met the forward troops of 5 Indian Division Japanese were driven in defeat over the (4 Corps), and thus shattered the Japanese border, down the far side of the mountain dream of conquering India. This Despatch wall, and back over the Chindwin, which they -describes the operations from the 23rd June, had crossed in triumph and with such high 1944, to the 12th November, 1944, when I hopes less than five months earlier. handqd over command of 11 Army Group to Topography and Climate Lieuti-Generai l Sir Oliver Leese. 4. The formidable nature of the terrain was 2. The re-establishment of our communica- one of the features of this campaign. Battles tions with Imphal opened a new phase in the were fought at 5,000 feet and over, often in campaign. The Japanese invasion of India had almost impenetrable jungle; and troops, loaded been stopped ; it remained to throw the enemy with full equipment, struggled up from nullahs back whence he had come. In the words of 2,000 feet below in the face of heavy small the Prime Minister, the defence of the Imphal arms, grenade and mortar fire. Yet, hazar- Plain and our subsequent successful offensive dous and difficult as the nature of the country •" constituted the greatest collision which had made every movement or operation, tanks often yet taken place on land with Japan and has proved the decisive factor in the fighting up resulted in the slaughter of between 50,000 and and down these mountain ranges, where they 60,000 Japanese. The climax was the final climbed almost precipitous slopes to blast •eviction of the Japanese from India with the Japanese bunkers at a range of ten yards. -almost total loss of five of his best divisions." 5. As if still further to test the magnificent .My earlier Despatch dealt with " The defence fighting spirit of the troops, another enemy was * Operations in Burma and North-East India from advancing steadily upon us: the torrential <6th November, 1943 to 22nd June, 1944. monsoon rain that turned tracks into leech- SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 APRIL, 1951 laden streams and chaungs into treacherous (e) The following reinforcements and with- torrents; rain that washed away our already drawals were to be made:— exiguous roads, turned rivers into raging floods (i) 82 (West African) Division would be and grounded our supporting air forces. " The concentrated in India during August. Economist," in its issue of the 15th April, (ii) 22 (East African) Brigade would 1944, wrote " The monsoons are on their way, arrive in Ceylon during July. and it would be turning a new page in military history if either side campaigned through the (NOTE : This is an .independent brigade; rain-sodden and malaria-ridden months 11 (East African) Division and 28 (East ahead." That " new page in military history " African) Brigade (independent) were al- has been turned. ready in Ceylon in June.) (iii) 19 Indian Division would be avail- Instructions for Monsoon Operations. able as a relief when one British or Indian 6. On the 8th June, the Supreme Allied division returned to India for rest. Commander* issued a Directive which included (iv) The first brigade group of 36 the following:— British Division to be ready to move under (a) The broad mission of South-East Asia the command of Northern Combat Area Command (S.E.A.C.) in Burma was: — Command by the 1st July (the remainder by the 20th July), in relief of Special "To develop, maintain, broaden, and Force. protect the air link to China in order to provide a maximum and timely stock of (v) 3 Commando Brigade would be P.O.L. to China in support of Pacific withdrawn from Imphal as soon after the operations; so far as is consistent with the 1st July as operations permitted, but above, to press advantages against the might again be made available at a later enemy by exerting maximum ground and date for operations in Arakan. air effort, particularly during the current 7. In accordance with this Directive, I issued monsoon season, and in pressing such operation instructions to the Commander, advantages to be prepared to exploit the Fourteenth Army, Lieut-General W. J. Slim*, development of overland communications for operations during the monsoon and the to China. All these operations must be move of 36 British Division which was to go dictated by the forces at present available by road and rail to Ledo and thence by road or firmly allocated to S.E.A.C." to the Myitkyina area. (i) The general tasks allotted to me To complete the picture, the role allotted were: — by the Supreme Allied Commander to General (i) To secure Eastern Bengal and Assam Stilwell's forces in North Burma (Northern up to my boundary with Northern Com- Combat Area Command) was to protect the bat Area Command (N.C.A.C.) (General Mogaung - Myitkyina area by establishing an Stilwell's forces). outpost line ; Lonkin - Talawgyi - Kazu - Fort (ii) Provide the necessary ground forces Harrison - Seniku. for the defence of Ceylon. The Chinese Expeditionary Force (C.E.F.) had orders from the Generalissimo to cross (c) My specific tasks during the monsoon the Salween River and join General Stilwell's were as follows: — forces in the Myitkyina area. (i) Arakan. Maintain an active defence on the 8. Such were our tasks : but before continu- general line Maungdaw - Tunnels Area ing the narrative, a word about communica- -Taung Bazaar during the monsoon. tion and roads is necessary. I shall give an Prepare to capture Akyab by an ad- account of road construction in a later section, vance starting as early as possible in when discussing engineering work, but the the next dry season. tracks which did duty for roads in the forward area may conveniently be described here, as (ii) Chindwin. they will be frequently referred to in subse- First Priority. Re-establish communi- quent paragraphs: cations on the road Dimapur - Kohima (a) A road from Palel to Tamu existed, - Imphal not later than mid-July. but it rapidly deteriorated when the monsoon Second Priority. Clear Japanese forces started, and to quote from my Chief from the area Dimapur-Kohima - Engineer's report " The mud had to be seen Imphal P^in- Yuma - Tamanthi. to be believed". In these conditions, only Third Priority. Prepare to exploit 4x4 lorries t were permitted to run south across the Chindwin in the Yuwa- of Palel, though the rule had to be relaxed Tamanthi area after the monsoon. occasionally for specialist vehicles. (d) Northern Combat Area Command (b) The road south from Tamu down the would come under the direct command of Kabaw Valley can only euphemistically be the Supreme Allied Commander from the called a road—it was a sea of mud varying 20th June, and the boundary between in depth from six to eighteen inches. In Northern Combat Area Command and the worst places corduroy roads, over which Fourteenth Army would be Wakching- . jeeps and 30-cwt. 6x6 lorries f could pass, Kaiyaw Naukkon (both exclusive Northern had to be built. Combat Area Command) - Taro - Lonkin - tndawgyi Lake-Lake Indaw (all inclusive * Now Field-Marshal Sir William J. Slim, G.B.E., Northern Combat Area Command). K.C.B., D.S.O., M.C. f A 4 x 4 lorry is a four-wheeled vehicle, all four * Now Vice-Admiral The Earl Mountbatten of wheels of which can be driven by the engine. Similarly, Burma, K.G., P.C., G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E., G.C.V.O., a 6 x 6 lorry is one in which the power can be trans- K.C.B., D.S.O. mitted to all of its six wheels. SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE, 2 APRIL, 1951 1713 (c) The Sittaung track from Palel to the astride the Japanese communications, and Chindwin was not a road at all. It was one brigade on the Imphal - Ukhrul road passable for jeeps and 4x4 vehicles as clearing enemy positions about Milestone 17.