Psychonomic Bulletin & Review https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1421-6 BRIEF REPORT Representational coexistence in the God concept: Core knowledge intuitions of God as a person are not revised by Christian theology despite lifelong experience Michael Barlev1 & Spencer Mermelstein1 & Tamsin C. German1 # Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2018 Abstract Previous research has shown that in the minds of young adult religious adherents, acquired theology about the extraordinary characteristics of God (e.g., omniscience) coexists with, rather than replaces, an initial concept of God formed by co-option of the person concept. We tested the hypothesis that representational coexistence holds even after extensive experience with Christian theology, as indexed by age. Christian religious adherents ranging in age from 18 to 87 years were asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about persons and Christian theology about God were consistent (both true or both false) or inconsistent (true on one and false on the other). Results showed, across adulthood, more theological errors in evaluating inconsistent versus consistent statements. Older adults also exhibited slower response times to inconsistent versus consistent statements. These findings show that despite extensive experience, indeed a lifetime of experience for some partici- pants, the Christian theological God concept does not separate from the initial person concept from which it is formed. In fact, behavioral signatures of representational coexistence were not attenuated by experience. We discuss the broader implications of these findings to the acquisition of evolutionarily new concepts. Keywords Core knowledge . Person concept . God concept . Religious beliefs . Conceptual change Introduction features of the environments in which humans evolved. A fundamental insight of this view is that our representations The past few decades of research in cognitive development of the world are not necessarily veridical—rather, organisms have revolutionized our most basic theories about the ontog- of different species carve the world along lines that were rel- eny of concepts. In infancy, domain-specialized learning evant for the survival and reproduction of the ancestors of that mechanisms scaffold the development of concepts of physical species (Tooby, Cosmides, & Barrett, 2005). entities and their mechanical properties, animate agents and Beyond this core conceptual repertoire, however, humans their patterns of self-propelled motion, intentional agents and have the capacity to acquire Bevolutionarily new^ concepts, or their mental states, natural kinds and their properties, concepts that were not targets of natural selection (Sperber & numerosities, and others (Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016; Hirschfeld, 2004, refer to these as concepts that exist within Carey, 2009; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002; Spelke, 1990). The the actual but not proper domain of evolved mechanisms): of architecture of this reliably developing conceptual repertoire subatomic particles, of an infinite universe, of geological and has been designed by natural selection to track fitness-relevant evolutionary processes, and of extraordinary beings.1 What is the relationship between these concepts and the core Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1421-6) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. 1 A debate in the literature concerns whether natural selection shaped our minds to represent concepts of extraordinary beings. Notably, Norenzayan * Michael Barlev (2013) argues that representations of omniscient and moralizing gods were [email protected] culturally and perhaps genetically selected to promote cooperation in large groups. A full discussion of this debate is beyond the scope of this article, but we consider the by-product view, most notably advanced by Boyer (2001), 1 Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, University of more likely. See for example Baumard, Hyafil, Morris, and Boyer (2015)fora California, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9660, USA cogent critique of Norenzayan (2013). Psychon Bull Rev conceptual repertoire? We address this question by focusing develops slowly. In their Experiment 1, participants who var- on the case study of the God concept in Christian theology. ied in age (3-5, 6-12, and 18-21 years) were introduced to an The God concept is formed by co-opting the person concept, agent (Mr. or Ms. Smart) who Bknows everything about a reliably developing set of core knowledge intuitions about the everything^ and were asked six questions about this agent’s physicality, biology, and psychology of persons (Boyer, 2001).2 mental states (e.g., BDoes Mr./Ms. Smart know what you’re For example, Lane, Wellman, & Evans, (2010) showed that thinking right now?^). Only 16% of the youngest participants Midwestern U.S. children younger than 5 who explicitly attrib- attributed full omniscience to Mr./Ms. Smart (Byes^ answers uted constrained knowledge to persons (e.g., their mom) on ver- to all 6 questions about the breadth and depth of omniscience, bal response tasks did also to God. That is, initially children i.e., knowledge of all domains, and all knowledge within a conceptualize God’s knowledge as that of a person. The God specific domain), whereas 63% (statistically not different from concept is then modified to represent those characteristics that set chance performance) and 83% of participants in the middle God apart from ordinary persons. In Lane et al. (2010), children and older groups, respectively, did so. older than 5 differentiated between persons and God, to whom Because a full understanding of omniscience, and possibly they attributed extraordinary knowledge.3 A question that fol- other extraordinary characteristics, develops slowly, it is lows from this is whether the modified God concept, which possible that the young adult participants in Barlev et al. includes characteristics incompatible with the person concept, (2017) had not yet acquired a full understanding of God’s replaces the person representations on which it is initially formed omniscience, omnipresence, and incorporeality or had not (Barret, 1999;Barret&Keil,1996;Boyer,2001). had enough experience with it for it to fully replace their Barlev, Mermelstein, & German, (2017) found evidence initial understanding of God. The present study expanded on that later-acquired Christian theological representations of Barlev et al. (2017) by searching for behavioral signatures of God do not replace initial person representations of God but representational coexistence in a sample of Christian religious rather coexist alongside them. In three studies, young adult adherents that varies in theological experience, as indexed by Christian religious adherents evaluated as true or false state- age. ments in which their formal theology about God and intuitions While there are no prior studies of representational coexis- about persons were consistent or inconsistent. If initial person tence in the God concept of older adults, recent studies of representations of God are replaced by later-acquired repre- older adults show evidence of coexistence in science concepts. sentations, then accuracy and response time should be inde- Shtulman and Harrington (2016) presented adult participants pendent of consistency with intuitions about persons. For ex- varying in age with statements where naïve and scientific the- ample, statements such as BGod has beliefs that are true^ (true ories were consistent (i.e., true according to both, or false according to both intuition and theology) and Ball beliefs God according to both) or inconsistent (i.e., true naively but false has are false^ (false according to both) should be responded to scientifically, or false naively but true scientifically). Both with the same accuracy and time as statements such as BGod younger and older adults made more scientific errors and were has beliefs that are false^ (false theologically but true intui- slower responding to inconsistent statements (e.g., Bthe earth tively) and Ball beliefs God has are true^ (true theologically revolves around the sun^ which is scientifically true but intu- but false intuitively). However, if initial person representa- itively false) compared with consistent statements (e.g., Bthe tions of God coexist with later-acquired representations, then moon revolves around the earth,^ which is both scientifically they might interfere with them. Indeed, participants in Barlev and intuitively true). In the present study, the full set of science et al. (2017) made more theological errors and were slower items used by Shtulman and Harrington (2016) are embedded when evaluating inconsistent compared with consistent among the religion items for comparison. statements. The present study was designed to answer two primary Lane, Wellman, & Evans, (2014) suggest that a full under- questions: standing of extraordinary characteristics such as omniscience (1) Are initial representations of God as a person replaced by acquired Christian representations of an omniscient, omni- present, and incorporeal God in participants with extensive 2 B ^ We use the term core knowledge intuitions throughout this manuscript to maturation and/or theological experience? capture our view that it is the output of such cognitive mechanisms that is responsible for the initial person representation of extraordinary supernatural (2) If initial representations of God as a person are