Origin and Limitations of the Antarctic Treaty Aant Elzinga INTRODUCTION As a philosopher and historian of science it strikes me how two mutually op- posite kinds of retrospective accounts of the emergence of the Antarctic Treaty have evolved. There is the naive view, according to which the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and the Antarctic Treat (AT) simply succeeded because politics was entirely set to one side. And there is the cynical view, according to which both the IGY and the advent of the AT were a matter of politics all the way. Both of these views are untenable. Instead, I want to argue for a critical realist perspective that focuses on both the science and its geopolitical context. THE DUAL FUNCTION OF SCIENCE IN THE ANTARCTIC TREATY As cold war archives have opened, recent scholarship has shown that there was a great deal more politics behind the scenes than we were previously told. However, on some basic issues differences were successfully set aside or frozen, and fundamental principles were agreed upon: the question of claims (sovereign neutrality), the question of carrying out atomic tests (prohibited), demilitariza- tion, and the use of science as a criterion for full participation in the manage- ment regime that was set up. It was not because of the application of altruism that this was possible. On the contrary, national interests and agendas were still there, but the extreme cost of the alternative, perpetuating conflict, was too great. Thus, realism, pragmatism, and willingness to compromise on the basis of mutual benefit were the effective principles at work. The AT involves a mechanism of inclusion/exclusion based on scientific per- formance. Performing substantial scientific research as an entry ticket for new Aant Elzinga, Department of Philosophy, countries to manifest their presence and participate in the management of the Linguistics and Theory of Science, University Antarctic continent’s future is key. I call this the sublimation of politics in sci- of Gothenburg, Box 200, SE-405 30 Gothen- ence. Science has a dual function, both advancing new knowledge and mani- burg, Sweden. Correspondence: Aant.Elzinga@ festing a country’s serious interest and presence. Politics in this context is not a theorysc.gu.se. bad thing, but rather a good thing, an incentive to do good research that will, 60 • SCIENCE DIPLOMACY in turn, give a country clout at the decision- making table. the statutes of the International Polar Commission (IPC) of The success of the AT lies in the fact that it gave science 1908, which Lüdecke (this volume) considers an important a dual function, including its status as a kind of symbolic episode in the history of Antarctic research and explora- capital in a political arena, an arm’s-length function that tion. Representatives of 12 countries (but not the United reinforced rather than undermined the multinational in- Kingdom, Germany, and Norway)1 agreed to establish tergovernmental political management regime. closer relations between polar explorers; to standardize methods of observation in key fields; to cooperate in the discussion and interpretation of results; to provide advice THREE PRINCIPLES OF and assistance to new polar enterprises, with emphasis on SCIENTIFIC INTERNATIONALISM scientific criteria; and to provide for the need for conti- nuity in activities by, for example, introducing research Even though the science criterion has become more bases for a five-year period, with rotation of participat- flexible with time, a challenge for the future is still the ing researchers who might come from different countries. question of internationalism—how far and what kind. In This far- reaching ideal of internationalism and planning this respect, three dimensions of internationalism can be was eclipsed by World War I and the cold war in science distinguished. that followed when, under the auspices of the then newly established International Research Council (IRC), the vic- 1. The epistemological, or knowledge, principle states tor countries boycotted research communities in Germany, that truth knows no boundaries and scientific results Austria, the Soviet Union, and some other countries, a belong to all. This is also called the principle of univer- situation that only changed (in part) when the IRC was sality. One way to operationalize it is to measure the replaced by the International Council of Scientific Unions frequency of multiauthor, multinational publications to (ICSU) in 1931. see if this has increased over time and to what extent When the idea of setting up the Special Committee nontreaty countries are represented. on Antarctic Research (SCAR) emerged in 1957 and was 2. The organizational principle pertains to the need to co- implemented the following year, several countries were, operate and exchange results. Division of labor helps at first, opposed to or dubious concerning a strong inter- prevent costly and unnecessary duplication. It is also a nationalist thrust in this context; not least, the Australian matter of what the sociologist of science Robert Mer- government objected because it felt this might lead to acts ton called the need for “organized skepticism,” what of occupancy on its claimed territory.2 This concern is evi- we today call peer review, to enhance the quality of re- dent, for example, in the actions of Keith Bullen, a seis- search and its results. One can furthermore distinguish mologist at the University of Sydney who attended SCAR’s a scale of cooperation ranging from simply multilateral constitutional meeting in The Hague and was elected its coordination of efforts to actual cooperation and, fur- vice- president. On his return to Australia he reported back ther, to close multinational collaboration in projects to government officials that in line with Australian policy, and at research stations. he had succeeded in getting a clause that had proposed that 3. The welfare principle involves solidarity and the appli- SCAR should directly organize the whole scientific pro- cation of the fruits of science for the benefit of all hu- gram in Antarctica removed from the draft SCAR consti- mankind, including the distribution of its goods. Joseph tution. Thus, SCAR shied away from the kind of dirigiste Needham, the first science director of the United Na- approach to cooperation in science that Henryk Arctowski tions Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization had advocated for in the old IPC in 1906. In 1958–1959 it (UNESCO) called it the periphery principle. He had in was, however, more than just a research management prin- mind the dissemination of science from its world cen- ciple that was at issue, it was a matter of politics. ters to the peripheries in the third world. Julian Huxley, With respect to the welfare principle in international- the first director general of UNESCO, used it to argue ism, the AT still has some way to go. Two alternatives to for organizing Antarctic research within an interna- the AT have been suggested; one is the notion of Antarctica tional institute (see Elzinga and Landström, 1996). as part of the heritage of humankind, from which stems the idea that it should be placed under the auspices of the When it comes to the epistemological principle, the United Nations. The other is the notion of Antarctica as a AT does quite well. Regarding the second principle, it has world natural park, an idea proposed by international envi- been unable to live up to the ideals already expressed in ronmentalist nongovernmental organizations. Both of these ELZINGA / LIMITATIONS OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY • 61 concepts have been unsuccessful, but they have contributed a definitive benchmark. Pre- IGY periods are depicted as to some accommodation of the AT to broader internation- ones of conflict and tension between countries with po- alist and environmental conservation principles. In light of litical and economic interests in Antarctica, whereas the these changes it appears that the most viable road for con- post- IGY era is mostly portrayed as one of harmony, one tinued and farther- reaching internationalism should involve where science is able to flourish. This portrayal is also a the introduction of international research stations. This misconception. point is briefly discussed at the end of this paper. Once the Antarctic Treaty was in place, national inter- ests and rivalries still existed when it came to advancing research projects because by and of itself, the science, or THE DECISION NOT TO LET THE COLD WAR the basic research motive, is not enough to establish new SPILL OVER INTO ANTARCTICA forms of large- scale multinational collaboration within the ATS framework. More often than not, a definitive political Regarding the negotiations prior to the signing of the will on the part of the participating countries, along with AT, first, 60 secret meetings were held, and then the formal the possibility of significant mutual benefit at economic conference opened in October 1959, culminating in the and political levels, is needed. The role of leading (hybrid) signing of the treaty on 1 December. The process was not scientific personalities who might act as champions for an easy one. As Ambassador Oscar Pinochet de la Barra specific projects with transnational and transdisciplinary recalled at the symposium “On the Future of the Antarc- collaboration is also important. It may be instructive to tic Treaty” held in Ushuaia, Argentina, on 20–24 March consider a visionary proposal for European research col- 1995, “some delegates were in favour of freedom of sci- laboration in Antarctica that arose in the early 1970s; ul- ence, others were against it; some supported the freezing timately, this proposal failed because even if the will was of sovereignty, some did not; some wanted a treaty for 30 there in relevant scientific communities, other factors con- years, others a more permanent treaty; some said yes and trolled by decision makers at several political levels consti- some said no to observers; and so on” (Jackson, 1995:9).