Strengthening the Partnership Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, Matthew Waxman Prepared for the United States Air Force R Project AIR FORCE Approved for public release; distribution unlimited The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-96-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Strengthening the partnership : improving military coordination with relief agencies and allies in humanitarian operations / Daniel Byman ... [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. MR-1185-AF ISBN 0-8330-2868-5 1. United States—Armed Forces—Civic action. 2. United States. Air Force— Civic action. 3. Humanitarian assistance, American—Foreign countries. 4. Charities—Foreign countries. I. Byman, Daniel, 1967– UH723 .S77 2000 355.3'4—dc21 00-041482 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. Cover design by Tanya Maiboroda Cover photos courtesy of (top) Major Michael Young (USAF), www.usafe.af.mil/news/photos00/00079b.jpg, and (bottom) www.af.mil/photos/Nov1998/981739c.jpg © Copyright 2000 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2000 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1200 South Hayes Street, Arlington, VA 22202-5050 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] PREFACE This study examines how the U.S. military, particularly the U.S. Air Force (USAF), might improve cooperation with relief agencies and European allies in humanitarian relief operations. Improved coordination would help the USAF support U.S. government efforts and increase the success of relief efforts. This study notes potential reasons for humanitarian intervention, the types of missions typically carried out by U.S. forces, and common political limits placed on military forces. With this context in mind, it describes a wide range of relief organizations, identifies problems in coordination, and offers recommendations to the USAF and to the wider military community that would improve coordination. It also examines the role of allies in relief operations and allied perspectives on key issues confronting USAF planners. The study is primarily written for military planners, but it will also interest civilians, both within and outside government, who are concerned with humanitarian assistance. This study was sponsored by General John Jumper (USAFE/CC) and was conducted as part of the Strategy and Doctrine program of RAND’s Project AIR FORCE. Comments are welcomed and may be addressed to the authors or to the Program Director, Dr. Zalmay Khalilzad. PROJECT AIR FORCE Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and iii iv Strengthening the Partnership analysis. It provides the Air Force with independent analysis of pol- icy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future aerospace forces. Research is performed in four programs: Aerospace Force De- velopment; Manpower, Personnel, and Training; Resource Man- agement; and Strategy and Doctrine. CONTENTS Preface ......................................... iii Figures ......................................... ix Tables.......................................... xi Summary ....................................... xiii Acknowledgments................................. xxiii Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................... xxvii 1. INTRODUCTION .............................. 1 Research Approach and Structure .................. 3 PART ONE. COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPLEX CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS ................................. 7 3. FREQUENCY OF CONFLICT AND RESPONSE ......... 13 Incidence of Conflict Worldwide ................... 13 Unpredictability of Intervention ................... 20 Drivers of Intervention .......................... 22 Limited Warning Time .......................... 23 Preference for Multilateralism ..................... 24 4. MILITARY TASKS IN COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES ..... 27 Provide Humanitarian Assistance .................. 28 Protect Humanitarian Assistance ................... 30 Assist Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons ....... 34 v vi Strengthening the Partnership Enforce Peace ................................. 37 Restore Order ................................. 39 5. COMMON CONSTRAINTS ON OPERATIONS .......... 45 Weak Resolve at Home .......................... 45 Balancing Conflict and Reconciliation ............... 51 Advanced Planning Difficulties .................... 54 PART TWO. THE RELIEF COMMUNITY AND THE MILITARY 6. OVERVIEW OF THE RELIEF COMMUNITY ........... 59 United Nations Family .......................... 59 Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement .............. 62 Nongovernment Organizations .................... 64 Categorizing Nongovernment Organizations .......... 67 7. ADVANTAGES TO BETTER COORDINATION WITH THE RELIEF COMMUNITY ........................... 73 More Rapid Response ........................... 73 Smoother Airlift................................ 74 More Timely Identification of Local Needs ............ 75 Better Exploitation of Expertise .................... 77 More Efficient Use of Resources ................... 78 8. COORDINATION STRUCTURES AND THEIR LIMITS .... 81 Interagency Process ............................ 83 International Coordination ....................... 84 Operational-Level Arrangements ................... 84 Coordination Structures ......................... 91 Center of Excellence ............................ 97 9. BARRIERS TO IMPROVED COORDINATION WITH RELIEF AGENCIES ............................. 101 Disparate Organizational Cultures .................. 102 Concerns About Neutrality and Impartiality ........... 104 Limited NGO Ability to Plan ...................... 107 Ambivalence About Sharing Information ............. 110 Competition for Publicity ........................ 112 Varying Time Horizons .......................... 113 Mutual Lack of Familiarity ........................ 114 Limited Coordination Within NGOs ................. 116 Contents vii Uncertainty About the Military’s Commitment ........ 117 Improving Prospects for Cooperation ............... 118 PART THREE. WORKING WITH EUROPEAN ALLIES 10. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A COALITION ACTIVITY .......................... 123 European Activity and Outlook on Humanitarian Missions ................................. 124 The Military Dimension ......................... 126 Regional Bases and Experience .................... 127 Relations with NGOs and NGO Concerns ............. 128 Transatlantic Synergies in Humanitarian Contingencies .. 130 What Role for NATO? ........................... 131 Some Observations on Kosovo ..................... 136 PART FOUR. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 11. A STRATEGY TO IMPROVE COORDINATION .......... 141 Ensure Familiarity: Recommended Actions ........... 143 Improve Information Sharing: Recommended Actions .. 150 Improve Long-Term Planning: Recommended Actions .. 155 Avoid the Potential Pitfalls of Selective Engagement ..... 163 Improve the Coordination of the Relief Flow: Recommended Actions ...................... 169 Establish Initiatives with Allies ..................... 174 Final Words .................................. 179 Appendix A. U.S. NGOs.................................... 181 B. MAJOR INTERNATIONAL NGOs ................... 187 C. FRENCH EXPERIENCE AND PERSPECTIVES .......... 195 Bibliography ..................................... 203 Index .......................................... 215 FIGURES 2.1. Contingency Operations ....................... 9 8.1. Many Disparate Actors ......................... 82 8.2. Host Country Lead ............................ 92 8.3. United Nations Lead .......................... 93 8.4. Alliance or Coalition Lead ...................... 94 8.5. Lead Country ................................ 96 ix TABLES 3.1. Recent and Current Intrastate Conflicts ............ 15 8.1. Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Level Structures ... 86 11.1. Ensuring NGO-Military Familiarity: Suggested Division of Responsibilities ............................ 152 11.2. Improving Information Sharing: Suggested Division of Responsibilities .............................. 156 11.3. Improving Long-Term Planning: Suggested Division of Responsibilities .............................. 164 11.4. Ensuring a Smoother Relief Flow: Suggested Division of Responsibilities .............................. 176 xi SUMMARY Many humanitarian interventions led and supported by the United States go beyond simple disaster relief and include such difficult tasks as protecting refugees, securing humanitarian aid, and restor- ing civil order. Such ambitious operations—commonly referred to as “complex contingency operations”—include attempting to