MONITORING FACTORS AFFECTING THE SRI LANKAN PEACE PROCESS CLUSTER REPORT THIRD QUARTERLY AUGUST 2006 – OCTOBER 2006 CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS CLUSTER Page Number PEACE TALKS AND NEGOTIATIONS CLUSTER.................................................... 2 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT CLUSTER.......................................................................9 INTERNATIONAL CLUSTER…………………………………………………….15 SECURITY CLUSTER..............................................................................................................15 LEGAL & CONSTIIUTIONAL CLUSTER......................................................................27 RELIEF, REHABILITATION & RECONSTRUCTION CLUSTER......................33 PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS & SOCIAL ATTITUDES CLUSTER................................40 MEDIA CLUSTER.......................................................................................................................48. ENDNOTES.....………………………………………………………………………..54 METHODOLOGY The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has conducted the project “Monitoring the Factors Affecting the Peace Process” to provide an understanding of the current status of the peace process. The output of this project is a series of Quarterly Reports. This is the third of such reports. It should be noted that this Quarterly Report covers the months of August, September and October. Having identified a number of key factors that impact the peace process, they have been monitored observing change or stasis through a range of indicators. These indicators suggest trends for each factor. The factors have been grouped into a series of clusters which reflect critical dimensions of the peace process. The trends will suggest the level of change in each cluster and in sum will indicate how the peace process and its environment have been strengthened or weakened. This Synthesis Report will highlight the trends that emerge from the monitoring process and analyse them within the context of their respective clusters and between the clusters. This report is drawn from the more comprehensive Cluster Report which examines the various trends, factors and indicators in greater detail. 2 I. NEGOTIATIONS AND PEACE TALKS CLUSTER 1.1 Context Over the last quarter the prospect for negotiations dimmed as the crisis of violence intensified and the parties became increasingly intransigent. The Government of Sri Lankan (GoSL) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) attended negotiations in Geneva on February 19-20 and were able to reach an agreement on how to re-commit to the CFA and to devise ways of ending the violence. Over the following weeks the violence gradually intensified and the Geneva Agreement was repeatedly violated. While the Government was determined was to meet for the second round the LTTE proved reluctant resulting in the talks not going. Provocative incidents of violence threatened an unraveling of the CFA. In a last ditch effort the facilitators attempted to encourage the parties to focus on a critical pillar of the ‘no war no peace’ situation – the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission. Having agreed to attend talks in Oslo the LTTE pulled out of the negotiations at the last moment. It became increasingly clear that the parties were unable and unw illing to address the crisis of violence in the peace process, and have conflicting views on how negotiations should proceed, resulting in a paralysis in arriving at a negotiated settlement. 1.2. Factors, Indicators and Trends 1.2.1. Efforts at salvaging the ‘no war no peace’ situation through face-to-face talks strengthens the deadlock in the peace process Faced with the mounting violence there were renewed efforts at international mediation and crisis diplomacy. Over this period these efforts have had a dual focus, somewhat similar to December and January, where the focus was on trying to secure an agreement to cease the large-scale violence, in essence to bring about a ceasefire within the CFA, and to return to negotiations in order to avoid a breakdown of the ‘peace process.’ With the Mavil Aru crisis these efforts had to be re-directed as the situation on the ground dramatically shifted with the launching of large scale military operations. In mid-September the parties agreed to meet for face-to-face talks once more in Geneva on October 28-29. That both parties participated in the talks was remarkable in itself, but as the lead up to Geneva suggested contentions over conditions for talks was to undermine the negotiations. The LTTE refused to move further either on to other issues or to agree to another round unless the A-9 was re-opened. The parties in effect were returning to their historic positions with the LTTE demanding talks on immediate changes in the ground situation, and with the Government expressing a desire for a broader discussion ranging from violence to the core political issues. While arguably the duration of talks did see a decline in violence, at least in terms of large scale military operations, the failure of talks inevitably led to a continuation of the crisis of violence. The CFA and the ‘no war no peace’ scenario have faced multiple challenges but the Mavil Aru Crisis that began in late July is unique in that it led to a full-on military offensive and a battle for the control of territory, rather than merely to paralyse or weaken military positions as seen with previous military campaigns. The SLMM unsuccessfully attempted to use its position to broker an agreement on Mavil Aru in late July, and was followed by Norwegian Special Envoy Jon-Hanssen Bauer who in arrived in Sri Lanka in early August during the Mavil Aru crisis and attempted to reach an understanding. The sluice gates were closed on July 20 and a letter with three demands was sent to the Government. A letter from the SCOPP was dispatched to the SLMM which in turn led to the LTTE Trincomalee Political Leader inviting the SLMM to talk directly with the people on July 26. The SLMM met the local people on July 28 at Kallady LTTE political office but during the discussion a bomb was dropped in the vicinity.1 On July 26 the security forces had according to the LTTE bombed Kathiravelli, killing seven people a few hours after the SLMM agreed on July 26 to come to Mavilaru.2 Bauer met with the leaders in Colombo, Killinochchi and Trincomalee. Reportedly at a meeting between Bauer and S.P. Thamilchelvam on August 6th the LTTE agreed to open the sluice 3 gate. The same day the head of the SLMM Ulf Henricsson and SLMM Trincomalee district head Ove Jansen proceeded to the sluice gates with LTTE Trincomlaee Politial Head S. Elilian.3 According to the LTTE and the SLMM the Government was informed of the decision and the SLMM visit but artillery shells landed in close proximity to the gates during the visit.4 The Government claimed that the SLMM had not informed the SCOPP of the intended visit.5 The issue raised a number of critical concerns, one being the role of the SLMM. The Mavilaru Incident raised serious issues about its security, and communication and confidence between the SLMM and the Government. As the head of the SLMM Ulf Henricsson put it: “We sat for talking and got clearance from the government and tried to convince the LTTE to have confidence in the government. They dropped a bomb in the vicinity. That’s not the right signal.” That this was repeated only a few days later is all the more troublesome as it indicates either a lack of communication on the part of the SLMM or a complete disregard for the efforts and more importantly the security of the SLMM. The position of the SLMM was already in question, with mounting criticism from the Government and, more immediately, a demand for the withdrawal of SLMM personnel from European Union member countries. Following the failure of the Oslo Talks and subsequent efforts by the SLMM to reach an understanding with the LTTE for the continuation of SLMM monitors from EU countries the SLMM went ahead with the withdrawal of monitors from Finland, Denmark and Sweden before the LTTE deadline of September 1. The SLMM’s ability to monitor has been affected by this change. The loss of personnel did have an impact on their capacity as the number of monitors stands at 30, compared to the 57 envisaged in the CFA. Both Norway and Iceland increased the number they were contributing and also redeployed personnel who had previously served in SLMM. 6 The change has also had significant symbolism as it represents a dramatic alteration of a pillar of the CFA. It also showed the challenges to negotiations based on parity between the parties that has been thrown off balance by the EU Ban which in itself is a response to the shift in the form of violence. The SLMM was forced to alter its composition despite the opposition of the Government. The Government “urged the three countries, even if their nationals have to withdraw from conflict areas due to the LTTE threat, not to withdraw from the SLMM headquarters in Colombo, as it gives further currency to the LTTE blackmail.”7 The change in the SLMM’s composition marked an alteration of an article of the CFA without the agreement of both parties. Another critical aspect of the Mavilaru Crisis is that it demonstrated an increased willingness to consider other options, besides negotiations. The government projected the Mavilaru military operation as a “humanitarian offensive” to safeguard the basic right to water for 15,000 affected farmers.8 Nonetheless, that a full scale military operation was launched does indicate that the government has moved beyond negotiations, retaliatory raids and covert operations. From December it has become clear that the LTTE too had increasingly shifted its strategy from occasional incidents of violence to a more sustained campaign. Thus both parties seem to be exercising their range of options of violence in dealing with each other. They have not, however given up on negotiations. Both insist they are for peace and a negotiated settlement. The LTTE for instance claimed that the government was waging “a war of aggression” and that the LTTE was “flexible for talks.