REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLEn GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES Rela ti onships Between U.S. And NATO Military Com mand Structures-- Need For Closer Integration This report is the unclassified version of GAO's Secret report LCD -77 -419, dated Au gu st 26 . 1977. It disc usses U.S. participa­ tion in two commdnd structures in Europe-· its own and NATO's Allied Command, Eu­ rope. These command structures are similar­ ly organized and have basicall y the same overall mission··lo providf;: a combat ready force to deter ;ogg ression from the Warsaw Pact. The report describes problems with transi tioning from a peace time to a wartime pos ture, and management layering within and betweer. U.S. and NATO commands-- areas I where there are potentials for realigning, eliminating, or substantially reduc ing the Si ze of the U.S. command structure and thereby n,~ king it more responsive to its prin ,e pur pose ior bei l,g in Europe. Alternati ves for achieving closer integration between the U.S. and NATO command structures are identified. l CO·77-44 7 OCTOBER 26 , 1977 COMPTRQLLEJJ GEN ERAL OF THE UNITED STAT ES W ASH INGT O N , D .C . Z~ " . 8-1564 89 To the President of the Sena te and the , Speaker of the House of Representatives This is an unclassifir d version of our report describ­ i ng the U.S . and No rth Atlant ic Treaty Organizat i on military o rgani zati ons and the need fo r c lose r integration be tween them . A war in Europe most like ly will be a NATO war; there­ fore NATO countries mu s t plan fo r and be pre pared to e xecute the war as a coalition rather than as individual nations . Our classi fied report was issued without Department of Defe nse comments bec ause t hey did not respond in time . Sub­ sequently , however, the Depar tm ent o f Defense fur nished us comments and supported our general conclusion tha t closer integra tion between the U.S . and NATO comm and structures is needed . An unclassif i ed version of the Depa rtme nt ' s com­ ments is in~luded as appendix V to this report . We made our review pursuant to the Budget and Account­ ing Act, 1921 (31 U. S . C. 53), and the Accounting and Audit­ ing Act of 1950 (31 U. S.C . 67) . We are s e nding copies of this report to the Director , Office of Manag e me nt and Budget ; the Secreta r y of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretaries of the Army , Navy, and Air Force . e .. /t~ Comp t rolle r General of the United States L COMPTROLLER GENERAL ' S RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN U. S . AND NATO REPORT TO THE CONGRESS MILITARY COMMAND STRUCTURES--NEED FOR CLOSER ~NTEGRATION Department of Defense DIG E ST The Un ited States participates in two commands in Eu r ope--its own and NATO ' s Allied Command, Europe. The United States has a unified command; headquarters commands for the Army , Navy , a nd Air Force; and nu­ me rous subordinate command headquarters . (See p. 4.) The U. S . a nd NATO command str uctures are similarly organized and have basically t he same overall mission--to provide a combat­ ready force to deter aggression t ram the Warsaw Pact na tions . The close relation­ ship of the two commands is best illustreted by (1) several U.S . commanders being al~v NATO commanders, (2) NATO assuming ~pera ­ tional command of U. S . combat forces in a NATO war, and (3) NATO being hea vily staffed with U.S. personnel in peacetime . (See p. 4.) Over the years, the U.S. comma nd structure has been studied and debated, both in the Co ngress and the executive branch; efforts have been made to identify, classify , re­ organize, and streamline headquarters a c ­ tivities throughout the Department of De­ fense. These efforts were all intended to make more efficient use of res ources by reducing the numbe r , size , layering , and duplication of headquarters and by updating .and streamlining command relation­ ships. Prior efforts have resulted in re­ organizations and consolidations of heac­ quarter s and headquarters functions. Several of these efforts and personnel cuts were initiated by the European com­ mands. Therefore these commands them­ selves share the credit for the actions taken to date. (See p. 18.) Tear Sheet. Upon Icmoval. Iht' I('P'" cO lier date ~h ould be noted he.eoll i The increasing interdependence of NATO members undersco res the need for a NATO command that can respond quickly in the event of an attack by the Warsaw Pact for­ ces, particularly an attac k wlth little or no advance warning . Transition from a peacetime to a wartime structure shouJ d require minimal change. The onl y prac­ tical way to accomplish this is through the close integration of the c ommand s truc tures of the NATO members' torce s with the NATO c ommand structure. (See p . 43.) The NATO and member na~ion commands s hould be integrated at leas t to the e xtent that the NATO command is f u lly knowledgeable, in peace time, of the i m­ portant military activities of member nations, such as the details of arrange­ ments for logistics support--arrangements that c o uld affect NATO wartime activities. ( See p. 27.) The U.S. command structure needs to be r e examined with these objectives in mind. Although the current Department of Defense positio n is that the most likely conflict i n Europe will be a NA'l'O war, the United States still ma intains functions b asically parallel t o those of NATO. (See p . 2B .) The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, has e mphasized the need for concerted multinati0nal efforts in suc)} areas as equipment commonality; force interoper­ ability; integration of command , control , a nd communications; and mutual logistical suppo rt as military imperatives in Europe. Fo r these reasons, the United States s ho uld determine how its command functions c an best be integrated with those of NATO. (See p. 2B.) This report discusses unilateral war and crisis managemect activities (see p. 28); problems of changing from a peacetime to a wartime po sture (see p. 30); and the need for a f unctional analysis of the U.S. command s truct ure (see p. 32)--areas where there are p o tentials for realigning or reducing the U.S. command structure and i i more fully integrating it with the NATO comma i d str ucture. There are at least two alternatives that should be considered in analyzing the U.S . command structure in Europe--alternatives that could improve U.S, participation in N\TO and reduce the management layering that now ex i sts . These alternatives are : - -Integrate the U.S. unified ~ ommand with NATO's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe. (See p . 45 . ) --Integrate component commands and the United States European Command . (See p. 45.) GAO recommends that the Secre tary of Defense ree xamine the U. S. comma nd structure i n Europe and make changes as necessary t o in­ sure that the structu r e i s optimally o r g an­ ized to perform its primar~ wartime mission . The exam ination should include evaluation of the potential benefits--botn to U.S. staffin~ and a strengthened NATO-- of taking the l eadership in g iving NATO greater auth­ ority and control over peacetime l ogistics support in order to facilitate the transi­ tion to and effectiveness o f wartime activi­ ties . (See p. 46.) GAO further rec o~ mends that the Secretary of Defense also take a leadership ~ole in encouraging a multilatetal study to identify wa ys in which closer integration of the com­ , mand structures of all the NATO member forces with the NATO c ommand structure c an be achie ved . (See p. 46.) The Secretary of Defense was g iven an oppor­ tunity to comment on GAOl s classified report. However, the c lass ified report was issued without Defense l s comments because they did not respond i n time. Subseque ntly , however, Defense furni s hed GAu comme nts and s upported GAOls ger.eral conclusion that closer integration between the u.s. and NATO command structures is needed. (See p . 46. ) Teal Sheet i i i BLANK I I C on ten t 5 DIGEST CHAPTER 1 INTRODUC TION 1 U.S. commitment to NATO 2 , U. S . military presence in Europe 2 2 RELATIONSHIP OF U.S. AND N~TO CO MMAN D STRUCTURES 4 U.S. command s truc ture 4 Headquarters, U.S. Eur opean Command 5 U. S. Arm y command s tructure in Eur ope 7 U.S. Air Force comma nd s truc ­ ture I n Europe 8 U.S. Nav y command st ru ctu re in Europe 9 Peacet i me versus wartime u.s . command st ructures 1 0 NATO command s tructure 14 ACE cha in of command 16 3 PRIOR EFFORTS TO RED UCE AND STREAMLINE TH E U. S . COMMAN D STRUCT URE 18 Streamlini ng the unified comma nd s 1 8 DOD headquarte rs review 18 Unified comma nd plan review 19 Streamlining the Army comm and structure i n Eu rope 21 The FENDER Study 21 USAREUR headquarters reductions 21 Project CHASE 22 The Nunn ~mendment reduction 23 Modernization of logistics -- ' ~ 77 24 Staff 77 24 Streaw1ining the Air Force command structure in Europe 25 Streamlining the Navy command structu re in Eu rope 26 CHAPTER 4 POTENTIAL FOR FURT HER IMPROVEMENTS IN THE U.S.