Bibliography The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is to be found at http://plato.stanford.edu All entries are referenced here as 2012. See specifi c details on the site for date of fi rst posting and any revisions. I have listed all relevant entries in this bibliography; some listed here do not appear in any of the ‘Further Reading’ entries. Entries with a * are also in Fisher and Kirchin eds. (2006), in part or whole. Entries with a + are also in Shafer-Landau and Cuneo eds. (2006), in part or whole. Altham, J. E. J. (1986). ‘The Legacy of Emotivism’, in Fact, Science and Morality: Essays on A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic, 275–288, eds. G. Macdonald and C. Wright, Oxford: Blackwell. Ayer, A. J. (1946). Language, Truth and Logic, London: Gollancz, 2nd ed.+ Beaney, M. (2012). ‘Analysis’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. Blackburn, S. (1981). ‘Rule-Following and Moral Realism’, in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, 163–187, eds. S. Holtzman and C. Leich, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.* Blackburn, S. (1984). Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press.* Blackburn, S. (1988). ‘Attitudes and Contents’, Ethics 98, 501–517.* + Blackburn, S. (1993a). Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.+ Blackburn, S. (1993b). ‘Realism: Quasi or Queasy?’, in Reality, Representation and Projection, 365–383, ed. J. Haldane and C. Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Blackburn, S. (2005). Truth, London: Penguin. Boyd, R. (1988). ‘How to be a Moral Realist’, in Essays on Moral Realism, 181–228, ed. G. Sayre-McCord, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.+ Brady, M. (2011). New Waves in Metaethics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Brink, D. (1989). Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Brink, D. (1997). ‘Moral Motivation’, Ethics 108, 4–32. 217 218 Bibliography Brown, C. (2011). ‘A New and Improved Supervenience Argument for Ethical Descriptivism’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6, 205–218. Campbell, R. (2012). ‘Moral Epistemology’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. Chappell, T. (2009). Ethics and Experience: Life Beyond Moral Theory, Buckinghamshire: Acumen. Copp, D. (2000). ‘Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth’, Synthese 124, 113–137. Copp, D. (2003). ‘Why Naturalism?’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6, 179–200. Copp, D. (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Copp, D. (2012). ‘Normativity and Reasons: Five Arguments from Parfi t against Normative Naturalism’, in Ethical Naturalism, 24–57, eds. S. Nuccetteli and G. Seay, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Copp, D. and Sobel, D. (2001). ‘Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire’, Analysis 61, 44–53. Cuneo, T. (2007). The Normative Web, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dancy, J. (1993). Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell. Dancy, J. (2006). ‘Nonnaturalism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, 122–145, ed. D. Copp, Oxford: Oxford University Press. D’Arms, J. and Jacobson, D. (2006). ‘Sensibility Theory and Projectivism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory, 186–218, ed. D. Copp, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Darwall, S., Gibbard, A., and Railton, P. (eds) (1992). Moral Discourse and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Divers, J. and Miller, A. (1994). ‘Why Expressivists about Value should not Love Minimalism about Truth’, Analysis 54, 12–19.* Dreier, J. (1996). ‘Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth’, Philosophical Studies 83, 29–51. Dreier, J. (2000). ‘Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61, 619–638.* Enoch, D. (2011). Taking Morality Seriously, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Firth, R. (1952). ‘Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12, 317–345.+ Fisher, A. (2011). Metaethics: An Introduction, Durham: Acumen. Fisher, A. and Kirchin, S. (eds) (2006). Arguing about Metaethics, London: Routledge. Fitzpatrick, W. (2009). ‘Recent work on Ethical Realism’, Analysis 69, 746–760. Frankena, W. (1939). ‘The Naturalistic Fallacy’, Mind 48, 464–477.* Bibliography 219 Garner, R. (2010). ‘Abolishing Morality’, in A World without Values, 217– 234, ed. R. Joyce and S. Kirchin, Dordrecht: Springer. Geach, P. T. (1960). ‘Ascriptivism’, Philosophical Review 69, 221–225. Geach, P. T. (1965). ‘Assertion’, Philosophical Review 74, 449–465. Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gibbard, A. (2003). Thinking How to Live, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Gill, M. (2008). ‘Metaethical Variability, Incoherence, and Error’, in Moral Psychology, volume 2, 387–401, ed. W Sinnott-Armstrong Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Gill, M. (2009). ‘Indeterminancy and Variability in Meta-ethics’, Philosophical Studies 145, 215–234. Gowans, C. (2012). ‘Moral Relativism’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. Hale, B. (1986). ‘The Compleat Projectivist’, Philosophical Quarterly 36, 65–84. Hale, B. (1993a). ‘Can there be a Logic of Attitudes?’, in Reality, Representation and Projection, 337–363, ed. J. Haldane and C. Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press.* Hale, B. (1993b). ‘Postscript’, in Reality, Representation and Projection, 385–388, ed. J. Haldane and C. Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harman, G. (1985). ‘Is there a Single True Morality?’, in Morality, Reason and Truth, 27–48, ed. D. Copp and D. Zimmerman, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld. Helm, B. (2001). Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Honderich, T (ed.) (1985). Morality and Objectivity, London: Routledge. Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. (1992). ‘Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived’, Synthese 92, 221–260.* Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. (2000) ‘Copping out on Moral Twin Earth’, Synthese 124, 139–152. Horgan, T. and Timmons, M. (2006) (eds). Metaethics after Moore, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Huemer, M. (2006). Ethical Intuitionism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Humberstone, L. (1992). ‘Direction of Fit’, Mind 101, 59–83. Hurka, T. (2012). ‘Moore’s Moral Philosophy’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. Jackson, F. (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.+ 220 Bibliography Jackson, F. and Pettit, P. (1998). ‘A Problem for Expressivism’, Analysis 58, 239–251.* Jacobson, D. (2012). ‘Fitting Attitude Accounts of Value’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. Joyce, R. (2001). The Myth of Morality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.+ Joyce, R. (2002). ‘Expressivism and Motivational Internalism’, Analysis 62, 336–344. Joyce, R. (2012). ‘Moral anti-Realism’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. Joyce, R. and Kirchin, S. (2010). (eds) A World without Values, Dordrecht: Springer. Kennett, J. (2001). Agency and Responsibility: A Common-Sense Moral Psychology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kirk, R. (1999). Relativism and Reality, London: Routledge. Kirchin, S. (2010a). ‘A Tension in the Moral Error Theory’, in A World with- out Values, 167–182, ed. R. Joyce and S. Kirchin, Dordrecht: Springer. Kirchin, S. (2010b). ‘The Shapelessness Hypothesis’, Philosophers’ Imprint 10, 1–28. Kirchin, S. (ms). Thick Evaluation. Kirkham, R. (1995). Theories of Truth, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Lenman, J. (2012). ‘Moral Naturalism’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. Lillehammer, H. (1997). ‘Smith on Moral Fetishism’, Analysis 57, 187–195. Lillehammer, H. (2004). ‘Moral Error Theory’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104, 93–109. Loeb, D. (2008). ‘Moral Incoherentism: How to Pull a Metaphysical Rabbit out of a Semantic Hat’, in Moral Psychology, volume 2, 355–385, ed. W Sinnott-Armstrong, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, London: Penguin.* + Majors, Brad (2005). ‘Moral Discourse and Descriptive Properties’, Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 474–494. Maund, B. (2012). ‘Color’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. E. Zalta. McDowell, J. (1981). ‘Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following’, in Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, 141–162, eds. S. Holtzman and C. Leich, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.* McDowell, J. (1983). ‘Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World’, in Pleasure, Preference, and Value, 1–16, ed. E. Schaper, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bibliography 221 McDowell, J. (1985). ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’, in Morality and Objectivity, 110–129, ed. T. Honderich, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.* + McDowell, J. (1987). ‘Projection and Truth in Ethics’, Lindley Lecture, University of Kansas. * McDowell, J. (1988). Mind, Value and Reality, London: Harvard University Press. McNaughton, D. (1988). Moral Vision, Oxford: Blackwell. Miller, A. (2003). An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics, Cambridge: Polity Press. Millgram, E. (1995). ‘Was Hume a Humean?’, Hume Studies 21, 75–94. Moore, G. E. (1903). Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted 2nd ed., ed. T. Baldwin (1993) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.* + Nolan, D., Restall, G. and West, C. (2006). ‘Moral Fictionalism versus the Rest’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83, 307–330. Nuccetelli, S. and Seay, G. (2007) Themes from G. E. Moore, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Olson, J. (2011). ‘Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics