BENEŠ Statesman or charlatan? The plans and the reality 1908-1948 by László Gulyás Prepublishing copy Corvinus Publishing Toronto - Buffalo 2007 Translated from Hungarian by Peter Csermely ©LÁSZLÓ GULYÁS ISBN 1-882785-21-5 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 4 PART I: BENEŠ AND THE BIRTH OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA.......... 7 1.1 THE FIRST CONCEPT or, what preceded 1914 ............................. 7 A SUBJECT OF THE MONARCHY ......................................................... 7 1.2 THE ÉMIGRÉ ACTIVITIES OF BENEŠ ...................................... 37 PHASE ONE (September, 1915 – March, 1916) ...................................... 37 PHASE TWO (March, 1916 – December, 1917) ...................................... 55 PHASE THREE (1918) ............................................................................ 68 1.3 THE SECOND CONCEPT ............................................................... 74 THE PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS ................................................................ 74 1.4 COUP, THE CREATION OF SLOVENSKO ................................. 92 SLOVAK – MAGYAR RELATIONSHIP TO 1914 ................................ 92 SLOVAK – MAGYAR RELATIONSHIP 1914-1918 ........................... 109 1.5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECOND CONCEPT ............... 117 PRELIMINARIES TO SLOVENSKO .................................................... 117 THE GLITTERING CHAMBERS OF VERSAILLES ........................... 137 PART II: DEFENCE OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK STATE ............ 168 2.1 DEFENSE OF THE SECOND CONCEPT ................................... 168 PRIME MINISTERIAL INTERLUDE ................................................... 168 BENEŠ’ FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 20’s ............................................ 170 2.2 BENEŠ’ FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY 30’s ................... 201 DECLINING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION .................................... 201 FEELERS TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION ........................................ 212 2.3 THE FAILURE OF THE SECOND CONCEPT .......................... 220 BENEŠ’ FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MID-30s .................................... 220 THE COLLAPSE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ......................................... 239 PART III: THE SECOND EXILE ....................................................... 262 3.1 THE THIRD CONCEPT ................................................................ 262 THE EARLY YEARS (1939-1941) ........................................................ 262 THE THIRD CONCEPT OF BENEŠ ..................................................... 277 3.2 THE FOURTH CONCEPT ............................................................ 290 THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH CONCEPT .............................. 290 BENEŠ AND THE SLOVAK QUESTION ............................................ 317 EARLY SIGNS OF THE FAILURE OF THE FOURTH CONCEPT .... 324 PART IV: VICTORY, THEN DEFEAT ............................................. 334 4.1 THE ATTAINED ELEMENT OF THE FOURTH CONCEPT . 334 ETHNIC CLEANSING ........................................................................... 334 4.2 THE FAILURE OF THE FOURTH CONCEPT ......................... 356 ATTEMPTS AT COOPERATION WITH THE COMMUNISTS.......... 356 PART V: CONCLUSIONS ................................................................... 372 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................. 384 ADDENDA: MAPS ............................................................................... 402 3 INTRODUCTION The concepts and ideas of Edouard Benes. For Hungary, state and nation, among those non-Hungarians who exerted the greatest influence on its history of the 20th century, Edouard Benes ranks among the most influential of the Central European politicians. The important stages of his career often intersected the path of Hungary’s history. During and immediately after the First World War, he was intimately engaged in the formation of the new Central European order, the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the dismemberment of historic Hungary. The leading figures of the age, the framers of the Versailles Peace Treaty, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson, meet and consult him. In fact, several of his requirements and suggestions are incorporated. Between the two wars, as „permanent Czechoslovak Foreign Minister” – a position he held without break between 1918 and 1935 -, then as President, he was one of the highest profile politicians internationally and in the League of Nations. He was present at every important diplomatic event of his age. He negotiated with such political leaders as Briand, Barthou, Streseman, Stalin and Litvinov, as well as being the major mover behind the Little Entente and the strongest opponent to Hungary’s revisionist hopes. Before the Second World War – after the collapse of Czechoslovakia – he was again forced into exile but Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill continued to consider him as a partner, enabling him to return to Prague victorious, in 1945. President of Czechoslovakia between 1945 and 1948, he orchestrated the expulsion of the German and Hungarian minorities, all the while struggling against the attempts of the Communist takeovers. In this last endeavor he fails, spending the last year of his life essentially under house arrest in his country home. I have devoted the past 17 years to the study of the career of Benes, beginning with a 1988 undergraduate paper. During that time, I have written various studies on the topic, while reading thousands of pages by and of him. When I chose the political career of Benes as my historian’s thesis, I was clear that the required length of the thesis could in no way do justice to a Benes biography. I think my reasoning is verified by being unaware of the existence of any biographical work that does justice to his multi-faceted career. I, too, shall refrain from the attempt. Yet, I took it as a professional challenge to shed light on the role of Benes, attempting to create such a framework which makes it possible. As a starting point, I set as my goal: Disclose the role Benes played in 20th century Hungarian history. During my research, I realized that if I strive to answer merely that question, it will lead to a pronounced one-sided, Hungarian-centric result. But as the short sketch unequivocally shows, Benes is one of those politicians whose actions influenced, to a large degree, the fate of all of Central Europe. We can state that Benes had a role – perhaps not outstanding, but certainly important – in the two events that left their stamp 4 on Central Europe, Versailles and Yalta. His actions have greatly influenced the histories of other Central European nations and states: Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Sudeten Germans, Russyns, etc. Hence, I expanded my original goal and restated it as: What was the resultant outcome on Central European history of all the plans formulated by Edouard Benes during his long political career? To state it more pointedly: Is Edouard Benes a positive figure in Central European history – a great man and statesman, as the majority of Czech historians tend to depict him – or a negative figure whose mistakes, Machiavellianism and unrelenting cynicism brought severe suffering to several Central European nations, not only Hungarians but Germans, Slovaks, Poles and, indeed, to Czechs? After framing the above initial question, a methodological question arises, to wit: How can a political career, so long, full and wide ranging, be adequately grasped, explained and illustrated? The logical answer would seem to be a chronological ordering. But in making use of that, I have not been able to address the problems that arise from the wide divergence, or the next problem, which is the identification of reliable source material on which to base a reliable portrait of Benes. In the midst of my musing, it was Benes himself who came to my rescue, as I surveyed the several thousand pages of Benes-written material on my bookshelves. I suddenly realized that Benes was one of those politicians who, for various reasons – partly propaganda, partly the nature of politics – revealed his thoughts to his political partners or the public. During his long political career, he published his plans, thoughts and opinions in countless articles, speeches, letters, memoranda and books. Based on all these, and with an interest to solving the methodological problems, I decided to base this book on the following framework: During his career, Benes worked out four concepts, or frameworks, for the organization of Central Europe, three of which he tried to implement. Thus, I shall try to present his career alongside these notions. They are: Concept 1: “If Austria did not exist, it would be necessary to invent ∗ her.” This Monarchy-friendly position was published in 1908 in Dijon as part of his doctoral thesis, “Le probleme autrichien et la question tchégue”, and essentially represented his views until 1914. Concept 2: “Smash Austria-Hungary.” This view was arrived at during his first émigré period, published in Paris in 1916. Essentially, this was the guiding principle of all his refugee political activities, moreover, it was the course of Czechoslovak foreign affairs, headed by him, from Versailles to Munich. Concept 3: “Poland and Czechoslovakia … resolved: after the conclusion of this war, some manner of closer political and economic alliance will be created.” He published this view in January 1942 in the American Foreign Affairs magazine, in an article titled