Problem of evil 1 Problem of evil In the philosophy of religion, the problem of evil is the question of how to reconcile the existence of evil with that of a deity who is omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent (see theism).[1][2] An argument from evil attempts to show that the co-existence of evil and such a deity is unlikely or impossible, and attempts to show the contrary have been traditionally known as theodicies. There are a wide range of responses that have been given to the problem of evil. These include the explanation of evil as the result of free will misused by God's creatures, the view that our suffering is required for personal growth, the denial that God is omnipotent, omniscient, or omnibenevolent, and skepticism concerning the ability of humans to understand God's reasons for permitting the existence of evil. There are also many discussions of "evil" and associated "problems" in other philosophical fields, such as secular ethics,[3][4][5] and scientific disciplines such as evolutionary ethics.[6][7] But as usually understood, the "problem of evil" is posed in a theological context.[1][2] Detailed arguments Numerous different versions of the problem of evil have been formulated.[1][2][8] Logical problem of evil One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil is often attributed to Epicurus[9] and may be schematized as follows: 1. If an all-powerful and perfectly good god exists, then evil does not. 2. There is evil in the world. 3. Therefore, an all-powerful and perfectly good god does not exist. This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens. In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world". Since it is unclear precisely how the antecedent of the first premise of the epicurean argument entails the consequent, later versions have been offered such as:[2] 1. God exists. 2. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good. 3. A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils. 4. An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence. 5. An omnipotent being, who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence. 6. A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil. 7. If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists. 8. Evil exists (logical contradiction). Versions such as these are referred to as the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and cannot therefore all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the propositions stating that God cannot exist with, or would want to prevent, all evils (premises No. 3 and No. 6), with defenders of theism arguing that God could very well exist with and allow evil in order to achieve a greater good. One greater good that has been proposed is that of free will, famously argued for in Plantinga's free will defense. The first part of this defense accounts for moral evil as the result of free human action. The second part of this defense argues for the logical possibility of "a mighty nonhuman spirit"[10] such as Satan who is responsible for so-called Problem of evil 2 'natural evils', including earthquakes, tidal waves, and virulent diseases. Many philosophers accept that Plantinga successfully solves the logical problem of evil,[11], as he appears to have shown that God and evil are logically compatible, though others demur[12]. Evidential problem of evil The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism. As an example, a critic of Plantinga's idea of "a mighty nonhuman spirit" causing natural evils may concede that the existence of such a being is not logically impossible but argue that due to lacking scientific evidence for its existence this is very unlikely and thus it is an unconvincing explanation for the presence of natural evils. William L. Rowe's famous example of natural evil: "In some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, A version by William L. Rowe: horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its [13] suffering." 1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse. 3. (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2] Another by Paul Draper: 1. Gratuitous evils exist. 2. The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism. 3. Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[14] These arguments are probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, one can see no good reason for God’s permission of evil. The inference from this claim to the general statement that there exists unnecessary evil is inductive in nature and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.[2] The logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil still exist. However, the existence of God is viewed as any large-scale hypothesis or explanatory theory that aims to make sense of some pertinent facts. To the extent that it fails to do so it is disconfirmed.[2] According to Occam's razor, one should make as few assumptions as possible. Hidden reasons are assumptions, as is the assumption that all pertinent facts can be observed, or that facts and theories humans have not discerned are indeed hidden. Thus, as per Draper's argument above, the theory that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being who is indifferent requires no hidden reasons in order to explain evil. It is thus a simpler theory than one that also requires hidden reasons regarding evil in order to include omnibenevolence. Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is a hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear Problem of evil 3 without hidden arguments. As such, from a probabilistic viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1] Author and researcher Gregory S. Paul offers what he considers to be a particularly strong problem of evil. Paul describes conservative calculations that at least 100 billion people have been born throughout human history (starting roughly 50 000 years ago, when Homo Sapiens – humans – first appeared).[15] He then performed what he calls "simple" calculations to estimate that the historical death rate of children throughout this time. He found that it was over 50%, and that the deaths of these children were mostly due to diseases (like malaria). Paul thus sees it as a problem of evil, because this means, throughout human history, over 50 billion people died naturally before they were old enough to give mature consent. He adds that this could have implications for calculating the population of a heaven (which could include an additional 30 000 billion humans who died naturally but prenatally, the aforementioned 50 billion children, and finally the remaining 50 billion adults – excluding those alive today).[16][17] A common response to instances of the evidential problem is that there are plausible (and not hidden) justifications for God’s permission of evil. These theodicies are discussed below. Related arguments Doctrines of hell, particularly those involving eternal suffering, pose a particularly strong form of the problem of evil (see problem of hell). If unbelief, incorrect beliefs, or poor design are considered evils, then the argument from nonbelief, the argument from inconsistent revelations, and the argument from poor design may be seen as particular instances of the argument from evil. Answers and theodicies Responses to the problem of evil have sometimes been classified as defenses or theodicies. However, authors disagree on the exact definitions.[1][2][18] Generally, a defense may refer to attempts to defuse the logical problem of evil by showing that there is no logical incompatibility between the existence of evil and the existence of God. A defense need not argue that this is a probable or plausible explanation, only that the explanation is logically possible, for if on some logically possible explanation God and evil are logically compatible, then whatever the case with respect to that explanation's being true or not, God and evil are logically compatible.[19] A theodicy,[20] on the other hand, is more ambitious, since it attempts to provide a plausible justification—a morally sufficient reason—for the existence of evil and thereby rebut the "evidential" argument from evil.[2] Richard Swinburne maintains that it does not make sense to assume there are greater goods that justify the evil's presence in the world unless we know what they are—without knowledge of what the greater goods could be, one cannot have a successful theodicy.[21] Thus, some authors see arguments appealing to demons or the fall of man as indeed logically possible, but not very plausible given our knowledge about the world, and so see those arguments as providing defenses but not good theodicies.[2] Lacking omnibenevolence, omniscience, or omnipotence The problem of evil will not be encountered if God lacks any one of the three qualities.