A VIEW FROM THE OTHERS Russia and Quad Plus Is There a Way Forward? DR. ANNA KIREEVA DR. ALEXEY KUPRIYANOV Abstract Russia’s official stance toward both the Quad and the concept of the Indo- Pacific has been largely negative. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeat- edly argued against the Quad, accusing the United States of attempts to contain China and draw not only allies Japan and Australia but also India to this goal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ approach is explained by the fact that the Quad is essentially perceived as an echo of the Cold War alliances as well as NATO- style arrangement that Russia is well-familiar with in Europe. Russia’s position is ex- plained by the fact that the Quad is seen as running counter to Russia’s interests of building a collective security architecture and undermining Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Centrality as well as by the character of Rus- sia’s bilateral relations with ASEAN members. A rift in US–Russia relations seems to preclude any opportunity for cooperation with the Quad or Quad Plus. Moscow deems it impossible to support the Quad due to its anti- Chinese nature, as adopting policies against China is not considered to be in Russia’s national interests. Russian officials generally overlook cooperation on nontraditional secu- rity by either the Quad or Quad Plus. At the same time, Russia enjoys a privileged strategic partnership with India and other powers that are at odds with China, such as Vietnam, and would rather prefer to remain neutral in the growing US– China strategic competition and retain as much strategic autonomy as possible. Russia has been one of the key players in addressing nontraditional security threats in the Indo- Pacific and, although direct cooperation with the Quad or Quad Plus is out of the question, bilateral cooperation with the group’s individual members or under the auspices of regional multilateral institutions like ASEAN Regional Forum or ASEAN Defence Minister’s Meeting–Plus (ADMM+) is a tangible prospect, including addressing COVID-19 and the pandemic’s effects. Introduction Russia’s official stance toward both the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, better known as the Quad—composed of the United States, Japan, Australia, and In- dia—and the concept of the Indo- Pacific has been largely negative. The Russian 210 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 Russia and Quad Plus Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, repeatedly argued against the Indo- Pacific and the Quad. The first speech where he touched upon the Indo- Pacific in a substantial way took place in Vietnam in February 2019. He started by charac- terizing the contemporary world order as a polycentric and more democratic one in the making, with a number of economically and politically rising powers. He described the Indo- Pacific as an artificially created region and accused the United States of attempts to contain China and draw not only allies Japan and Australia but also India to this goal via military cooperation.1 During his speech at the Primakov Readings summit in July 2020, Lavrov named the US Indo- Pacific Strategy as aimed at creating confrontational blocs in the region.2 One of the prevalent critiques given by Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been based on questioning the basic principles of the Indo-Pacific—that it is free and open—and the necessity for formulating a new region. According to Lavrov, the Indo- Pacific seems to be an exclusive rather than an inclusive bloc which clearly does not correspond to the principles of openness. Moreover, on the Rus- sian side questions arise about why a new and very vaguely characterized Indo- Pacific is supplanting an inclusive and multilateral Asia- Pacific structures with large participation, clear and agreed-upon rules, and defined geography. The Quad has been accused of policies aimed at containing China.3 At the same time, it should be noted that Russia, apart from being a European power, at the same time geographically belongs to the northern Pacific Ocean and, thus, can also be characterized as a Pacific or an Asia-Pacific power.4 Apart from the post- Soviet space, the European and Asian dimension of Russia’s for- eign and economic policy can be characterized as strategically important ones, the latter being connected to the need for development of the Russian Far East.5 In particular, there is an academic tradition among Russians living in the Far East that prefers to refer to this part of the country as Northern Pacific, highlighting its geographic and historic interaction with Asia and North America.6 Thus, a question arises why Russia, being a northern Pacific power and position- ing itself as a part of the Asia-Pacific, is so negatively predisposed toward both the Indo- Pacific and Quad? Should such a position be taken for granted, or is there a way forward for Russia to cooperate with the Quad or Quad Plus? To answer this set of questions this chapter explains Russia’s reaction by analyzing its foreign and security policy toward Asia as well as the set of bilateral relations with Quad mem- bers and China, both elements deemed critical for understanding Moscow’s official approach. The article starts by examining the transformation of Russia’s Asian policy and its approach to regional security agendas. These are followed by the overview of Russia’s bilateral relations with Quad member states and the People’s Republic of China. The final section explains Russia’s approach based on the above JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 211 Kireeva & Kupriyanov presented analysis together while shedding light on its position on liberal and rules- based international order. The conclusion discusses whether there is a way forward for cooperation between Russia and the Quad or Quad Plus. Russia’s Asian Policy and Approach to Regional Security Russia’s interest in the Indo-Pacific region has a long history. For centuries, Russia traded with Persia, China, and India. Russian pioneers and pathfinders fought their way to the East and on to the Pacific Ocean; after the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet leaders showed interest in spreading the ideas of socialism and communism to the countries of the East. In the second half of the twentieth century, Moscow’s policy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans was defined through the prism of the Cold War, and both oceans, primarily the Pacific, were viewed as battlefields. The difference between them was that in the Pacific Ocean the Soviet Union had bases in Primorye and Kamchatka, but there were no strong allies, while there were no Soviet bases in the Indian Ocean, but there was a powerful friendly partner: India. The end of the Cold War completely changed the situa- tion. In the last years of the Soviet Union, Pres. Mikhail Gorbachev formulated an initiative to reorganize the regional Pacific order and said that the Soviet Union was ready to participate in this process.7 However, the collapse of the USSR and the economic difficulties of the 1990s interrupted this emerging interest in the Pacific Ocean. The general collapse of the Russian economy, the desire to break with the Soviet legacy, the pro- Western orientation of the new leadership in every sense, and a lack of strategic thinking led to the rejection of any attempts to de- clare Russia as a powerful Pacific power. However, as Russia overcame its protracted internal crisis, its leadership grew aware that Moscow should pay more attention to the East, as the twenty-first century would become the “Age of Asia.” One of the pioneers of this idea was the head of Russian foreign intelligence, then- Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov.8 His line was continued by Vladimir Putin, who, after becom- ing president of Russia, took decisive steps in this direction. Such policy enhanced Russia’s relations with Asian states as a strategic course to diversify Moscow’s relations in politics, security, economics, and energy since the early 2000s and has been often labeled as a “pivot to Asia” or “turn to the East.”9 At the same time, even taking into consideration growing economic interaction with Asia, Russia has been often considered as an “external player” or an “absent power” due to it small share in regional trade and investment as well as lack of participation in production networks. Russia’s involvement in regional institutions is also facing a number of limitations.10 212 JOURNAL OF INDO-PACIFIC AFFAIRS SPECIAL ISSUE 2020 Russia and Quad Plus A crisis in Russia’s relations with the West in 2014 prompted Russia to acceler- ate its pivot to Asia, as it had become apparent that only on the basis of greater cooperation with Asian states would it become possible for Moscow to realize its key goal of establishing a center of power in Eurasia.11 For a long time, Russia’s policy in the region remained multivectored: while strengthening relations with China, Moscow at the same time sought to maintain close ties with India, im- prove economic and political ties with Japan, actively promote the resolution of the Korean problem, maintain the central role of ASEAN, and not spoil relations with the United States. However, as events have played out over the past several years, Russia has seemingly grown closer to China, and pressure from the United States is literally pushing Moscow into the arms of Beijing. Attempts by Wash- ington’s regional partners, primarily Japan and India, to avoid such a development have proven unsuccessful, with American pressure proving so strong that Tokyo and New Delhi’s efforts are in vain.