| winner of the dila prize 2013 | Reflections of a Confluence: International Law in the Philippine Court 1940–2000 Francis Tom Temprosa1 1. INTRODUCTION In 1901, at the brink of the establishment of a civil government in the Philippines, the present Supreme Court of the Philippines was born. Under American influence, the Philippine Commission instituted a new system modeled after the judicial system of the United States. Judicial powers of government were vested in the Supreme Court and other inferior courts, and the Court was entrusted with the power to issue writs and hear con- troversies brought before it.2 In the same year, one of the very first potential interfaces between international law and municipal law in the country could have happened. The Court was asked to rule on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in In re the Application of John W. Calloway for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.3 Justice Willard wrote that, at that time, no judge was 1 S.J.D. Candidate (Grotius Fellow), University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Professor of Law, Ateneo de Manila University School of Law; Professorial Lecturer of Public International Law, Far Eastern University Institute of Law; Senior Lecturer of Public International Law, Miriam College; Legal Adviser, Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines. 2 Institute of Developing Economies, The Philippine Judicial System 3 (Raul C. Pangalangan ed., 2001). 3 In re the Application of John W. Calloway for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, G.R. No. 456 (S.C., Aug. 28, 1901) (Phil.). 88 Temprosa: International Law in the Philippine Court 89 conferred with an authority to issue such a writ, and thus, the writ pre- viously issued to free Calloway, who was arrested by virtue of military orders, was repealed.4 This started the inexorable march of international law jurisprudence into domestic law. Years later, during the 1940s, the Court cited international law in a decision involving the freedom and detention of Filipinos who were dis- placed from their homes by the United States military. In Raquiza v. Brad- ford, decided in 1945—proximate in time to the Second World War—the Court, in further justifying their detention, said that the Filipinos might be considered as prisoners of war.5 It reasoned: In volume II, Hyde International Law, page 345, section 676, we read: It should be borne in mind that an army in the field, in the course of any operation in any locality . may also avail itself, of the right to make civilians prisoners of war. The author cites from the Rules of Land Warfare which contains circum- stances under which civilians may be considered as prisoners of war. This enumeration includes: (c) Persons whose services are of a particular use and benefit to the hostile army or its government, such as the higher civil officials, diplomatic agents, couriers, guides, etc. (Emphasis added) We think that the petitioners would, prima facie, qualify as prisoners of war under the charges of “Espionage activity for Japanese,” “Active collaboration with the Japanese,” and “Active collaboration with the enemy.”6 There is a confluence of international law and municipal law on the bed of the Philippine judicial system. There have been ripples in this movement be- fore. But increasingly, through the years, the Philippine Court has referred to international law—and have decided upon questions of international law—on many and different occasions, forming strong currents of disjoint and opposition at times. These movements give rise to implications, as well as questions on the application and operation of international law in the domestic courts of the Philippines. 4 Id. 5 Raquiza v. Bradford, G.R. No. L-44, 75 Phil. Rep. 50 (S.C., Sept. 13, 1945) (Phil.). 6 Charles Hyde, International Law Volume II 345 §676 (2nd ed. 1945)..