Low-Carbon Policy Experimentation in Chinese Cities: Local Leadership and Implementation Strategies

Low-Carbon Policy Experimentation in Chinese Cities: Local Leadership and Implementation Strategies

Low-Carbon Policy Experimentation in Chinese Cities: Local Leadership and Implementation Strategies Weila Gong Bavaria School of Public Policy Technical University of Munich Paper prepared for the ISA 2021 Annual Convention, April 2021. Please do not cite without the author’s permission. Abstract Local engagement in low-carbon energy transitions is central to the success of China’s 2060 carbon neutrality pledge. Previous research on subnational climate experimentation focuses on identifying the dynamics and patterns of climate policy experimentation, but less is known about how urban low-carbon policy experiments have been implemented. This study draws on 42 in- depth interviews and comparative case studies to examine why some Chinese cities have been more successful than others at implementing low-carbon policy experiments. It compares Shenzhen and Xiamen – two environmentally friendly and economically advanced cities that took divergent approaches to low-carbon policy experimentation. My findings highlight the importance of local government leadership and the capacity to mobilize resources as key determinants of success. Keywords: cities, subnational climate governance, policy experimentation, leadership, policy implementation, climate change, China 1. INTRODUCTION Local climate policy implementation is central to the success of China’s low-carbon energy transitions (Qi et al., 2008; Song., 2020; Schreurs, 2008). China’s policy experimentation process has been described as a mass campaign-style resource mobilization with local government officials as the target and objects of state mobilization (Perry, 2011). The National Low-Carbon City Pilot Program, a government-driven policy experimentation mechanism, encourages subnational government to explore policy instruments and governing styles to decarbonize from the bottom up (Heilmann, 2018; Song t al., 2020). As of 2021, 82 Chinese cities have engaged in the national pilot program, but they have demonstrated different levels of responsiveness to climate policy experiments (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation (NCSC), 2017). Although scholarly research has noted the importance of government leadership in climate experimentation (Tie et al., 2020; Hoffmann, 2011), relatively little is known about the implementation strategies and politics of the local low-carbon policy process. This paper aims to fill this gap by examining low-carbon policy experimentation and implementation in Chinese cities, and the implications for the country’s 2060 neutrality pledge. My approach departs from previous research by shifting the focus from top political leaders to local leaders’ ability to mobilize the necessary resources to implement low-carbon policies. Prior studies that assess the impact of top political leaders’ characteristics, such as their motivations and backgrounds, on government responses in policy experiments (Bulman, 2016; Tie et al., 2020). I instead focus on leading local officials and their implementation strategies. I argue that local government leadership has served as a catalyst for local engagement in low-carbon policy experiments that help institutionalize decarbonization. I evaluate the level of local policy engagement in low-carbon policy experimentation in terms of the level of policy institutionalization. This engagement entails continuity in experimental program development, and ideally, institutions, standards, regulations, and legal acts that can facilitate decarbonization (Jacob et al., 2005). I draw on comparative case studies and in-depth interviews to argue that the level of local engagement in low-carbon policy experimentation is determined by the strength of local government leadership – particularly their resources mobilization abilities. Leaders who can build a broad implementation alliance to overcome the widespread political apathy towards low-carbon issues are likely to have a higher level of engagement in low-carbon policy experiments. Likewise, implementation is likely to be more advanced where leaders have created a group of trained personnel to draft and implement action plans. Thus even within the constraints on political and economic authority in a centralized political system like China’s, local governments can mobilize the necessary resources for climate policy experimentation. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the study’s research design and methodology. Section 3 reviews China’s subnational climate policy engagement and government- led policy initiatives related to decarbonization. Section 4 introduces my analytical framework – local government leadership. Section 5 compares the two case studies, illustrating the different policy implementation approaches taken by Shenzhen and Xiamen. Section 6 concludes by analyzing the role of local government leadership and implementation strategies in low-carbon policy experimentation and discussing the study’s implications. 2. Methodology My research design controlled initial characteristics such as economic and development status to examine the conditions under which some local areas have a higher level of engagement than others in climate policy experimentation. Shenzhen and Xiamen were selected as the case areas because they had similar levels of economic development, environmental protection, and energy efficiency but took divergent approaches to low-carbon policy experimentation. I use a most- similar comparative case design (George and Bennett, 2004) to compare their low-carbon policy engagement. Shenzhen introduced a wide range of experimental projects in its International Low- Carbon City Program and created the country’s first regional carbon emission exchange. Yet Xiamen has taken a rather cautious approach, with few experimental programs and a lack of cross- divisional coordination in policy implementation. Xiamen has made much less progress in low- carbon policy institutionalization than Shenzhen. It is admittedly tricky to conduct a perfectly controlled comparison given the complexity of such processes (George and Bennett, 2004). To improve the internal validity of this comparison, I use process tracing to identify the key changes in low-carbon policy experiments between 2010 and 2018 and the impact of local leaders’ turnover in low-carbon policy progress in both cities. I collected original data consisting of 42 in-depth interviews and unpublished government documents from the case cities to reconstruct the local policy process. Most of the interviewees were local officials from the Development and Reform Bureaus and Construction Bureaus as well as experts from the industrial sector and think tanks in both case regions and Beijing, who were involved in developing the local low-carbon policy programs. In an environment like the Chinese government, where interviewees are hard to access, personal connections and referrals from important actors from Beijing help reach local officials for interviews (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013). To prevent bias from the snowball recruiting technique, I also interviewed professionals from a wide range of backgrounds, who have been researching or assisting local low-carbon city programs (Bleich and Pekkanen, 2013). My interview sample includes six active or former government officials, four academics, eight think tank researchers, four representatives from non-governmental organizations and the media, and four enterprise representatives. The semi-structured interviews asked common questions about who did what, when, and how to orchestrate the implementation process, the key challenges in the experimentation progress, what measures have been taken, and how to address the implementation challenges. Most interviews were conducted face to face and lasted 40 minutes to two hours. Personal conversations were held with key informants who have participated in or closely observed local low-carbon policy processes but are less accessible for formal interviews due to their position or time constraints. These personal conversations were conducted in less formal settings such as after conference conversations, but offered unique case-specific information about the key factors driving local responses to climate experiments. I conducted serial interviews (Read, 2018) with eight key informants who were interviewed twice (in 2013 and 2018). I use these interviews to examine the study’s key concept and variables – leadership and implementation strategies (Gallagher, 2013). I also triangulate original data collected from field research with published data sources included government documents, newspaper reports, and statistical yearbooks (Gallagher, 2013). 3. Local Leadership and Low-carbon Policy Experimentation Low-carbon policy experiments are conducted in an environment characterized by uncertainty (Hoffmann, 2011). A lack of financial resources and trained personnel has constrained the experimental programs’ development (Hughes, 2019). Recognizing the need to bridge the traditional and experimental governing systems, Hoffmann (2011) calls for the climate governance leadership to integrate low-carbon policies into the existing policy system. This paper explores the role of local government leadership in low-carbon policy experimentation in Chinese cities, and considers the implementation strategies used in the experimentation process. Prior studies have documented the importance of subnational leadership in climate initiatives. For instance, Barry Rabe (2004) explores how US policy entrepreneurs pushed climate action plans

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