The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical Perspective Author(s): Ian S. Lustick Source: International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn, 1997), pp. 653-683 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2703502 . Accessed: 31/10/2013 15:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Organization. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 130.91.177.89 on Thu, 31 Oct 2013 15:10:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Absenceof Middle EasternGreat Powers: Political"Backwardness" in HistoricalPerspective Ian S. Lustick Propelledby the oil boomof the mid-1970s the Middle East emergedas theworld's fastestgrowing region.' Hopes and expectations were high for Arab political consoli- dation,economic advancement, and cultural efflorescence. With falling oil pricesand a devastatingwar between Iran and Iraq,these hopes had dimmedsomewhat by the early1980s. In 1985,however, the spectacular image of an Arabgreat power was stilltantalizing. A Pan-Arabstate, wrote two experts on theregion, would include a totalarea of 13.7million square kilometers, secondonly to theSoviet Union and considerably larger than Europe, Canada, China,or theUnited States.... By 2000 itwould have more people than either ofthe two superpowers. This statewould contain almost two-thirds of the world'sproven oil reserves.It wouldalso haveenough capital to financeits own economicand socialdevelopment. Conceivably, it could feed itself.... Access to a hugemarket could stimulate rapid industrial growth. Present regional in- equalitiescould ultimately be lessenedand the mismatch between labor-surplus andlabor-short areas corrected. The aggregatemilitary strength and political influenceof this strategically located state would be formidable....It is easyto comprehendwhy this dream has longintoxicated Arab nationalists.2 Withinten years, however, this assessment sounded more like a fairytale thana scenario.Indeed the last two decades have been dispiriting for Arab nationalists, not onlymeasured against the prospect of a greatnational state, but compared to levels of I am gratefulfor helpful comments made on preliminarydrafts of thisarticle by ThomasCallaghy, Melani Cammett,Avery Goldstein, Steven Heydemann, Friedrich Kratochwil, Sevket Pamuk, and this journal'sanonymous reviewers. The paperon whichthis article is based was originallyprepared for a January1996 workshop on "Regionalismand the Middle East" organizedunder the auspices of the Joint Nearand Middle East Committeeof the Social ScienceResearch Council. 1. El Mallakh1978,195. 2. Drysdaleand Blake 1985,225. For similarexpectations and scenarios of Arab unity, prosperity, and power,see Kerr1982, 2; and El Mallakh1978, 186-89. On thepotential for a greatArab state, see, for example,Waterbury 1978, 53-55, 100; Lucianiand Salame 1988, 13; Salam6 1988a,264, 278; and Sira- geldin1988, 204. InternationalOrganization 51, 4, Autumn1997, pp. 653-83 ? 1997by The IO Foundationand the Massachusetts Institute of Technology This content downloaded from 130.91.177.89 on Thu, 31 Oct 2013 15:10:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 654 InternationalOrganization cooperationand interstate integration inEurope, Asia, and the Americas, where highly developedcountries are joining with rapidly expanding emergent economies in re- gionallybased communitiesof wealthand growth.In theMiddle East, on theother hand,all integrationschemes have failed. Intraregional trade remains very low, with estimatesranging between 2 and 8 percentover the last fifteen years.3 Most Middle Easternstates are experiencing either economic stagnation or absolute decline. From 1980 to 1991 theMiddle East (includingIsrael and Iran,but not Turkey) and North Africaregistered almost a 3 percentdecrease in annual income growth compared to a 1 percentdecrease in Sub-SaharanAfrica and a 1 percentincrease for all thedevelop- ing world.4The regionsuffered a declineof almost2 percentin grossdomestic product(GDP) per capitabetween 1980 and 1993.5Unemployment in 1993 was twiceas high(15 percent)as thatin anyother region of the world.6 Manyexplanations have been offeredfor disunity, economic stagnation, and the failureof anyMuslim or Arab state to emergeas or to builda MiddleEastern great power.Despite the rhetoric and sentimentof Arab nationalism and Arab unity and, morerecently, Islamic unity, contemporary Middle Eastern history is riddledwith parochialhostilities, meaningless schemes for mergers and federations, and a raftof regimesstrong enough to suppressdissidents but too weakand insecureto riskinti- mateforms of cooperationwith their neighbors. With "artificial" colonial borders virtuallyintact, energy and capital surpluses are mostly separated from demographic bulkand centersof militaryand administrativecapacity and politicalappeal. These conditions,it is oftenpointed out, have preventedMiddle Easterners from building largeinternal markets and from exploiting their homogeneity, resources, and admin- istrative-politicalcapacity for dynamic, long-term economic growth.7 Mostanalysts who have confronted what Fouad Ajami dubbed the "Arab predica- ment"have implicitlyor explicitlyused theprocesses and successesof European integrationafter World War II to identifythe requisites of success in theMiddle East and thereasons for failure.8 Those whohave thoughtthe prospects were not all bad forArab integration have stressedwhat they deemed the growing self-confidence, pragmatism,and flexibilityof stateswhose separatesovereignty was increasingly recognizedand accepted as permanentby their neighbors. Using Western Europe as a pointof reference,these observers expected Arab governmentswould therebybe able to leave asideold feudsand cooperate without worrying about political dissolu- 3. See Miller1993, 8; Shafik1995, 17. 4. Shafik1995, 15. 5. Ibid., 65. Annualgrowth in GDP in theregion also decreased,from a peak of 6 percentin the mid-1970sto less than1 percentin thelate 1980s.See ibid.,4. 6. Diwan 1995,3. 7. Fora usefullist of failed Arab integration initiatives, see Azzam 1993,227-28. 8. Despitethe recent emphasis on Islam as a unifyingpolitical identity in theMiddle East, no frame- workhas beenor is morepromising as a basisfor achieving substantial political and economic integration thanArab nationalism.Therefore, I focus my analysison thefailure of Arabintegration or Arab state building,while acknowledging that Arabism has neverbeen completely divorced from Islamic motifs and suggestingat theend of the article that the argument works equally well for Muslim schemes for political integration.For a sampleof the "obituaries"written for Arab national unity, see Brown1984, 27-43; Ajami 1992; andTibi 1990,24-25. This content downloaded from 130.91.177.89 on Thu, 31 Oct 2013 15:10:22 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Absenceof Middle Eastern Great Powers 655 tionor subversion.9Some analystshave stressedthe functional necessity of close economiccooperation and political integration, arguing from necessity to inevitabil- ityor likelihood.'0Others trace the large-scale movement of laborand remittances acrossArab state boundaries, recalling, in theiranticipation that such interdependen- cies werebinding the Arab world into an economicwhole, theories associated with KarlDeutsch and Ernst Haas to theeffect that increasing transactions across borders andthe unintended spillover of functionally important requirements for cooperation wouldlead Europetoward both political and economic integration. "I More pessimis- tic analystshave used theEuropean experience to explainwhy the Arab world has notintegrated successfully. Citing regime heterogeneity in the Middle East, the ab- senceof strong democratic institutions, theskewed distribution ofwealth, and the weakness andinsecurity ofgovernments-these observers blame the failure of regional integration on howdifferent the Middle East is in theserespects from Western Europe. 12 My argumentbegins by suggestingthat, whether optimistic or pessimistic,these analysesare based on a misplacedanalogy of post-WorldWar II Europeanstates withpost-World War II Arabor, more broadly, Islamic or MiddleEastern states. A muchmore fundamental appreciation of the political and economic quandaries faced bythe peoples of theMiddle East is possibleif the dozens of statesin theregion are comparedto thescores and even hundreds of European states and principalities that, ingradually decreasing number, comprised Europe (and the lands bordering the North Atlantic)from the 1200s through the late nineteenth century. The questionthen be- comes:How is it thatpowerful states, such as GreatBritain, France, Russia, Ger- many,Italy, and theUnited States, could arise in theseregions-states that not only combinedthe natural resources, cultural affinities, demographic bulk, military capac- ity,administrative integrity, and economic wealth necessary for activity on theworld stageas greatpowers, but could also serveeither as hegemonicleaders