1490 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 0? THE BUREAU OF SAFETY ITT RE INVESTIGATION OF AN ACCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED ON THE TRACKS 0*1 THE CENTRAL UNION DEPOT AND RAILWAY COMPANY AT CINCINNATI, OHIO, ON FEBRUARY 8, 1929. May IB, 1929. To the Commission : On February 8, 1929, there was a side collision between tne forward, -portion of a •passenger train of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, consisting of empty mail and baggage cars, making a back-up movement, and a standing passenger tram of tne Louisville & Nashville Railroad on the tracks of the Central Union Depot and Railway Company at Cincinnati, Ohio, resulting in the death of one employee, and the miury of one employee and two other persons. This accident was investigated m con­ junction with a reore-ientative of the Olio Commission of Public Utilities. Location and method, of operation The Central Union Depot and Railway Company operates the Union Station, used by the trains of eight divisions of five different railwavs, and also operates a double- track mam line exteniin°" westward from the station to Harriet Street, a distance of 1.2 miles. Thin sectjon of xrack is used by passenger trams of tne Louisville & Nashville and Baltimore & Ohio Railroads, and also by passenger trams of otner railroads. There is no block signal system in use m the vicinity of the point of accident, nor are tram orders used, movements being handled entirely bv switch tenders. In the case of move­ ments with the current of traffic the signals given by switch tenders/merely indicate../whether the switches m question are properly lined lip for the movement to be made, while m the case of movements against the current of traffic the switch tnndera first make the necessary arrangements oetween themselves before authorizing such movements to be made. There are ei^ht parallel tracks, numbered from north to south, under the tram shed of the Central Union pasnenger statxon. The distance from the bumping posts, westward, to the end of the tram rhed is approx­ imately 600 feet, track 3 connects with track 3 at a point about 400 feet west of fchc western end of the tram shed. The accident occurrea at the fouling point of the ~2~ junction of these t vo tracks, 903 feat vest of the bump- i^r oobtb. Starting at the bumping post and proceeding "'eftwud track 3 is t^ngrnt for a distance of "bout 750 fo t and then it curvej slightly toward tha left for a distance of about 75 f-j^t, folio rir.g "Thich it is tangent to the pciat of accident,the grade is 0 97 per c an+ de­ scending for - distance of approximately 550 feet and then it is 0.74 por cent for 3 00 feet,following 'Thich it is level to the point of accident. It was rcming at the time of the accident, ahich occurred at about 8.40 p.m. Description Bnltimor? & Ohio gt. Louis Division pasGenrer tram No. 23 arrived at the Control Union pmsengnr station nt about 8.05 p. TI The rix rear enre ware ^oved /estvord to Park Street co^ch yard ov yard engine at about 8.18 p.m.,leaving the forvvra portion of the tmn, consirtng of B&O engine 5115, hatred o^t, one oostnl c^r and tvo b-^tgago car';, ^11 of steel constTdction, in ch^rere of Yard Ocncuctor Carner "nd Engmeman Bl^ck, strndin^ on tinck 3 under the tram n^cd rith tne engine neirost tha bun-omr port. After ticse tbrea cars ''er-1 unloaded the contemplat­ ed back-up movement ~; >n star tec but shortly "f ter"f irds, on reaching the fouling point it the junction of tria^L 2 and 3, tnvelmg at a rpejd estimated to have beer between 5 ard 10 miles oar hour, the northwest corner of the leading c_ir struck the south s">de of tire rear car in L&N passenger trmn No. 17 Louisville & Nashville passenger train No. 17 con­ sisted of an enama, he iced east and standing near tne bunpmg post on tra,ck 3, t"7o bags' ige cara, one combination car,one coach, one dim ir" car, five sleeping cars, one observation car, and L&N vard engine 880, headed wast and coupled to the west end of the tram This tram was i^de up on track 3 and n charge of Yard Conductor Citron and Yard Engmeaan Herron, vhile being oo3r^ted within the Cincinnati terminal, and it was intended that yard ei^ipe 880 should h^ul the tram backward to "Vood Street and then assist it across the briage over tne Ohio River to Covington,Kv., however, while standmr on track 3 obstructing track 3, preparatory to starting me con­ templated movement, the observation car was struct by the cars in B&O train No. 33. -3- The leading baggage car m the B&O train scraped the side of the LAN observation car a distance of about 58 feet, damaging the observation car slightly and re­ sulting in the derailment of the baggage car, which car then continued westward until it struck the tender cistern of L&N yard engine 880. The impact forced the cistern against the cab of the engine; breaking the coupling between the tender and observation car,and separating the yard engine from the observation car a distance of about 15 feet. The employee killed was the conductor of the yard engine, who was caught between the tender cistern and the engine cab. Summary of evidence Yard Conductor Carner stated that his duty consisted of backing trains m and out of the passenger station. He attached the back-up hose to the leading car of the B&O cut about 20 or 26 minuter before it was ready to back out of the train shetff. He then anchored the hose m the door hasp hole, and, as was customary, tested the air merely as a matter of precaution, by opening the bacK-up hose valve slightly, not in ader to set the brakes but just to ascertain that there was a flow of air. After receiving a signal from the platform foreman indicating that the cars were unloaded he again opened the valve to assure himself that there was a proper flow of air, also to give warning to anybody who happened to be working around the cars that the back-up movement was about to start. He then went to the door of the leading car and gave the engmeman a back-up signal by means of the air-whistle, and also waved a back-up signal with his lantern. Tne movement was then started and as the cars approached the end of the tram shad Conductor Carner saw that the L&N tram was blocking track 3 and that the switch tender was giving stop signals, he said that he opened the tail hose valve slightly and that the air apparently was work me; but the brakes did not seen to take effect, so he opened the valve wider, but without result, and tben he opened the valve completely and as he noticed no reduction in the speed, which he estimated to have been between 8 and 10 miles per hour, he jumped off on the engmeman1 s side, when about two or two and one-half car-lengths from the fouling pomt, shouted a warning of danger and graved stop signals with his lantern, but to no avail. After the accident he walked toward the leading car and on his way he requested Passenger Car Inspector Campbell, of the CCC&StLRy, to accompany him whichhe did Steam and water were escaping and there was considerable excitement at the time But Conductor Carner held his lantern over to look at the position of the angle cock and he said -4- tbe air ATIS cut m and flawing freely, he die not recall having closed tne ane*le cock at this lime hut said that ^uDsecruent to the arrival of the wrecker, while m company irith Yardmaster Gray, the yardmaster called his attention to the fact that the angle cock was closed. Conductor Garner said that he afterwards asked Passenger Car In­ spector Campbell if he bad looked at the toack-uo hose and wnether the latter went to that -point with him to verify the position of the an^ie cock, but received negative re­ plies. Conductoi earner's rtatements as to how he handled the air before starting the back-up movement were very conflicting, at one point h^ said that after he received the signal from the olatform foreman indicating that the cars were unloaded he made a 15 or 30-oound brake-pipe re­ duction and that this rhould have applied the air crakor, yet he did net know whether they did apply, at another point he s nd that he could not recall having hearc any escape of air wh^n he first tested, it. He did not try the air after starting out and before seeing tne danger aheed, did not get the required signal from/tne switch tender to start the back-up movement, and did not knc-7 that tne tram on track 3 'ras foiling track 3 until he received the stop signals from the switch tender, at which time his tram war about six car-langths from the fouling point. After the accident tne air orakes were tested m his presence and he saw that they applied properly on all three cars, he did not knoor a^ to/me engine Switch Tender Cropr^r^pJ the CUD&RyCo, stated that he heard no signal/on me back-up hose whistle as 3&0 tram No.