A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament Individual Country Reports Tamara Patton, Pavel Podvig, and Phillip Schell UNIDIR United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Geneva, Switzerland New York and Geneva, 2013 NOTE The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. * * * The views expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors. Copyright © United Nations, 2013 All rights reserved UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)—an autonomous institute within the United Nations—conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva, Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining to the variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions and conflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR’s activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations. www.unidir.org CONTENTS Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... vi About the authors ........................................................................................................... vii A New START model for transparency in nuclear disarmament: individual country reports ............................................................................................. 1 China ............................................................................................................................. 3 France ............................................................................................................................ 17 Russian Federation ........................................................................................................ 24 United Kingdom ............................................................................................................ 37 United States ................................................................................................................. 43 Model data exchange reports Annex A. China .............................................................................................................. 55 Annex B: France ............................................................................................................. 84 Annex C: Russian Federation .......................................................................................... 92 Annex D: United Kingdom ............................................................................................. 159 Annex E: United States ................................................................................................... 167 Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. 211 v vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The authors would like to thank their colleagues who consulted with us on this study at various stages, encouraged us to continue this work, and contributed their own perspectives, comments, and suggestions. Special thanks go to Nick Ritchie and Corentin Brustlein, who provided valuable comments, and to Karina Qian, who made an important contribution to the project at its early stages. The authors would also like to thank the staff of UNIDIR for their support and help. This project was generously supported by the Government of Japan. vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS Tamara Patton is a Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme. Patton’s research focuses on the uses of satellite imagery, mapping, 3-D modelling, and other geospatial tools for analysis of issues relevant to nuclear non- proliferation and disarmament. She was previously a Visiting Fellow with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. She has also worked with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the US Naval Postgraduate School’s Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory and Remote Sensing Center, and the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies. Patton holds an MA in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a BA in International Studies from the University of Washington. Pavel Podvig is Programme Lead of the Weapons of Mass Destruction programme at UNIDIR and Director of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project. Podvig started his work on arms control at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, which was the first independent research organization in the Russian Federation dedicated to analysis of technical issues of disarmament and non-proliferation. In recognition of this work, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). He has worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, missile defence, and the US–Russian arms control process. Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a physics degree from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology and a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations. Phillip Schell is a Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme. Schell’s research focuses on security issues related to weapons of mass destruction arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation with a regional specialization on East Asia. Before joining the Institute, his assignments included the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Non-Proliferation Centre and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. He has also worked with the International Atomic Energy Agency and the International Crisis Group. Schell holds an MA in International Policy Studies and Nonproliferation from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and an undergraduate degree in Chinese Studies and Political Science from the University of Cologne. viii A NEW START MODEL FOR TRANSPARENCY IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY REPORTS This supplement to the UNIDIR study A New START Model for Transparency in Nuclear Disarmament1 contains data exchange documents for all Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty nuclear-weapon states that are modelled after the reports submitted by the Russian Federation and the United States as part of their New START obligations. 2 These model reports demonstrate the feasibility of applying the New START-type data exchange mechanism to nuclear arsenals of other states and illustrate advantages of this kind of reporting. In the New START framework, these documents provide detailed information on the composition of the strategic forces and the supporting infrastructure that helps the Russian Federation and the United States to monitor compliance with the treaty and conduct verification and inspection activities. In the multilateral context, data exchange would play a role of an important confidence-building tool and open a possibility of closer cooperation among nuclear-weapon states in moving towards coordinated reductions of their nuclear arsenals. The format of the data exchange documents is described in the protocol to the treaty. The treaty also specifies that the reports should be submitted every six months after the treaty enters into force. The information exchanged by the parties is considered confidential and cannot be released to the public without mutual consent.3 There are two exceptions to the consent rule—each party has the right to release to the public the aggregate numbers of strategic arms, and the detailed data related to its own strategic forces.4 The parties normally release the aggregate numbers some time after the official exchange takes place.5 The United States also has released unclassified versions of three of the four data exchange reports that it has submitted to the Russian Federation so far.6 Some information—geographic coordinates, unique identifiers, and site diagrams of facilities—was withheld from the public release as required by the treaty,7 while other data, such as the number of deployed warheads associated with intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) bases or submarine bases, was removed during the declassification process. The model data exchange documents presented in this supplement comply with the requirements of the New START protocol to the maximum extent possible and use the United States reports as an example.