September 14, 2011 The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center Analysis of four propaganda displays in May – July 2011: background, analysis and conclusions Overview 1.In May – July 2011 the State of Israel faced four propaganda displays which, in our assessment, constituted part of the broader anti-Israel delegitimization campaign. The events encompassed a variety of methods and took place on land, sea and air. 2.The events were orchestrated by anti-Israel networks and activists, from the Middle East and worldwide, that routinely participate in the delegitimization campaign against Israel. Some were local ad-hoc initiatives that arose mostly from online social networks. They aimed to bring the issue of the Palestinians refugees’ “right of return” to the forefront through large- scale protests against Israel in the PA-administered territories and along Israel’s borders with its Arab neighbors. 3.The following is a general description of the four propaganda displays (in chronological order): a.The Nakba Day events: 1.The events took place on May 15, 2011, and were organized to mark the anniversary of Israel’s establishment, considered by Palestinians to symbolize their defeat in the 1948 War of Independence. The main idea this year was to conduct unusually massive events (in comparison with previous years) to express the Palestinian refugees’ “right of return” to Israel through rallies and propaganda demonstrations along Israel’s borders with Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, and attempt a violent invasion of Israeli territory. 164-11 2 2.Mass demonstrations were also planned in the PA-administered territories and in other Arab or Muslim countries (Egypt). The demonstrators were mobilized mostly through social networks with the tacit approval (or even encouragement) of Syria, which considered it a means to shift attention from the popular protest against the Assad regime to Israel. 3.In practice, the focal point of the events was Majdal Shams, a Druze village in the northern Golan Heights, where Syrian security forces did not prevent rioters from approaching the border fence, after which they broke through and invaded the village. Four rioters were killed and dozens were wounded in the violent confrontation between them and IDF soldiers. On the Israeli-Lebanese border, the Lebanese army unsuccessfully tried to contain the incident. About ten rioters were killed and dozens were wounded in an attempt to invade Israeli territory. Smaller demonstrations took place in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, where the PA and Hamas made efforts to contain them and keep them from getting out of hand. b.The Naksa Day events: 1.The events took place on June 5, 2011, marking the defeat of the Arab countries in the Six Day War in 1967. The main idea behind the events was to duplicate what was considered the success of the Nakba Day events and hold mass rallies along Israel’s borders with Arab countries to try and invade Israeli territory. Once again online social networks played a major role in mobilizing rioters and bringing them to the borders, and once again the Syrian regime allowed (and apparently also encouraged) the events on the Israeli-Syrian border. 2.In practice, the focal points of the Naksa Day events were two locations on the Golan Heights—Majdal Shams and Quneitra—where about one thousand rioters massed (mainly Syrian civilians and Palestinians residing in Syria) and attempted to invade Israeli territory. IDF forces had prepared in advance and prevented the rioters from breaking through the border. Twenty- four rioters were killed in the violent confrontation. 3.The events were not widely covered by international media. The deadly results of the clashes on the Israeli-Syrian border drew strong internal Palestinian criticism of the pro-Syrian terrorist organizations that had 3 encouraged the incident, and violent protests broke out in Al-Yarmuk refugee camp on the outskirts of Damascus. In Lebanon, however, the Lebanese army prevented the rioters from approaching the border this time. Smaller demonstrations were held in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip, supervised and controlled by the PA and Hamas. c.The international flotilla to the Gaza Strip—Freedom Fleet 2 (in late June): 1.The flotilla was organized by a coalition spearheaded by four networks taking part in the delegitimization campaign against Israel. They participated in the Mavi Marmara flotilla and, for the past year, their steering committee and nationally-based networks were involved in planning the flotilla, fundraising, enlisting activists, and purchasing vessels. One of the organizations, the Turkish IHH, withdrew from the coalition shortly before the flotilla set sail due to the Turkish government’s own political considerations. The remaining coalition members were two umbrella networks from Europe (FGM and ECESG) and an ad-hoc network from the United States called U.S. Boat to Gaza. They were joined by an Arab, radical Islamic and predominantly Jordanian group which had purchased its own ship (Noor) shortly before the flotilla’s planned date of departure. That ship did not take part in Freedom Fleet 2. 2.The organizers’ main idea was to dispatch to the Gaza Strip an upgraded flotilla which would challenge Israel and be difficult to stop, deface Israel in global public opinion, and provide political and propaganda assistance to the Hamas de facto administration in the Gaza Strip. The idea was not acted upon due to several reasons, mainly the withdrawal of Turkey and the IHH, the difficulties imposed by the Greek government on the departure of Freedom Fleet 2 vessels from its ports, and the numerous reservations about the flotilla voiced on the international scene by the UN, the United States and West European countries. Another contributing factor was Israel’s preparation for the flotilla, which proved effective and could be partially credited for its failure. 3.In practice, instead of an upgraded flotilla consisting of 15 vessels, including two large passenger ships, the organizers were planning to send ten smaller ships or yachts (of which only one set sail). One of them reached the naval blockade area on the Gaza Strip border; it was a French yacht called Dignité/Al- Karama that carried ten activists, three journalists and three crewmembers 4 (most of them French nationals). The yacht was intercepted by the Israeli navy on July 19 without any violence and without generating the international media storm the organizers were hoping for. d.The “fly-in”—arrival of anti-Israel activists in Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport on July 8: 1.This propaganda display was organized by several dozen groups and networks mostly from Judea and Samaria and Western countries, particularly France and the United States. Conspicuous among them were anti-Israel networks in France and the ISM group affiliated with the radical left in the United States. The main idea behind the propaganda display was to have hundreds of activists flown in to Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport on regular commercial flights. There the activists intended to conduct propaganda activities and use passive resistance against any attempts by Israel’s security forces to deport them. If an opportunity presented itself, they then intended to leave the airport to take part in a series of anti-Israel activities in Judea and Samaria or even in Israel (Bil’in-style demonstrations and protests). One of the stated purposes of the organizers was to protest the restrictions imposed by Israel on the arrival of anti-Israel activists from Ben Gurion International Airport to Judea and Samaria. 2.In practice, the State of Israel had prepared in advance for the event. By appealing to various airlines and using diplomacy, Israel was able to prevent some 350 activists from boarding flights to Israel from airports in Europe. Another 130 activists (mostly from France and Belgium) arrived in Israel, where they were detained and deported. According to Palestinian sources, several dozen Palestinians managed to reach Judea and Samaria. Apparently some of them took part in violent demonstrations near the Qalandia roadblock in northern Jerusalem and other friction points between the Palestinians and Israeli security forces. Contrary to the expectations of the organizers, the event was largely ignored by international media. 4.While markedly different, these four propaganda displays constitute, in our assessment, part of the delegitimization campaign against Israel, inspired by its successes in the Goldstone Report affair and the Mavi Marmara flotilla. Some of the events were long in the planning (it took about a year to plan and organize what was expected to be an upgraded 5 flotilla). Other events were the result of ad-hoc initiatives undertaken in advance of important dates in the history of the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflict. In two cases (the flotilla and the fly-in) the events were orchestrated by umbrella organizations and activists taking part in the delegitimization campaign. In the two remaining cases (the Nakba and the Naksa) a major role was played by Palestinian and Arab activists who used social networks to help mobilize supporters. Their aim was to bring the methods used in the popular protests against the Arab regimes (and sometimes its slogans) into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In addition to these events, the networks and activists involved in the delegitimization campaign continued with their “routine” activities (defacing and boycotting Israel, prosecuting top Israeli officials, and more).1 5.The recent events vividly illustrated the ideologically heterogeneous character of the umbrella networks, groups and individual activists operating against Israel. The flotilla and the fly-in were the work of a coalition that included networks and activists affiliated with the radical left in Europe and the United States. They joined forces with Islamist elements whose part in the flotilla event became less significant after the IHH and its Turkish allies withdrew.