Int J Soc Robot (2011) 3: 197–204 DOI 10.1007/s12369-010-0075-6 Humans, Animals, and Robots: A Phenomenological Approach to Human-Robot Relations Mark Coeckelbergh Accepted: 22 August 2010 / Published online: 4 September 2010 © The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com Abstract This paper argues that our understanding of many bots may be presented as partners, as in the film The Step- human-robot relations can be enhanced by comparisons with ford Wives (2004), or in other substitute roles, as in Bicen- human-animal relations and by a phenomenological ap- tennial Man (1999) and I, Robot (2004). These images do proach which highlights the significance of how robots ap- not entirely belong to the domain of fiction: some humans pear to humans. Some potential gains of this approach are might engage in relationships with human-like robots [1] explored by discussing the concept of alterity, diversity and and as humanoid robotics develops further other practices change in human-robot relations, Heidegger’s claim that an- will emerge. However, it is more likely that in the near fu- imals are ‘poor in world’, and the issue of robot-animal rela- ture relations between humans and robots will mainly take tions. These philosophical reflections result in a perspective the form of strong attachments to robots that do not appear on human-robot relations that may guide robot design and human (although they might have some humanoid aspects). inspire more empirical human-robot relations research that They may be given an animal-like appearance (zoomor- is sensitive to how robots appear to humans in different con- phic) or a different appearance. Many current robots are texts at different times. zoomorphic: consider for example the iCat (Philips), Hug- gable (MIT Media Lab), and the ‘huggable animal-like ro- Keywords Human-robot relations · Human-animal relations · Phenomenology · Appearance · Robot-animal bot’ Probo (Free University Brussels) [2]. relations A turn away from anthropomorphism is more likely for several reasons. First, because human appearance is not re- quired it is easier to design the robots and make them avail- 1 Introduction able. Second, they avoid the problem of the so-called ‘un- canny valley’. The Uncanny Valley hypothesis suggests that The introduction of robots in the personal sphere—now and if a robot looks too much like a human (but when it is still in the near-future—gives rise to new personal relations be- clear that it is not a human), it appears ‘uncanny’ [3]. Feel- tween humans and robots. How can we better understand ings of uneasy do not occur when the robot looks very dif- these relations from a philosophical perspective? ferent or when we encounter a human; only the appearance The idea of personal relations between humans and ro- of the nearly-human has this effect. Robots that look differ- bots often invokes science-fiction images of robots that ap- ently do not incur this problem. Third, since humans already pear human and that are used as substitutes for humans. Ro- have relations with non-robotic non-humans such as animals and – to some extent – computers and other electronic equip- ment such as mobile phones, we can expect that the intro- A first version of this paper has been presented at the 2nd International Conference on Human-Robot Personal Relations, duction of non-humanoid robots will be less controversial Tilburg, June 11–12, 2009. than, for instance, humanoid sex robots. While the account developed here is relevant to relations with humanoid ro- M. Coeckelbergh () University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands bots, I am also concerned with relations with other robots, e-mail: [email protected] in particular intense, long-term relations with non-humanoid 198 Int J Soc Robot (2011) 3: 197–204 robots such as those that may develop between children and the technology is between us and the world. Consider the their toy robot or between adults and pet robots. role played by scientific instruments such as telescopes and In this paper, I propose to understand such relations microscopes: our perception is always mediated by these by taking a phenomenological approach and by comparing technologies. For example, research at the nano level is im- human-robot and human-animal relations. I support my ar- possible without such mediations. If we had only our human gument by drawing on insights from philosophy of technol- eyes, we could neither see any nano particles nor manipulate ogy and by briefly exploring the phenomenology of animals. them. The technology that shows things at that level is indis- I show how this approach can enhance our understanding of pensable, not as a mere ‘instrument’ but as a way of seeing human-robot relations. (and manipulating) the world. There are at least two senses When I use the term ‘phenomenology’ in this paper I re- in which robots could fulfil such a role. First, they can me- fer to (1) a general orientation that gives attention to how ro- diate between us and the world in a rather literal sense, for bots appear to human consciousness in order to better under- instance we can imagine a disabled or even locked-in per- stand human-robot relations (hermeneutics rather than sci- son using a robotic device to give her information and to do ence), and (2) two specific currents within the philosophical things in the world. Or we can think of remote controlled tradition of phenomenology: the work of Martin Heidegger robots on other planets that enable us to see and manipulate and the ‘postphenomenology’ of the American philosopher the world through the eyes of the robot. of technology Don Ihde. However, the third concept, alterity relations, is the most First, I use Ihde’s work to characterize personal human- interesting for the purpose of understanding relations to per- robot relations as alterity relations and show how this con- sonal robots: sometimes we relate to technology as an other. cept could contribute to existing studies of human-robot in- What does this mean? Using Ihde’s framework, we can un- teraction. Then I discuss the importance of appearance for derstand personal human-robot relations as alterity relations understanding that interaction and call attention to the va- if and to the extent that in these relations appear to humans riety of human-robot relations in different contexts. I make as an other or ‘quasi-other’ [6]. The robot is neither part of a comparison between human-robot and human-animal re- me (embodiment relation) nor something that mainly medi- lations, considering in particular robots that represent ani- ates my relation to the world. Instead, in our interaction with mals. I respond to Heidegger’s work to discuss the relevance the robot ‘it’ appears to us as more than a thing: an other to of phenomenological similarities and differences between which I relate [6, p. 107]. humans, animals, and robots for human-robot relations. Fi- This approach to the status of the robot stands in contrast nally, I raise the issue of robot-animal relations. to most traditional philosophical accounts (including tradi- tional phenomenology), which would require that the robot has intentionality, consciousness, and so on. Instead I argue 2 Human-Robot Relations as Alterity Relations here and elsewhere that what matters for understanding and evaluating human-robot relations is how the robot appears to In philosophy of technology, Ihde developed a (post)phe- us. Therefore, even if—based on traditional accounts – we nomenological framework to discuss human-technology re- are not prepared to ascribe to robots the character of alterity, lations [4]. Applying the concept of intentionality to human- we can speak of quasi-alterity in those cases where the robot technology relations, he distinguishes three structural fea- appears to us as an other. Whatever the ‘real’ status of the ro- appearance tures of technological intentionality: embodiment relations, bot may be, it is its that is relevant to how the human-robot relation is experienced and constructed. (I will hermeneutic relations, and alterity relations. Let me explain continue this argument in the next section.) these relations and apply the concepts to robots. Moreover, to view relations with robots in this way does Embodiment relations refer to the amplification of bod- not imply that there is a reciprocal relationship of ‘selves’ or ily perception: technology comes to be experienced as being that we need to seek recognition from the ‘android partner’, part of us; we do no longer notice it. For instance, usually I as Ramey suggests in his arguments for a phenomenologi- do not notice that I wear glasses. Most robots will not in- cal approach to the ethics of human-android interaction [7]. vite an embodiment relation. Exceptions are perhaps partic- Moreover, while I sympathize with Ramey’s rejection of sci- ular non-autonomous robots such as robot suits (for instance entism and with his recommendation that we attend to possi- HAL), robot arms, or robot ‘exo-skeletons’ (see for example ble changes in the (human) self as a result of interaction with the performances of the Australian performance artist Stel- android robots, I propose that we understand the robot other larc): such robots might come to be experienced as part of as an other that is experienced as external. However much the body. truth there may be in Ramey’s Heideggerian claim1 that we The hermeneutic relation refers to the role technology plays as an in-between that allows us to interpret the world [4, 5]. We do not have direct access to the world; instead, 1Ramey is influenced by Olafson’s interpretation of Heidegger [8].