Passing the Torch in Central Asia: Transition Dynamics in Uncertain Times This article, written exclusively for CABAR.asia by Dr. Charles Sullivan, traces how three new Central Asian leaders differ in terms of their respective governing styles and how they seek to shape state-society relations. Follow us on LinkedIn The newly independent countries of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan exhibit varying modes of authoritarian governance today. While Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have experienced maiden transitions at the highest levels and retained non- democratic systems, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan are still contending with this issue. Differing degrees of coercion combined with the level of maneuverability of sitting presidents explain the political variation observed in Central Asia. However, a series of political, economic, and regional challenges in an era of intensified Great Power rivalry threaten the durability of the “Stans”. Introduction When it comes to Central Asia, the region’s autocrats are seemingly in a league of their own in terms of self-aggrandizement. The most famous person in Kazakhstan is Nursultan Nazarbayev, also known as Elbasy or the “Leader of the Nation” in Kazakh. His birthday (July 6th), which is also known as Capital Day, and the Day of the First President (December 1st) are official state holidays. Kazakhstan’s government even changed the name of the capital city from Astana to Nur-Sultan following Nazarbayev’s resignation from the presidency in 2019.[1] Nazarbayev has a bit of a sense of humor. In 2015, he jokingly apologized for winning reelection once again, this time supposedly with 97.7% percent of the popular vote.[2] But the elites in Kazakhstan are no longer laughing alongside Elbasy, in light of the mass protests which arose in response to the “stage-managed” June 2019 presidential election designed to anoint Nazarbayev’s chosen successor.[3] Protests in Kazakhstan have since waned, but not because the elites have initiated a change in course. On the contrary, the novel coronavirus pandemic has forced most people off of the streets. To even further complicate matters, in mid-June 2020 Nazarbayev himself tested positive for COVID-19.[4] Passing the Torch in Central Asia: Transition Dynamics in Uncertain Times Ready for (no) change: Pitfalls of Staying in Power in Turkmenistan Turkmenistan’s political system is even more eccentric in nature. The stories about the late president Saparmurat Niyazov (who preferred to be called Turkmenbashi or the “Leader of the Turkmen”) are bizarre. Niyazov banned ballets, rewrote the calendar months and days of the week, penned his own opus (Ruhnama) and made it a required text, and built golden monuments in his own image.[5] He then suddenly died in late 2006. Thereafter, his successor, Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, began crafting his own cult of personality. Berdymukhamedov likes to be called Arkadag (or “Protector” in Turkmen) and regularly shows off his military combat readiness, bowling skills, and off-road driving, all so as to apparently inform his citizens that he has no intentions of unexpectedly leaving power anytime soon.[6] Few in Tajikistan laugh at President Emomali Rahmon, in part because he essentially won the country’s five-year-long civil war in the mid-1990s (albeit with Russia and Uzbekistan’s much-needed assistance)[7] and has since assumed near-total control over the country, save for the most remote areas. But Rahmon also takes precautions to keep himself from serving as the butt of jokes. As a case in point, in 2013 the government temporarily banned YouTube access in the country after someone released a video showing the president singing and dancing at his son’s wedding.[8] Islam Karimov, the late ironfisted ruler of Uzbekistan, did not have any sense of humor. He silenced all dissent – most brazenly in May 2005 in the city of Andijan[9] – until his death in 2016. However, Karimov’s successor, Shavkhat Mirziyoyev, has given Uzbekistan’s citizens much to talk about by partially dismantling his predecessor’s dictatorship. Overall, Central Asia’s autocrats all seem to be charting different courses nowadays. The variation in terms of the types of authoritarian governance practiced across Central Asia today is quite pronounced. In Ashgabat, dictatorship remains in vogue. In Tashkent, the government is gradually abandoning absolutism and rekindling ties with the West. In Nur- Sultan, a farcical election designed to legitimize Nazarbayev’s successor energized local Passing the Torch in Central Asia: Transition Dynamics in Uncertain Times civil society activists, forcing the government in turn to make use of repressive measures to suppress public discontent. In Dushanbe, the political climate is growing ominous with the government seemingly making preparations for a dynastic succession in the coming years.[10] Yet how can we account for such variation? Overall, this article posits that contemporary differences with respect to the coercive natures of these ruling regimes and the statuses of the so-called “founding fathers” can help us understand the contrasting political trajectories observed across the region. Accordingly, this article traces how three new Central Asian leaders (Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Kazakhstan, Shavkhat Mirziyoyev in Uzbekistan, and Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov in Turkmenistan) differ in terms of their respective governing styles and how they seek to shape state-society relations. The deaths of Niyazov in Turkmenistan and Karimov in Uzbekistan have permitted the new leaders of these systems to either largely govern in the same fashion as their predecessor and not implement any substantive reforms (i.e. Turkmenistan), or carry out reforms designed to disassemble certain aspects of their predecessor’s system (i.e. Uzbekistan). In contrast, Nazarbayev’s resignation from the presidency but continued involvement in Kazakhstan’s politics (albeit seemingly from afar) arguably hinders his successor’s ability to carry out any significant reforms. Kazakhstan periodically introduces cosmetic modifications but these so-called reforms do not reshape the manner in which power is exercised within the system. Even if Tokayev aspires to undertake transformative measures, Nazarbayev’s sustained presence serves to obfuscate any such efforts, at least for the time being. As such, this article argues that authoritarian leaders who succeed a late president can seize or pass upon the opportunity to undertake a reformist agenda, whereas other leaders who must still work with their living predecessor seemingly remain enfeebled. In addition, this article provides an overview of the political situation in Tajikistan and discusses how the impending transition from Rahmon to his (as of now) unnamed successor may transpire in the future. Generally speaking, reforms in Central Asia carry little meaning. Elites champion grandiose plans to convince the masses that progress is being realized and that ordinary citizens should be grateful. In some countries (i.e. Uzbekistan) this strategy appears to be working, while in others (i.e. Kazakhstan) it is faltering. After all, had it not been for the onset of the novel coronavirus pandemic in 2020 and the ensuing two-month lockdown, the mass protests across Kazakhstan likely would not have ceased. So, why have Central Asia’s leaders thus far refrained from governing according to democratic principles? In truth, the elites have demonstrated over the past generation that they do not wish to disperse power by institutionalizing it. Bearing this in mind, the seeming absence of any Passing the Torch in Central Asia: Transition Dynamics in Uncertain Times international pressure on these governments to carry out liberalizing measures permits Central Asia’s autocrats to keep ruling as they wish. Consequently, if they continue to oppose reforms designed to liberalize and diversify their systems, then the fissure between elites and the masses will only further widen. Granted, the expansion of this sociopolitical cleavage will likely not bring about the downfall of these regimes in the immediate future, but it will certainly complicate state-society relations as the four Central Asian republics discussed here to enter into a new decade of heightened geopolitical uncertainty. Despotic Diversity Not all Central Asian autocracies are equally authoritarian in nature. Kyrgyzstan constitutes an (unstable) outlier in comparison to its neighbors. While it is unwise to label the Kyrgyz Republic as a liberal democracy,[11] the government in Bishkek has experienced several political transitions already since independence. In addition, Kyrgyzstan differs from its neighbors in that several of the country’s presidents have been overthrown. In contrast, in Turkmenistan, the government heavily restricts the activities of all local civil society groups while espousing a neutral foreign policy.[12] Turkmenbashi regularly “shuffled the deck” of elites to keep competitors off-balance.[13] Since assuming power, Berdymukhamedov has largely adhered to his predecessor’s domestic and foreign policies, while implementing a handful of cosmetic political reforms. As such, the dictatorship in Ashgabat looks to be stable. Uzbekistan is not nearly as repressive as its neighbor, yet this was not always the case. Under Karimov’s rule, some sources estimate that the government held as many as 10,000 to 12,000 political prisoners in detention.[14] Karimov’s tenure was marred by allegations of systemic torture and the institution of a forced