NIE 63.2-57 The Prospects for North Vietn~m 14 May 1957 This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of: The Black Vault The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military. Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com NIE 63.2-57 The Prospects for North Vietnam, 14 May 1957 APPROVED FOR RELEASE NIE 63.2-57 DATE: JAN 2005 14 May 1957 (b) (3) 280 N AT ION A LIN TEL L I G ENe E EST 1M AT"E N UM B E R 63. 2 - 5 7 (Supersedes relevant" portions of NIE 63-56) THE PROSPECTS FOR NORTH VIETNAM· Submttted by .the DIRECTOR OF. CENTRAL. .INTELLIGENCE . The following intelligence organizations participated in 'the preparation .of this estimt;&te: .The Central Intelligence AgenCY .and the" intelligence· organizations. of the Departments of State, the Arm1l, the Navy, the Air Force, and The JOint Staff. Concurred tnby the. INTELLIGENCE· ADVISORY· COMMITTEE on 14 Mav1957. concurring were the SpeCial.Assistant, In­ telligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of staff, Intelligence, Department of the Armv;the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director 01 intelligence, USAF; ana theDep­ uty Director for Intelligence, The Joint· Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the lAC, and the Assist':' ant Director, Federal Bureau Of InVestigation, abstained, the.· subject being outside of their 1uri8dfction. 105 NIE 63.2-57 The Prospects for North Vietnam, 14 May 1957 (Continued ... ) THE PROSPECTS FOR NORTH VIETNAM THE PROBLEM To analyze the current political, economic, and military situations and to esti­ mate the prospects for North Vietnam over the next year or so. CONCLUSIONS 1. Although the Communist regime in support. However, the DRV has probably North Vietnam (DRV) has probably lost been disappointed by the lack of effective a considerable measure of its original Bloc support for its objective of unifying popular support and has been faced with all Vietnam under DRV rule. The DRV, sporadic outbursts of violence, it remains with Bloc logistical support, could easily in firm control largely because of the loy­ overrun South Vietnam, Cambodia, and alty and effectiveness of the army. More­ Laos if opposed only by indigenous forces. over, with SUbstantial help from the Bloc, However, the Bloc would support such an it has apparently made significant prog­ attack only if Moscow and Peiping were ress toward economic restoration, par­ to estimate that such action carried little ticularly in agriculture. (Paras. 13-16, risk of US military intervention. (Paras. 20-21) 29-34) 2. The DRV has undertaken to "cor­ 4. The DRV will probably continue its rect its mistakes" which it admits caused tactics of "peaceful competition" with popular resentment, and it will probably South Vietnam for the support of the Vi­ be able to regain some of the popular sup­ etnamese, although it will continue its ef­ port which it lost. If the party organ­ forts to infiltrate and to subvert official ization is sufficiently strengthened and and nonofficial organizations and to ex­ if crop prospects are good, steps toward ploit dissident and dissatisfied groups in further socialization of agriculture may South Vietnam. In Laos, we believe that come as soon as the fall or winter of 1957. the DRV will continue to support Pathet Local disturbances may recur but for the Lao efforts to negotiate a political agree­ foreseeable future the DRV will be ca­ ment with the Royal Lao Government, pable of maintaining effective control. with the ultimate objective of Communist (Paras. 17, 23-26) control, and may encourage local Pathet Lao military action in order to bring pres­ 3. The DRV is generally isolated from the sure to this end. The DRV will probably outside world except for close ties with not, in the immediate'future, playa pri-, the Bloc, on which it depends for aid and mary role in Cambodia. (Paras. 34-36) 1 106 N IE 63.2-57 The Prospects for North Vietnam, 14 May 1957 (Continued ... ) 2 DISCUSSION 5. Since the Geneva Agreements in 1954, the Dong has accordingly given increasing em­ Lao Dong (Workers) Party - the Communist phasis to the less direct tactics of peaceful Party of Vietnam - has sought to lay the competition and subversion. foundations for the transformation of North Vietnam into a Communist society. Its most I. THE INTERNAL SITUATION important immediate tasks have been to es­ tablish an effective system of administration Current Status and control over the population and to reha­ 9. The Lao Dong has organized the "Dem­ bilitate the economy which had suffered ex­ tensive damage during the long years of war. ocratic Republic of Vietnam" (DRV) along the lines of other "peoples democracies" and 6. The Lao Dong was in a relatively favorable it controls directly the government apparatus situation at the time it assumed control in and the Vietnam Peoples Army (VPA). North Vietnam. Its victory over the French Power and leadership are exercised by mem­ had engendered considerable popular support, bers of the Politburo who hold positions si­ and its leader, Ho Chi Minh, was considered multaneously in the party and government. even by many non-Communist nationalists as We believe that Ho Chi Minh is the ultimate the only person who could drive the French authority in the regime. He is Chairman of from the rest of Vietnam. It controlled and the party, President of the DRV, and, since had' the loyalty of a large, battle tested, and October 1956, the Secretary General of the effective army. Nevertheless, from the Com­ Central Committee of the Lao Dong. Other munist point of view the party itself had two important leaders who hold both party and major weaknesses. There was a shortage of government positions are Vo Nguyen Giap, well-trained cadres, and many members of the member of the Politburo and Minister of De­ party were motivated more by anti-French and fense and Commander of the Army, and Pham nationalist sentiments than by Communist Van Dong, also a member of the Politburo dogma. and Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Truong Chinh, although recently removed 7. During the past year these fundamental from the office of party Secretary General, weaknesses were exposed as the regime at­ remains a member of the Politburo and still tempted to impose its control on the peasantry holds the post of Vice Chairman of the Central too rapidly and too crudely. Much of the Agrarian Reform Committee. popular support which the regime once en­ joyed as a nationalist force appears to have 10. Below the top level, the party still suffers been dissipated. The regime now confronts from a serious shortage of experienced tech­ the task of rebuilding sufficient popu"Iar ac­ nicians, administrators, and managers. The ceptance of its programs to permit the imple­ government's administrative apparatus and mentation of further steps toward socializa­ the party's lines of control hav:e proved in­ tion and increased production without the adequate to carry out some major aspects of direct and constant application of force and the regime's program. On at least one oc· coercion. casion the party has had to use the army to restore order. 8. While supremacy over all Vietnam remains a basic Communist objective, the success of 11. The army with a strength of about 268,- President Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam 000 remains the main source of DRV strength. and the apparent unwillingness of the Bloc It is a relatively well paid elite enjoying spe­ to permit u military invasion have substan­ cial privileges, and most of its officers are tially reduced the likelihood of a take-over of members of the Lao Dong party. The less South Vietnam in the near future. The Lao able and less reliable members are being 107 NIE 63.2-57 The Prospects for North Vietnam, 14 May 1957 (Continued ... ) 3 weeded out, various categories of militia and 14. The cadres further disturbed the normal regional troops are being integrated into the life of the communities by forcing local peas­ VP A, and the regime has been seeking to im­ ant organizations to disband. Even some of prove the relations between the army and the the peasants who ostensibly profited from the redistribution of land were dissatisfied because ____ ~~~ants. 1 -the land-reform cadres-made--~xcessive estt;.----­ 12. As the economy of North Vietnam is bas­ mates of the crop yield and, consequently, of ically agricultural, the principal problems the taxes to be paid. Catholic peasants were facing the regime involved organizing and further alienated when the land reform cadres controlling the peasantry and increasing requisitioned their churches for use as store­ agricultural production. Land reform cadres, houses, distributed church land to individuals, drawn from politically reliable but otherwise and intimidated worshippers. The concurrent poorly trained personnel, have been the re­ purge of party members involved abuses, guilt gime's principal instrument both for organ­ by association controversies, and arbitrary rul­ izing the peasants and for purging and re­ ings, so that by mid-1956 the morale of the building the party in the rural areas. These party was shaken and the official line changed cadres have been largely successful in des­ to a criticism of the manner in which the troying the landlords as a class and in dis­ purge had been administered. tributing the land among middle and lower 15. The application of controls :has probably class peasants. As the land was redistrib­ also caused some loss of popular support in uted, the cadres began to introduce rudimen­ urban areas.