CHAPTER V MATTER AND FoRM 1 IN MEDIAEVAL philosophy it was customary to divide 'being' into that which exists in itself and that which exists in another. To the latter the name accident is given. Accident is then subdivided into that which not only exists in another but exists through the other, and that which, while existing in another, is the cause of the existence of the other. The former is again called accident, the latter is called form. Thus in the accepted termino­ logy of the time, the term accident had two meanings, a general and a specific, the one used to include substance, for form is a substance,• and the other used as the opposite of substance. It must have been in order to avoid this confusion of terms that Maimonides introduces the term "force" to take the place of the term "accident" in its general sense. "Force," therefore, desig­ nates existence in something else, and it is used by Maimonides in Propositions X, XI, XII, and XVI, to include accidents, forms, the lower faculties of the rational soul, the internal principle of motion, and the universals, all of which require something else in which to exist.3 The distinction of matter and form is deduced, after Aristotle, from the phenomenon of the reciprocal transformation of the elements. Water, for instance, becomes air and air becomes water. This process of transmutation, it is argued, cannot be merely the alteration of one thing into another, for the elements represent opposites, and nothing can become its opposite unless 'This chapter is based upon Propositions X, XI, XII, XVI, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII and XXIV. ' Seen. 9 (p. 573) on Prop. X. l Seen. 15 (p. 577) on Prop. X . 99 Harry Austryn Wolfson - 9789004385559 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 02:22:33PM via free access 100 CRESCAS' CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE it is first completely destroyed. The transmutation of the ele­ ments therefore implies the destruction of one thing and the generation of another. But when one thing is destroyed, it can no longer give rise to another thing, for from nothing, nothing can be generated. It is therefore necessary to assume the exist­ ence of a certain substratum common to all the four elements within which the transmutation takes place. That substratum is matter, and the four elements are the four different forms which the matter assumes. Thus every one of the four natural elements is composed of matter and form.4 The matter underlying the four elements is known in Jewish philosophy as 'absolute body' and the four forms which it as­ sumes are variously known as the 'elementary,' 'natural,' 'proper,' 'specific' or 'essential' formss. This common, underlying, proxi­ mate matter of the four elements, however, was not considered to be completely formless. It was supposed to be composed of another matter, known as 'prime' or 'intelligible' matter, and an­ other form known by various names. Simplicius calls it 'cor­ poreal form,' by which name it is commonly known in Arabic, Jewish and scholastic philosophy. In Plotinus it is also design­ ated by the term 'quantity,' which term is also used in the Arabic philosophic encyclopedia of the Ibwan al-Safa. The terms 'cor­ porei ty' and 'first form' are also applied to it. 6 There is no reference to 'corporeal form' in Aristotle. It was introduced into his system by his followers in order, probably, to account for the difference in the nature of his prime matter and his common matter of the four elements. The prime matter of Aristotle was generally understood to be incorporeal and in­ extended. The common matter of the four elements, however, it was argued, had to be something extended. It was therefore 4 See notes 3-7 (pp. 569-572) on Prop. X. s See the list of terms in n. 16 (p. 577) on Prop. X. 6 Ibid.; cf. n. 18 (p. 579) on Prop. X. Harry Austryn Wolfson - 9789004385559 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 02:22:33PM via free access CH. V-MATTER AND FORM 101 inferred that the prime inextended matter is not identical with the common extended matter of the elements, and that between these two matters there must be an intermediate form which endows the prime matter with extension. That form is the first or corporeal form which prime matter assumes.7 Once this form was introduced, speculation became rife as to its nature. Three views are recorded in Arabic and Jewish liter­ ature, which we shall restate here under the names of their chief exponents, Avicenna, Algazali and Averroes. According to Avicenna the corporeal form IS a certain pre­ disposition in prime matter for the assumption of tridimension­ ality. As for tridimensionality itself, he considers it as an accident under the category of quantity which accrues to the elements subsequently. Algazali agrees with Avicenna that tridimension­ ality is only an accident. But he disagrees with him as to the nature of the corporeal form. The latter, according to him, is not a predisposition in matter for tridimensionality but rather the cohesiveness or massiveness of matter in which tridimension­ ality may be posited. In opposition to both of them, Averroes identifies the corporeal form with tridimensionality itself but he distinguishes between indeterminate and determinate tridimen­ sionality. The former, he says, constitutes the corporeal form, the latter are only accidents. A similar difference of opinion existed among Jewish philosophers. Crescas, in his restatement of the definition of corporeal form, however, uses vague language which lends itself to any of these three interpretations. 8 The proof for the existence of matter and form from the trans­ mutation of the elements, as we have seen, establishes only the existence of the common matter of the elements and the element­ ary forms. It has no application at all to the 'prime matter' and 7 Seen. 18 (p. 579 ff.) on Prop. X for a discussion of the origin, history and meaning of the "corporeal form". s Ibid. p. 588. Harry Austryn Wolfson - 9789004385559 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 02:22:33PM via free access 102 CRESCAS 1 CRITIQUE OF ARISTOTLE the 'corporeal form.' In order to prove the existence of the latter a new argument had to be devised. This new argument is in its main outline analogous to the argument from the transmutation of the elements, but instead of reasoning from the destruction and generation of elements it reasons from the continuity and division of matter. It runs as follows: Matter which is con­ tinuous loses its continuity and becomes divided. Continuity and division are opposites, and opposites cannot be the recipients of each other. Hence, they imply the existence of a substratum capable of assuming both these opposites. This substratum is the prime matter.9 It has thus been shown that in the successive stages of matter and form the lowest is the opposition of 'prime matter' and the 'corporeal form.' The combination of these two constitutes the 'common matter' of the four elements. The corresponding form of the latter is the four 'proper' or 'natural' forms of the elements, and so the stages of matter and form go on until the highest pure form is attained. Neither matter nor form can have actual existence by itself- not even the common matter of the four elements, though it is already composed of matter and form. The first actually existent sublunar substances, according to Maimonides, are the four elements.'• Though form only is to be considered as the cause of the existence of an object, still both matter and form are essential factors in the process of becoming, and consequently both of them are substances." So is also the concrete individual object, composed of matter and form, a substance. For, substance, as defined by Aristotle, has four characteristics: (a) It is that which does not exist in a subject, or, if it does exist in a subject, (b) it is the cause of the existence of that subject, (c) it also constitutes the limits which define the 9 Evidence for the view expressed in this paragraph as to the existence of such a new proof is to be found inn. 22 (p. 591) on Prop. X. •• Maimonides in Prop. X and Crescas in Prop. X, Part I, n. 16. 11 Prop. X, Part I, notes 8- 9 Harry Austryn Wolfson - 9789004385559 Downloaded from Brill.com09/24/2021 02:22:33PM via free access CH. V-MA TTER AND FORM 103 individuality of the subject, and (d) it is its essence." Matter and the concrete thing are substances in the first sense of the term, form is a substance according to the other three senses. Accidents, however, differ from form by the fact that, they not only cannot exist without a subject but their existence is not at all essential to the existence of their subject.'3 All the accidents may be classified under nine categories. These, again, may be subdivided into separable and inseparable accidents. The in­ separable are quantity, figure, which is a subdivision of quality, and position; the separable are all the other accidents.'4 The chief points in this theory of matter and form are two. In the first place, the 'common matter' of the four elements is itself a composite, consisting as it does of two elements, the prime matter' and the 'corporeal form.' In the second place, this common, composite matter of the four elements has no actual existence by itself. Actual existence accrues to it by virtue of its 'specific' or 'elementary' form. Against this conception of matter and form Crescas raises no objection as long as its pro­ ponents maintain it consistently, as do in fact Avicenna and Maimonides.