RIPON fOR(.JM COMMENTARY COMMENTARY The I rani:lII Crisis 2 Piercing the Myth of Soviel Superiority 4 Theodore Jacqucney 5 PR ES IDENTIAL SPOTLIGHT John Connally's Big Poli tical C:unble: A New U.S. Pol icy 6 for the Midd le East EDITORS NOTE 7 The The Palestinian Question and Iranian American Interests in the 8 Middle East Crisis A View From Amman 11 BOOK REVIEW Chea p Oil : How To Break 12 ew IIllernational events in the last three decades have OPEC seared the American psyche like the mass kidnapping Fof the American embassy staff by theocratic led mobs POLITICAL POTPOURRI 13 in Tehran. As we go 10 publication. this crisis remains 3t a fever pilch with the ultimate fate of the hostages still quite BUREAUCRACY uncerl3in. MARCHES ON 16 Yet not since the Japanese surpri se attack on Pearl ~la rbor has there been such a virtual unan imity of America n resolve to sta nd up 10 an adversary. Public reticence for direct U.S, intervention secrns linked almost exclusively to concern for KIPON fOK~M the safe return of the hostages. Should any harm befall Ihe hostages. the dovish position in Ame rican politics might be Ed itor: Arthul M. /l ill II to seizc Ayatollah Khomeini and his Revolutionary Council ElIccu\ivc Editor: Sleven D. ljl'cngood Art Director: Elizabeth Lee (The Graphic Tuna) for U.S. convened intern ational war crimes tribunals pur­ TilE RIPON FORUM (l5SN 0035-5526) is published month­ suant to the Nuremberg and Eichmann precedents. More in­ ly (except for the March/April and July/ August combined terventionist alternatives migh t range from U.S. seizure of issues) by the Ripon Society, Inc. Iranian oil fields as reparations to the permanent desolation In the publicat ion. the Society hopes 10 provide a forum for of all oil producing facilities in Iran. Only the voluntary reo fresh ideu, well researched proposals. and a spirit of creative cril ids.rn and innovation in the Republican P~rt)'. Manu­ lease of the hostages can avert such a tragic denouncement. ~riptS and photo@:rllphs ~re 5OUcited. but do not represe nt the views of the Society unless 50 stated. Even if the Iranian crisis is happily resolved with a minimum Coments are copyrighted 0 1979 by the Ripon Society, Inc .. 800 18th Street, N.W .. Washington. D.C. 20006. of bloodshed, its political aftermath will almost certainly SeC'Ond cb$.i postage and fees paid at Washington. D.C. and include a welter of recriminati ons, half truths and facile for-­ additional maiJif18 offices. mulations. The Carter Administration will perhaps deservedly Subscription rates: SIS per year, $1.S0 (or students, service· bea r the brunt of much of the criticism. It can be faulted fo r men. Peace Corps. Vina and other volunteers. Overseas, add S6, I'lease allow five weeks for address changes. failing to beef up the security of the U.S . embassy. This same The Ripon Society. Inc .. John C. Topping. h ., President. isa administration which at times has seemed to vie w the United Republican research and policy organization whose members States as a "nonali gned nation" has by its general stance of are business. academic. and professiona l men and women. It is headquartered in Washington, D,C" with fifteen chap. vacillation hardly given pause to the delusions of such fana· ten, several affilia ted subchapter!, and National Associate tics as Kh omeini. members throughout the United States. The Society is sup­ ported by chapter dues, individual contributions, and reve­ nues from iu publications and contract work. Dismal and craven as Carter's foreign policy leadership has been, the posturing of many of his poli tical adversaries is hardly more attractive. Ted Kennedy offers the hint oflead- 2 Ripon Forum ership while advocating demagogic energy polkies that would class 10 assume an ac ti ve political role. make us even more pushovers for the OPEC carlel. Aside from a slightly greater leaning toward rJecontrol. the various The merchants. profeSSionals and managers were the Iranians Republican frontrunners offer little different from Carter. Of who. aside from the Pahlavi family. reaped mosl of the econ· all the President ial candidates in either party only one. Rep. omic benefits of Iran's headlong march toward moderni7a· resentative John I). Anderson of Illinois. has had the guts to tion. They could have assumed power in the evolulion of face up to the OPEC challenge. Anderson has advocated a the Shah's rule toward a conslitutional monarchy but the reo fifty cent per g<lll on gasoline tax to cut U.S. energy consump· preSSion by the Shah threw these modernist Western orien led tion :md suscep ti bi lity to international energy blackmail. Iranians into a political alliance with 3n anti·Western religious I-I e has coupled this with a credible proposal to create a con· fanat ic. We now sec the whirlwind that we reaped as Iran lot· sumer cartel. For his efforts Anderson has been readily dis· tefS between ilS present rigidly right wing U.S. hating relig· missed by the pundits for not being a serious candidate. The ious leadership and a well organized rigidly left wing U.S. test of a candidate's seriousness is apparently his willingness hating opposition. TIle pro.Western middle class is disorgan· (0 offer only least common denominator solutions and 10 i1.ed and politically impotent as it sees its country subject sandwich them between tons of rhetoric about Presidential to the rule of the mobs and mullahs. leadership. The third principal failing of U.S. foreign policy toward Iran In the unfolding national debate over how we came to this far transcends the strategic importance of Iran. Five an d a pass in Iran some fairly simplistic formulations can be ex· h3lf years ago when our good friend the Shah decided to pected, particularly from Presidential contenders. It will be press for an overnight tripling of OPEC oil prices the Saudis argued that Iran has fallen into the hands of this !Iud monk were 3ghast and prepared 10 exert their economic muscle 10 Kh omeini precisely because the United States didn't embrace collapse this move which they viewed as disastrous to the the Shah long enough. In this view "the fall of Iran" can be world economy. Yet the U.S. grand design called for a Shah attributed to Carter's human rights policies igniting latent led Ir3n armed to the teeth as the counterweight to Soviet anti·Shah feeling among the Iranian 1Il3SseS. The absurdity expansionism in the Middle Eas!. The Shah could play this of this view can be seen by w:llching the imgry faces of the role only through a hefty increase in OPEC price levels. demonstrators in Tehran on the nightly newscasts. The depth The Watergate enfeebled Administration failed to pick up on of the Shah's unpopularity among his own people is stagger· the Saudi lead and acquiesced in the OPEC price hikes. ing. [I is fantasy to presume thai th e Shah could have clung Once OPEC found out how easy it was to bluff Ihe oil raven· 10 powe r long once the anti·Shah movement had become so ous industrial nations of the West. spir31i ng real energy prices broad based. became a fact of life. "We now see the whirl wind that we reaped as Iran tolters between its IlfCSCll t rigidl y right wing U.S. hal in g reli gious leadership a nd a well organized rigid ly left wing U,S. hating opposition. TIl e I> ro-Wes tern middle class is disorganizcd and politically impolc nt as il sees its country subjcct to the ru le or the mobs and mulla hs." There are. however. at least three very specific failings of a Ironically. the Shah's success in breathing life into a once U.S. foreign policy thai has been pursued with bipartisan Oaccid OPEC cartel was a major reason for his downfall. support toward Iran. The first was the willingness to sub· Thc huge increase in oil revenues to Iran ensuing frolll the ordinate our intelligence gathering about the Iranian domes· OPEC price hikes financed the Shah's construction of a vast tic situation to our unfolding regional alliance with the Shah. war machine. The samc windfall revenues encouraged the Our intelligence services and military becu1I1e so closely iden· Shah to embark on massive development projects. These tified with the interests of the Shah tha t they los t the detach· lavish expenditures triggered a corrosive inflation, inevitably ment necessary to perceive that his castle was built on sand. in volved rampant corruptioll. and fanned the resentment of Americ3n intelligence was convinced that the Shah was still the poor who were bystanders to this economic booill. The an impregnable anchor of our foreign policy long after in· rapid pace of modernization proved jarrin g to traditional dependent Farsi·speaking foreign observers had concluded values. bUI the clergy led opposit ion 10 the Shah drew mass that the Shah's days in power were numbered. support as the urban poor became convinced that they had no role in the Shah·s vis ion ofa new lranJan Empire. The second failure in an alliance as close as that that once It is doubtful that much can be salvaged rrom the travesty existed between the U.S. and [ran was our unwillingness to in fr;HI other than perhaps Ihe li ves of the hostages and other press Ihe Shah to permit the rapidly growing Iranian Illiddle Americans together with a modicum of national dignity.