Colin Tyler Department of Politics, University of Hull, United Kingdom ORCID: 0000-0003-0338-9181 Brexit: Hatred, lies and UK democracy* 27/2019 Political Dialogues DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/DP.2019.011 Abstract: Keywords; Brexit; democracy; European Union; This article analyses the Brexit debate within the fake news; political violence; populism; UK poli- UK. It examines the historical roots of the debate tics. from 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community, but focuses primarily on 1. Introduction the debates that occurred between 2013 when Da- vid Cameron pledged to hold a referendum up to A referendum was held in the United King- the 2019 UK General Election. Section one briefly dom (UK) on 23rd June 2016, with the qu- introduces the topic. Section two examines the estion of “Should the United Kingdom re- rise of social hatred during the referendum cam- main a member of the European Union or paign. It focuses on the history of British euro- 1 scepticism, the immediate context of the Brexit leave the European Union?” 33,577,342 campaign, concerns over UK sovereignty and people voted; that is, 72.21% of the electo- immigration, and the increasing use of threats rate (46,500,001 people).2 51.89% voted to and political violence. Section three examines the leave and 48.11% voted to remain. In abso- decline of trust in politics due to the increasing failure to challenge lies in the Brexit debate. It ex- plores the idea of “Project Fear”, the anti-expert * I am grateful to Richard Barnes, Jim Con- nelly, Christopher Fear, Janusz Grygieńć, Pip Tyler narrative, and the anti-elitism narrative. Section and audience members at both Nicolaus Coperni- four asks what this period tells us about UK de- cus University, Poland and the Indian Institute of mocracy. It focuses on weak and disorderly gov- Technology Tirpuati, India, for their comments on ernment, the democratic status of the referendum, and other help with an earlier version of this arti- the erosion of trust in parliamentary institutions cle. I bear sole responsibility for the use made of that and mechanisms, and some reasons for (limited) help. 1 optimism. The article concludes by considering UK Government, “EU referendum”, GOV. possible ways forward for the UK government and UK, n.d., https://www.gov.uk/government/topical- events/eu-referendum/about polity following the decisive Conservative victory 2 BBC News, “EU Referendum: results”, BBC in the 2019 UK General Election. News, n.d., https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/ eu_referendum/results accessed 4 November 2019. 63 lute numbers, 17,410,742 voted to leave the without creating the necessary supranational EU while 16,141,241 voted to remain part planning mechanisms for growth and social of it. justice under democratic control. ... [T]he Th is was neither the end nor the be- political inspiration of the EEC amounts to ginning of the process. And indeed some a belief in the institutionalisation of NATO, which will harden the division of Europe and interesting diffi culties have arisen since the encourage the emergence of a new nuclear Brexit referendum was called. Here, I will superpower, thus worsening East–West re- refl ect on the events that led to the vote and lations and making disarmament more dif- those that have followed from it, as well as fi c u l t.” 3 its signifi cance for the UK. In particular, I will refl ect on the hatred and lies that has Th e Conservative Party has always had surrounded the Brexit debate in the UK a particularly diffi cult relationship with Eu- (a debate that has continued even aft er the ropean institutions. Th at makes it somewhat 2019 UK General Election), and what im- surprising that the UK gained membership plications the whole process has for a coun- of the European Economic Community try that has long prided itself on its demo- (EEC) under a Conservative Prime Min- cratic institutions and traditions. ister, the Europhile Edward Heath. As you know, the EEC was founded in 1957. For the 2. Hatred next twelve years the UK drift ed towards membership. French President Charles De a. A brief historical introduction to UK euro- Gaulle vetoed British applications for mem- scepticism bership twice, in 1963 and 1967. De Gaulle Profound resistance to European integra- died on 9 November 1970 and on 1 Janu- tion is historical in the UK as elsewhere. As ary 1973 the UK joined the EEC. Th e La- with almost all of the UK’s Brexit debate, it bour Party came to power in February 1974 has been expressed by leading politicians in with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister. On both the Conservatives and Labour parties. 5 June 1975, the UK government held a ref- For example, throughout his long politi- erendum on Britain’s continuing member- cal career the prominent Conservative and ship, with the Labour Party campaigning later Unionist MP Enoch Powell voiced his to remain. Th e electorate agreed with the implacable opposition to what he saw as the government, when 67.23% of voters opted ultimately political mission of the EEC in to stay in the European Community and all its subsequent forms. At the other end 32.77% voted to leave. of the political spectrum, the Labour Party Th e UK’s subsequent relationship with grandee, Tony Benn also maintained an im- the European institutions has been multi- placable opposition to the EEC. For exam- facetted, complex and continually shift ing. ple on January 1963 he wrote: Many UK politicians and citizens are pro- “[T]he Treaty of Rome which entrenches la- issez-faire as its philosophy and chooses Bu- 3 Tony Benn, Encounter (January 1963), quoted reaucracy as its administrative method will in Ruth Winstone (ed.), Best of Benn: Speeches, Dia- stultify eff ective national economic planning ries, Letters and Other Writings (Arrow, 2015), p.21. 64 foundly committed to the EU. Many of these has exceeded a purely economic remit and Europhiles have an intense dislike for their increasingly aspires to become a European Eurosceptic compatriots, tracing the latter’s superstate. Th is is a recurring theme of resistance oft en to an arrogant, isolationist, Leavers, especially those in UKIP and the ridiculously nostalgic “Little Englander” Brexit Party, and of course not least Nigel mentality. In others they recognise a more Farage. Karl McCartney, Conservative MP socialist and internationalist motivation for Lincoln from 2010 until he was voted for some current Euro-sceptics. Hence, out in the 2017 general election (following when he was a Labour Party backbencher, a series of scandals relating to expenses and the leader of the Labour Party (from Sep- other alleged misconduct), warns that the tember 2015 to April 2020) Jeremy Corbyn EU has long been pursuing a “centralising frequently expressed similar concerns to and Superstate-building agenda”, which the those of Tony Benn. For example, speaking Brexit vote has “re-energised”.5 Once the EU to a television reporter during the 1996 La- establishment – led by the Germans – has bour Party conference he warned that: “We succeeded in its “foul integration”, “former have a European bureaucracy totally unac- [national] Parliaments [will be left ] with countable to anybody. Powers have gone ‘collecting bins’, ‘street lights’ and regional from national parliaments. Th ey haven’t or local government-type devolved powers gone to the European Parliament, they’ve to play with.” gone to the [European] Commission and to A Stepwise binary logistic regression of some extent to the Council of Ministers.”4 the British Social Attitudes data from 2015 For Corbyn, the European institutions have revealed that the “key infl uences of on [UK] long pushed a neoliberal agenda, at the ex- attitudes towards the European Union” pense of workers’ rights. Corbyn led the were as follows.6 Labour Party during the post-referendum period. In that role he supported Remain and argued for a second referendum. How- ever, given his previous Eurosceptic stance, many critics have questioned his commit- ment to the Remain cause. 5 Karl McCartney, “Th e Superstate into which Elsewhere the intensity of public re- the EU is evolving makes our departure all the more urgent”, Brexitcentral, 28 September 2019, https:// sistance to the EU has increased notably brexitcentral.com/the-superstate-into-which-the- since Cameron’s 2013 commitment to hold eu-is-evolving-makes-our-departure-all-the-more- a Brexit referendum. It is now common to urgent/ accessed 11 November 2019. 6 hear the objection that the EEC was good Th e table appears in John Curtis, How Deeply Does Britain’s Euroscepticism Run? (British Social as a free trade area but that, especially fol- Attitudes, 2015), p.12. Curtis provides the follow- lowing the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU ing: “*** Especially strong relationship/Eurosceptic: Wishes either to leave the EU or to stay but reduce the EU’s powers./Europhile: Wishes to remain in the 4 “Jeremy Corbyn Opposes the EU”, https:// EU as it is or with the EU having increased powers./ www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJSiwNWb7pY ac- Source: Stepwise binary logistic regression of BSA cessed 11 November 2019. 2015 data.” 65 Dependent variable is these new terms, or to come out altogether. Continue vs Withdraw Eurosceptic vs Europhile … It is time for the British people to have Undermines identity*** Undermines identity*** their say, it is time for us to settle this ques- Economy if leave*** Immigration if leave tion about Britain and Europe.”7 Economy if stronger links Conservative or UKIP supporter Who was asking the question? For Immigration if leave Economy if stronger links many commentators, Cameron’s decision Strength of European identity Strength of European identity was an attempt to silence signifi cant Euro- sceptic voices within his own Conservative b.Th e immediate context of the 2016 Brexit Party.