The Antarctic Treaty System: Resource Development, Environmental Protection Or Disintegration? DONALD R

The Antarctic Treaty System: Resource Development, Environmental Protection Or Disintegration? DONALD R

ARCTIC VOL. 43, NO. 3 (SEPTEMBER 1990) P. 284-291 The Antarctic Treaty System: Resource Development, Environmental Protection or Disintegration? DONALD R. ROTHWELL’ (Received 14 March 1990; accepted in mired form 30 April 1990) ABSTRACT. The Antarctic ’Reaty System has successfully managedAntarctica and the surrounding Southern Ocean since 1961 despite the existence of conflicting sovereignty claims andcalls from the Third World for greater internationalparticipation in the continent’s management. The spectreof unregulated mining activities Antarcticain causedthe parties to the Antarcticlhty to negotiate the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activitiesin 1988. However, the entry into force of the convention is now being challenged by Australia and France, who propose a prohibition on mining in Antarctica and favour the negotiation of a comprehensive environmental protection regime for the Antarctic. The development of a world park in Antarctica has been mooted since 1972, and during the 1980s various international environmental organizationsgave enthusiastic support to the concept. A meeting ofthe Antarctic ’Iteaty Consultative Parties 1989in resolved to further discuss in 1990 the implementationof comprehensive environmentalprotection measures in Antarctica. While 1990 may be a pivotal year in the current debate over the environmental future of Antarctica, 1991 is potentially more. significant, as the Antarctic ’Reaty willthen become eligible for a comprehensive review. This raises the prospect of substantial changes to the Antarctic regime. Key words: Antarctica, international law, minerals regime, comprehensive environmental protection, world park &SUM& Le Traite Antarctique a assure la gestion de l’Antarctique et du Bassin antarctique environnant depuis 1961 mals6 l’existence de revendicationsterritoriales conflictuelles et des appels du tiers-mondepour une plus grande participation internationale dans la gestion du continent.La perspective d’uneexploitation miniere non reglement& dans l’Antarctique amena les partiesimpliquks dans le .rtaite Antarctique A nkgocier en 1988 la Conventionconcernant la reglementation desactivitb de miseen valeur des ressources minerales en Antarctique. LlAustralie et la France sont cependanttrain en de contester l’application lade Convention: elles proposent d’interdire l’exploitation miniere dans l’Antarctique et penchent en faveur d’une nkgociation visant A ktablir un rtgime global de protection de l’environnement en Antarctique. Dts 1972, on a par16 de la creation d‘un parc mondial dans l’Antarctique, et, durant les annees80, plusieurs organismes environnementauxinternationaux ont soutenu ce projet avec enthousiasme. En 1989, les diffbrentes parties du comite consultatif du ’hit6 Antarctique se sont reunies et ont rtsolu de poursuivrela discussion en 1990 sur la mise en vigueur de mesures globales protectionde de l’environnement en Antarctique.Thdis que 1990 pourrait bien &reune annCe pivot dans le debat actuel sur l’avenir de l’environnement dans l’Antarctique, 1991 pourrait Stre encore plus importante,vu que c‘est I’annke où le ”Mt6 Antarctique pourraStre soumis hune revision dans le detail. Cette possibilite soultve I’tventualite de changements d’importance dans le rtgime gouvernant l’Antarctique. Mots cles: Antarctique, droit international,regime gouvernant l’exploitation des ressources minerales, protection de l’environnement, parc mondial ’Ttaduit pour le journal par NCsida Loyer. INTRODUCTION the Antarctic Treaty ConsultativeParties (ATCPs), a group made up of the original signatories to the treaty and other The Antarctic Treaty system (ATS) wasdominated for much states whohave over time demonstrated a substantial of the 1980s by negotiations for the developmentof a minerals scientific interest inthe continent, have implemented “recom- regime. Despite considerable pressure from statesoutside the mendations” and created the mechanism forthe negotiation ATS and from the United Nations, the Convention for the of supplementary conventionsto deal with matters of environ- Regulation of AntarcticMineral Resource Activities mental concern, such as the protection of scientific sitesand (CRAMRA, 1988) was successfully negotiated and opened the control of mineral activities. AtATCM XV considerable for signature in 1988. At no time during the six years of debate took place over whether the ATS should continue to negotiations for the minerals regime had there been serious support CRAMRA or instead give formal consideration to dissent among the parties to theATS about theurgent need the implementation of a comprehensive environmental pro- to negotiate such a regime before any mining activity com- tection regime, as proposed by Australia and France, or even mencedin Antarctica. However,with the conclusion of to consider the claims of certain non-governmental organi- CRAMRA and its opening for signature came the first hint zations (NGOs) that Antarctica be declared a “world park.” that a rift was about todevelop withinthe ATS. After much At the conclusion of the meeting a number of recommen- public and political debate, the AustralianGovernment dations were agreed upon, with RecommendationsXV-1 and announced on 22 May 1989 its intentionto not sign XV-2 scheduling special meetingsto be held during 1990 in CRAMRA. It sought insteadto permanently prohibit mining an effort toresolve the debate that had developed over the in Antarctica and to this endcommenced a worldwide merits of CRAMRA and the proposed environmental pro- campaign to implement a comprehensive environmentalpro- tection regime. tection regime for the Antarctic. The decision by France to Following the events of 1989, it is obvious that as the also reject CRAMRA and support theAustralian initiative 30-year-old ATS entersthe 1990s serious divisions exist among showed that concernfor the future of theAntarctic the treaty parties that could conceivably cause the disin- environment was fast becominga major political issue within tegration of the regime, which has so successfully governed the ATS and that CRAMRA was under threat from a rad- Antarctica since 1961. Whether a mining regime such as ically different regime option. CRAMRA should be adoptedan or environmental protection The Fifteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting regime prohibiting mining shouldbe implemented isa debate (ATCM) was also held in Paris in 1989. At these meetings in which no middle ground exists. Whenthis debate is viewed ‘Faculty of Law, The University of Sydney, 173 - 175 Phillip Street, Sydney, New South Wales 2000, Australia @The Arctic Institute of North America THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM / 285 against the possibility of a comprehensive review ofthe ATS centrations in these depositswere not large enoughto be com- in 1991, it is clear that the Antarctic regime is facinga serious mercially exploitable (Wrightand Williams, 1974). Factors challenge to its existence. Thispaper will detail the such as high exploration costs, the expense of large-scale development of both alternative regimes and then assess the mining operations in the harsh Antarctic environment, the prospects for the future. high transportation costs to warm-water ports, and the need to have very large deposits to make extraction commercially THE ATS AND MINERAL RESOURCES viable all contributed to a general skepticism as to whether commercialmining in Antarctica wouldever takeplace The 1959 Antarctic Treaty (Antarctic Treaty, 1959) was (Potter, 1969). However, the discovery in1973 by the Glomar originally signed and ratified by Australia, Argentina, Challenger of ethane and methane gas in the Ross Sea area, Belgium, Chile, France,Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South the first major evidence that a commercially exploitable Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States,and the USSR petroleum resource might exist in the Antarctic, was the (Appendix 1). It came about as a consequence of proposals catalyst for the ATS to recognize that commercial mining put forwardby the United Statesfor the internationalization in Antarctica could eventually becomea reality (Mitchelland of Antarctica, partly prompted by the Cold War, and even- Kimball, 1979). Thisdevelopment in the 1970s, plus the tually realized after the 1957-58 International Geophysical advancesin polar miningtechnology flowing from the Year, when a commitment emergedto ensure that Antarctica Alaskan oil fields, forcedthe ATS to take anticipatory action remain a non-nuclear and demilitarized continent where andnegotiate an Antarctic minerals regime before scientific goals and not territorial conquests could be achievedunregulated mining actually commenced. However, despite (Hayton, 1960). these developmentsthere was little change inopinion during Since it came into force in 1961, a further 27 states have the 1980s that the reserves that did exist were small in size become parties to the treaty, and of the total 39 state parties, and when combined withthe problems and costs associated 25 presently hold consultativeparty status (Appendix 1). An with the exploitation of minerals reserves in the Antarctic ATCM is held every two years, during which the ATCPs made mineral activitiesin Antarctica commercially unviable discuss matters of concern that have arisen from the (Tessensohn, 1986; Larminie, 1987). implementation of the treaty. Recommendations are agreed upon atthese meetingsin an effort torectify these concerns The Negotiation of an Antarctic Minerals Regime and often their impact to is implement a new code of conduct

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