THE DYNAMIC NATURE OF ELECTORAL EXPECTATIONS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of the Ohio State University By Christian Andrew Farrell, M.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2004 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Herbert F. Weisberg, Adviser Professor Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier ________________________ Adviser Professor Paul Allen Beck Department of Political Science ABSTRACT Expectations are an important part of our understanding of presidential primaries. Whether we look at expectations in terms of how they drive momentum for some candidates, or as a component of expected utility in the individual decisions of primary voters, the chances of a candidate winning either the party nomination (viability) or the general election (electability) are key variables in understanding their success. Viability and electability are influenced over a long period of time leading up to the primaries, and continue to develop throughout the primary season. By adopting a theory of rational expectations, I look at how expectations change in reaction to information that is made available to voters. Using expectations data from the 2000 National Annenberg Election Study along with data on media coverage and campaign finance in the 2000 presidential nomination process, I show that expectations about the candidates' chances change in response to changes in the information provided by the candidates and the media. In contests involving well-known candidates, voters act rationally by using this outside information to inform their expectations of the candidates’ chances of winning. In contests involving only lesser-known candidates, voters do not act rationally, and only base their expectations on past values of their expectations for these candidates. This dissertation provides new insights into how expectations change over the course of a primary campaign, and gives a better understanding of these important variables. ii For Mary. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to thank my wife, Dr. Mary Outwater, for continual reminders to just sit down and write this, so that I could just be done and pay attention to her instead, which is a far more gratifying and enjoyable way to spend my time. I also wish to thank my committee members, especially my adviser, Herb Weisberg, for his support during the process, and letting me stop by his office to talk any time, for any reason. Many thanks also go to Jan Box-Steffensmeier, from whom I learned more about political science just by working for her than I did in most of my class-work. And Paul Beck, whose comments and advice were always to-the-point and immensely helpful. Thanks also go to those who helped out with the data collection process: Richard Johnston for providing an early copy of the Annenberg data, Bob Biersack of the Federal Election Commission for the campaign expenditures data, and Zach Pickens for coding a whole lot of New York Times stories. iv VITA April 9th, 1977………………………………………Born – Tulsa, Oklahoma 1999…………………………………………………B.A. Political Science – University of Oklahoma 2000-2001…………………………………………...Graduate Teaching Assistant Department of Political Science The Ohio State University 2001-2003…………………………………………...Graduate Research Assistant For Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier Department of Political Science The Ohio State University 2002………………………………………………….M.A. Political Science The Ohio State University 2002-2004………………………………..………….Graduate Teaching Associate The Ohio State University FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Political Science Interdisciplinary Specialization: Survey Research v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract………………………………………………………………………….………...ii Dedication………………………………………………………………………………...iii Acknowledgments…………………………………………………………………..……iv Vita……………………………………………………………………………..................v List of Tables…………………………………………………………………………......ix List of Figures…………………………………………………………………………...xiii Chapters: 1. Introduction…………………....…………………………………………………..1 1.1 Rational Expectations……………………………………………………..3 1.2 Influences on Electoral Expectations……………………………………...8 1.3 Hypotheses……………………………………………………………….11 1.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….14 2. Electoral Expectations, Primary Elections, and Rational Expectations………....19 2.1 Primary Elections………………………………………………………...21 2.2 Electoral Expectations in Primaries……………………………………...31 2.3 Rational Expectations……………………………………………………45 2.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….59 vi 3. Data and Methods—The Study of Expectations in the 2000 Presidential Primaries…………………………………………………………………………61 3.1 The 2000 Presidential Nomination Campaign………………………...…62 3.2 Expectations and Vote Preferences………………………………………67 3.3 Media Coverage………………………………………………………….74 3.4 Campaign Expenditures………………………………………………….76 3.5 Methods…………………………………………………………………..77 3.6 Conclusion……………………………………………………………….87 4. Voter Decision-Making in the 2000 Presidential Primaries: Do Expectations Matter?…….………………………………………...…………………………...88 4.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis...……………………………………………....89 4.2 Party Identification…………………………………………………….....90 4.3 Socio-Economic Status and Group Memberships……………………….92 4.4 Issues: Campaign Finance and Abortion………………………………...94 4.5 Ideology………………………………………………………………….98 4.6 What is Missing?......................................................................................100 4.7 Models of Vote Preference…………………………………………..…101 4.8 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...106 5. A Time-Series Analysis of Vote Preference in the 2000 Presidential Primaries………………………………………………………………………..116 5.1 How Expectations and Vote Preference Change Over the Course of the Campaign…………………………………………………………...…..117 5.2 Time-Series Specifications of Vote Preference and Expectations……...120 vii 5.3 Analysis of Candidate Expectations and Vote Preferences…………….122 5.4 Results ………………………………………………………………….126 5.5 Conclusion……………………..……………………………………….130 6. Rational Electoral Expectations in the 2000 U.S. Presidential Primaries……...157 6.1 The Theory of Rational Electoral Expectations………………………...158 6.2 Media Coverage and Candidate Spending……………………………...161 6.3 Tests of Rational Electoral Expectations……………………………….167 6.4 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...184 7. The Effect of Rational Electoral Expectations………………………………….211 7.1 Rational Electoral Expectations………………………………………...214 7.2 Implications……………………………………………………………..217 7.3 Complications…………………………………………………………..222 7.4 Future Research………………………………………………………...225 7.5 Conclusion……………………………………………………………...230 Appendices: A. Coding Sheet for Media Coverage Data.……………………………………….233 B. Time Series Properties of Media Coverage and Campaign Expenditures……...234 C. Additional Rational Expectations Models………………………………...……241 List of References……………………………………………………………………....248 viii LIST OF TABLES Table Page 1.1 Types of Rational Expectations for Two-Candidate Races with Well-Known and Not-Well-Known Candidates…………………………………………………....18 4.1 Candidate Preference by Party Identification………………………………..…109 4.2 Socio-economic Status and Vote Choice……………………………………….109 4.3 Group Memberships and Vote Preference……………………………………...109 4.4 Campaign Finance Views and Democratic Vote Preference………………...…110 4.5 Campaign Finance Views and Republican Vote Preference………………...…110 4.6 Abortion and Republican Vote Preference……………………………………..110 4.7 Abortion and Democratic Vote Preference……………………………………..110 4.8 Perceived Candidate Ideologies and Party Ideologies………………………….110 4.9 T-tests of the Difference Between Perceived Candidate Ideologies……………111 4.10 Ideologies of Partisans and Candidate Supporters……………………………...111 4.11 Vote Preference by Attitudinal and Demographic Variables………………..…112 4.12 Vote Preference by Expectations……………………………………………….113 4.13 Vote Preference by Expectations, Attitudinal, and Demographic Variables…...114 5.1 Time-Series Properties for Vote Preference and Expectations Series……….…134 ix 5.2 Granger-Causality Tests of VAR-Intervention Model of Democratic Vote Preference and Viability………………………………………………………..135 5.3 Granger-Causality Tests of VAR-Intervention Model of Democratic Vote Preference and Electabilities……………………………………………………136 5.4 Granger-Causality Tests of VAR-Intervention Model of Democratic Vote Preference, Viability, and Electabilities………………………………………...137 5.5 Granger-Causality Tests for VAR-Intervention Model of Republican Vote Preference and Bush Viability………………………………………………….138 5.6 Granger-Causality Tests for VAR-Intervention Model of Republican Vote Preference and McCain Viability………………………………………………138 5.7 Granger-Causality Tests for VAR-Intervention Model of Republican Vote Preference and Bush and McCain Viabilities………………………………..…139 5.8 Granger-Causality Tests for VAR-Intervention Model of Republican Vote Preference and Republican Electabilities……………………………………….140 5.9 Granger-Causality Tests for VAR-Intervention Model of Republican Vote Preference, Republican Electabilities and Republican Viabilities…………...…141 5.10 Summary of Results of Granger-Causality Tests for Democratic and Republican Vote Preferences………………………………………………………………..143 6.1 Types of Rational Expectations for Two-Candidate Races with Well-Known and Not-Well-Known Candidates…………………………………………………...187 6.2 Match-Ups in the 2000 Presidential Nominations……………………………...187 6.3 Hypothesized Findings for 2000 Presidential Match-Ups……………………...187 6.4 Media Coverage in the 2000 Presidential Primaries…………………………....188 x 6.5 Media Coverage Before and After the New Hampshire Primary………………188 6.6 Candidate