SCO “Peace Mission” 2012 Promotes Security Myths Roger N. McDermott The security dimension of the Shanghai Cooperation plaining that heavy equipment, strategic bombers and Organization (SCO), which consists of Russia, China, submarines contradicted the official claims of the exer- Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, cises having an anti-terrorist scenario. Uzbekistan has focuses on combatting the three “evils” of terrorism, only participated in one Peace Mission in 2007, limiting extremism and separatism. The organization has become its involvement to sending a small number of officers to closely associated with the joint biannual “Peace Mission” the command-staff element of the exercise. Although no military exercises, which has prompted some observers to official explanation was offered by Tashkent to explain its overestimate the organization’s emerging military dimen- stance on Peace Mission 2012, it may have been influ- sion. The ninth Peace Mission exercise, aimed at showcas- enced by tense bilateral relations with Tajikistan, which ing advances in military cooperation and the anti-terrorist include mining the border and enforcing a visa regime capabilities of the SCO, was staged on 8-14 June 2012 in between both countries. Tashkent also denied an official Tajikistan. request to allow Kazakhstan to send troops and military Moscow is seeking to boost its security apparatus hardware to transit through Uzbek territory to Tajikistan beyond SCO’s information sharing Regional Antiterror- rendering the whole display of SCO unity entirely open ist Centre (RATS) in Tashkent. It also promotes a joint to question. military anti-terrorist dimension modelling Peace Mis- Peace Mission 2012 was the smallest in the series of sion exercises around the bilateral prototype with the Peo- exercises involving only 2,000 personnel, including 369 ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted under the SCO from the PLA and 350 Russian servicemen (Peace Mission banner in 2003. However, the trends in these exercises 2005 involved 9,800 troops). On 5 June a PLA aviation have gradually moved away from larger-scale combined- group flew from Kashi in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous arms exercises to fit an anti-terrorist model. Yet, the inter- Region (XUAR), and PLA Ground Forces represented by nal divisions surrounding the exercises, forces involved, infantry and artillery companies began a 48 hour journey limited scenario planning and lack of any credible joint on 3 June from Atushi in XUAR overland through Kyr- force structure suggest that its real purpose lies in project- gyzstan. Astana sent a Kazakh battalion from an air assault ing an unrealistic image of the SCO’s military capabilities. brigade in its airmobile forces together with tactical and Peace Mission 2012 was held in northern Tajikistan, army aviation including Mi-24 and Mi-17 helicopters and culminating on the last day with the live-fire element at Su-27 fighter aircraft. Kazakhstan also dispatched Turk- Chorukh-Dayron Combined-Arms Training Range in ish built Kobra armoured reconnaissance vehicles on- the mountainous northern terrain of Sugd Region. The board An-12 to the exercise. Tajikistan was represented by exercise involved military and security forces from China, air assault and infantry battalions together with Special Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. As in most Forces, while Kyrgyzstan deployed a mountain warfare previous Peace Mission exercises, Uzbekistan refused to company and Special Forces unit. Peace Mission 2012 was participate. Tashkent has frequently objected to what it therefore less dominated by Chinese and Russian forces regards as the unrealistic aspects of these exercises, com- than in previous exercises. FOI Memo 4040 RUFS Briefing No. 14 Project No: A18001 July, 2012 Approved by: Markus Derblom Russia’s Deputy Defence Minister Army-General Dmitry overseeing its implementation. The combined forces con- Bulgakov referred to Peace Mission 2012 as an example ducted air-to-ground fire attack, joint encirclement and of the SCO meeting new and emerging global threats suppression, inserting forces at depth for pursuit and and challenges. Yet, as Russian military officials promoted annihilation of enemy forces and vertical interception and their own positive version of the exercise, Chinese experts annihilation. Given the weak defence planning capacity were actively downplaying the event and particularly any in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the scenario was designed by suggestion that the SCO may become an eastern counter- Beijing and Moscow with input from Astana. Moreover, balance to NATO. the lack of civilian expertise in devising the scenario con- Moscow deployed a battalion with artillery subunits tributes to its unrealistic nature. from the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, along with 50 Ten years after forming the SCO and nine Peace Mis- sions military exercises later, with some more clearly than pieces of hardware including 15 BTR-80 APCs and Tigr others contradicting official claims to centre upon anti- armoured vehicles and air support flew 600 km from the terrorist scenarios, Moscow and Beijing engage in no real Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) base in intelligence sharing beyond security exchanges related to Kant, Bishkek including Su-24 frontline bombers, and the SCO, which undermines the ability of the SCO to Il-76 and An-124 military transport aircraft. Krasnaya respond to a real security crisis. Zvezda reported that Moscow had planned to send an air The modelling of the Peace Mission scenario reflects assault brigade from the elite Airborne Forces, but this perceptions of Central Asian security in the General Staffs most likely referred to a small-scale involvement of GRU in Beijing and Moscow; the weaker members contribute Spetsnaz in support of reconnaissance efforts. little or nothing to this planning process. Equally, the Russian preparations for Peace Mission 2012 involved “joint force” that features in such exercises exists in name rotating personnel from Central Military District into the only; there is no consistency in either the units or person- 201st Military Base in order to replenish the conscript ele- nel involved a permanent joint forces command or ade- ments earmarked to participate in the exercise. The deci- quate numbers of contract personnel serving within units. sion to use the 201st Military Base indicates that Moscow Security experts in Central Asia question the viability of wanted to avoid sending higher readiness units to partici- such a force structure to act during a crisis, and off-the- pate in the exercise. Ahead of the exercise Moscow also record discussions with Chinese officials suggest that the talked up a classified element intended to test “new” tac- PLA would only act during a real regional crisis using a tical approaches to anti-terrorist operations. Photographs bilateral mechanism. from the exercise published by Chinese news agencies sug- gest that the live-fire element and tactics were still rooted in traditional approaches to combined-arms operations. Roger N. McDermott, Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Observers also noted that although the force was inte- Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. grated it was Chinese-led and rather than fitting a strictly “counter-terrorist” model, concentrated on showcasing The views expressed in this briefing are those of the author firepower. and do not necessarily coincide with those of the FOI. The exercise was divided into three stages culminat- ing in four tactical episodes. Political-military consulta- Please visit www.foi.se/russia to find out more about FOI’s tions were followed by preparing the operation and finally Russia Project. FOI Phone: +46 8 5550 3000 Customer: Ministry of Defence Swedish Research Agency Fax: +46 8 5550 3100 SE-164 90 Stockholm www.foi.se.