ANALYSIS With Trump’s entry into the White House and the assembly of his peace team, a strong GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDER pro-Israel foreign policy in the decade-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict emerged and coun- ISRAEL-PALESTINE tered prior U.S. Mideast policy. AND THE DEAL The policy implications of this peace team and the recent publication of a U.S. peace plan preclude the implementa- OF THE CENTURY tion of a viable socio-political and economic framework aimed at coexistence in Israel- U.S. Foreign Policy Under Palestine. President Donald J. Trump 2017–2019 Grace Wermenbol September 2019 The EU needs to take action and needs to reevaluate their traditional role in the conflict’s mediation and seek to become a »player« rather than a »pay- er« by reinforcing its role in the peacemaking through a pro- gressive international working group. GLOBAL AND REGIONAL ORDER ISRAEL-PALESTINE AND THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY U.S. Foreign Policy Under President Donald J. Trump 2017–2019 Contents Report Summary ........................................................................... 3 Setting the Stage: Obama’s Legacy on Israel-Palestine ......................... 3 The Transition Period: The Trump Campaign and Israel ......................... 4 Trump Takes Office: A Departure in US Foreign Policy .......................... 5 The Trump Administration’s Peace Plan.............................................. 7 The European Union’s Role in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict ................. 9 References .................................................................................... 12 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – ISRAEL-PALESTINE AND THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY REPORT SUMMARY runner at the beginning of his first term. On only his second full day in office, President Barack Obama announced to a Upon his entry into the White House, President Donald roomful of State Department employees that with the ap- Trump vowed to put an end to the decade-long Israeli-Pales- pointment of former Senate Majority Leader George Mitch- tinian conflict by assembling a peace team made up of per- ell as his special envoy for Middle East peace he would make sonal confidantes. The appointment of his son-in-law, Jared it »the policy of my administration to actively and aggressive- Kushner, as chief peace point man, in addition to Ambassa- ly seek a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, as dor David Friedman and Special Envoy Jason Greenblatt, was well as Israel and its Arab neighbors« (Ruebner 2013: 1). Un- indicative of both the preternatural pro-Israel stances within like Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton, Obama the Trump team and the intricate personal ties that existed promised to tackle the »habit of American presidents« who between the administration and the Israeli establishment. »in their last year […] finally decide, we’re going to broker a The policy implications of this close convergence led to the peace deal.«2 implementation of far-reaching, pro-Israel decisions on the ground that countered prior U.S. Mideast policy, alienated Despite his criticism of past administration’s policies on Isra- the Palestinian Authority, and further challenged the ability el-Palestine, President Obama and his administration failed in of the U.S. to act as an impartial mediator. The recently-pub- their attempts to make any progress towards achieving an Is- lished economic portion of the U.S. peace plan, titled »Peace raeli-Palestinian peace settlement. In 2013, Obama’s secre- to Prosperity,« is unlikely to herald the beginning of effective tary of state already recognized the dire consequences of this negotiations between the involved parties. The report’s fail- would-be failure. Testifying before congress, John Kerry not- ure to acknowledge the complex political realities that have ed that, faced with an accelerated pace of settlement expan- led to the current economic context thus precludes the im- sion in the West Bank, if a two-state solution were not to be plementation of a viable socio-political and economic frame- reached within Obama’s final term, the prospect for the cre- work aimed at coexistence in Israel-Palestine. ation of a Palestinian state would be negligible (Sherwood 2013). The »framework agreement« that Kerry was in the Faced with an unilaterally-bent, pro-Israel U.S. foreign policy, midst of promoting would eventually fall apart, and at the the European Union and its member states will need to end of Obama’s second term the prospects of another U.S. reevaluate their traditional role in the conflict’s mediation president overseeing the possibility of a negotiated two- and seek to become a »player« rather than a »payer.« De- state resolution appeared dim (Entous 2018a). spite existing internal legislative challenges and political and ideological fragmentation, European Union member states While President Obama’s legacy »could well be the death of are able to leverage existing practices to enforce policies that the two-state solution itself« (ibid.), early on in his term Oba- comply both with international laws and pre-formulated UN ma established himself as perhaps the most rhetorically sup- regulations. As this report notes, German guidelines put in portive U.S. president of Palestinian rights and the most en- place in 2014 can form a model to prohibit public funds go- ergetic in his pursuit of Palestinian statehood.3 Nevertheless, ing to Israeli settlements while at the same time hampering Obama was unable to translate these sentiments into coher- settlement production activities through labeling guidelines ent policy changes as a result of his inability to challenge the and public awareness campaigns. Meaningful cooperation, Israel lobby in the United States and his refusal to openly moreover, extends beyond the EU and alliances between confront Israel in international fora (Ruebner 2016: 52). willing member states. Under the guidance of the nominat- Moreover, despite Republican4 and Israeli criticism of Oba- ed EU foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, a progressive inter- ma’s Middle East approach, a close observation of Obama’s national working group should be reconfigured in the style policy on Israel-Palestine reveals that the 44th American pres- of the now defunct UN Quartet to reinforce the internation- ident largely solidified the United States’ role as mediator on al community’s role in peacemaking. SETTING THE STAGE: 2 This swipe at former presidents referred to the failed attempts of OBAMA’S LEGACY ON ISRAEL-PALESTINE President Bill Clinton in 2000 at Camp David and President George W. Bush in 2007 at Annapolis to initiate negotiations under U.S. auspices to resolve those final status issues that were deliberately When President Donald J. Trump entered office in January shelved during the Oslo peace process (Ruebner 2013: 1, 2). 2017, he, like many of his predecessors, vowed to end the in- 3 As Obama said during his 2009 speech in Cairo: It is »undeniable that tractable crisis between the Israelis and the Palestinians.1 In the Palestinian people – Muslims and Christians – have suffered in pursuit of a homeland. For more than sixty years they’ve endured the his first interview with The Wall Street Journal after being pain of dislocation. Many wait in refugee camps in the West Bank, elected president, Trump said that he wanted to help resolve Gaza, and neighboring lands for a life of peace and security that they the Israeli-Palestinian conflict »for humanity’s sake« (Lang- have never been able to lead.« This, Obama declared, was an »intol- erable« situation for the Palestinians and he vowed that »America will ley / Barker 2016). These words echo those of his direct fore- not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own« (Abraham 2014: 153–154). 4 In the words of 2012 Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney, Obama »threw Israel under the bus.« When asked how he would 1 Every president since Harry Truman has tried, to a greater or lesser conduct policy on Israel and the Palestinians, Romney stated: »You extent, to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in general, and the Israeli- could just look at the things the president has done and do the op- Palestinian conflict in particular, and failed (Ruebner 2013: 3). posite« (Ruebner 2016: 53). 3 The Transition Period: The Trump Campaign and Israel behalf of Israel, particularly in the realms of military aid5 and ly »direct negotiations [lead to] peace« (MacAskill / McGreal international diplomacy (Pressman 2016). Observing these 2013). According to Obama’s nominee for undersecretary of bilateral ties, in July 2010, then Assistant Sectary of State for state for political affairs, Wendy Sherman, these efforts Political-Military Affairs Andrew Shapiro even argued that sought to quash the Palestine Liberation Organization’s (PLO) the administration should be considered the most pro-Israel bid for statehood recognition and full membership in the UN in its history, as Obama’s »enduring commitment to Isra- in November 2012 (ibid.). el’s security« meant that the relationship with Israel was »broader, deeper, and more intense than ever before« (Rue- In 2005, U.S. peace process negotiator Aaron David Miller bner 2016: 59). confessed that »for far too long, many American officials in- volved in Arab-Israeli peacemaking, myself included, have Notwithstanding the dysfunctional personal relations be- acted as Israel’s attorney, catering and coordinating with the tween President Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Israelis at