CH9900055 Annual report 1993 concerning the nuclear safety and radiological protection in the Swiss nuclear installations 11 li^jrmifl Hauptabteilung fur die Sicherheit der Kernanlagen Division principale de la Securite des Installations Nucleaires Divisione principale della Sicurezza degli Impianti Nucleari Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate 3 1-01 Annual report 1998 concerning the nuclear safety and radiological protection in the Swiss nuclear installations May 1998 HSK-AN-3535 KSA-AN-2062 Cover picture The pictures show various activities of the Inspectorate (HSK) during 1998 HSK Annual report 1998 Content Preface 6 Summary 9 Organisation 12 1. Beznau Nuclear Power Plant. 13 1.1 Operational data and results 13 1.2 Plant safety 13 1.3 Radiation Protection 16 1.4 Personnel and organisation 17 1.5 Emergency preparedness 17 1.6 Radioactive waste 18 1.7 Overall judgement by the Inspectorate 18 2. Miihleberg Nuclear Power Plant 19 2.1 Operational data and results 19 2.2 Plant safety 19 2.3 Radiation protection 23 2.4 Personnel and organisation 24 2.5 Emergency preparedness 24 2.6 Radioactive waste 25 2.7 Overall judgement by the Inspectorate 25 3. Gosgen Nuclear Power Plant . 27 3.1 Operational data and results 27 3.2 Plant safety 27 3.3 Radiation protection 29 3.4 Personnel and organisation 31 3.5 Emergency preparedness 31 3.6 Radioactive waste 31 3.7 Overall judgement by the Inspectorate 32 4. Leibstadt Nuclear Power Plant 33 4.1 Operational data and results 33 4.2 Plant safety 33 4.3 Radiation protection 36 4.4 Personnel and organisation 38 4.5 Emergency preparedness 38 4.6 Radioactive waste 39 4.7 Fulfilment of regulatory requirements 39 4.8 Overall judgement by the Inspectorate 39 5. Central Interim Storage, Wurenlingen 41 5.1 Supervision of construction 41 5.2 Review for operation license for the waste treatment plants .... 41 5.3 Waste from reprocessing 42 5.4 Provision of transport and storage casks 42 6. Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI) 43 6.1 The PSI in Villigen and Wurenlingen 43 6.2 Research reactors 43 6.3 Accelerator, proton beam channels and experimental areas 44 6.4 Hot Laboratory 46 6.5 Treatment of radioactive waste 46 6.6 Storage of radioactive waste 48 6.7 Emergency preparedness 48 HSK Annual report 1998 6.8 Particular events 49 6.9 Radiation protection 49 6.10 Personnel and organisation 49 6.11 Overall judgement 50 7. Other Nuclear Installations 51 7.1 Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne (EPFL) 51 7.2 University of Basle 51 7.3 Experimental reactor at Lucens (VAKL) 51 8. Disposal of radioactive waste 53 8.1 Wellenberg repository 53 8.2 Repository for high-level waste: preparatory measures 53 9.Transport of Radioactive Materials 55 9.1 Permits and approvals according to transport legislation 55 9.2 Authorisations according to radiation protection legislation 56 9.3 Inspections and audits 56 9.4 Training and information 56 9.5 Contamination associated with the transport of spent fuel 56 10. Emergency Preparedness 59 10.1 The Inspectorate's emergency organisation 59 10.2 Planning for protection in the case of emergencies 59 10.3 Training activities in the area of emergency protection 60 10.4 MADUK and ANPA 60 10.5 Basis for atmospheric dispersion calculations 61 10.6 Social aspects in connection with decision-making following an accident 62 11. Regulatory inspections 63 11.1 General aspects concerning regulatory inspections 63 11.2 Regulatory inspections in connection with the examination of probabilistic safety analyses 64 11.3 Unannounced technical regulatory inspection as a consequence of an event at the Muhleberg nuclear power plant (KKM) 65 11.4 Regulatory inspections in connection with aspects of radiation protection during periodic inspections at the Leibstadt nuclear power plant (KKL) 65 12. Selected Aspects of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection 67 12.1 Guidelines 67 12.2 Instructive events in foreign nuclear installations 67 12.3The year 2000 date change problem 69 12.4 Organisational factors and safety culture 70 12.5 Commission for the safety of nuclear installations 71 12.6 IRRT: IAEA experts assess the Inspectorate 71 12.7 Procedure in connection with the evaluation of events 72 12.8 Developments and tendencies in the area of periodic inspections 73 13. Safety research 75 14. PSI Schools 83 14.1 Reactor School 83 14.2 School for Radiation Protection 83 15. International aspects 85 15.1 "Convention on Nuclear Safety" (CNS) 85 15.2 Waste convention 86 15.3 Bilateral contacts with other countries 86 HSK Annual report 1998 Appendix A 89 Appendix B 119 List of Publications in 1998 128 List of Abbreviations.... 130 HSK Annual report 1998 in future, nuclear safety will be confronted, 3.74 Person-Sv), the most intensive supervi- world-wide, with significant and partly new sion by the Inspectorate (519 technical inspec- challenges. Various causes contribute to this: tions), but also a huge shock, which led to a crisis of confidence within the public. - The nuclear power plants are becoming The fact that patches of contamination on older and a discussion is going on concern- the casks, or on the railway wagons, occurred ing their possible lifetime extension. This relatively frequently during the transportation places high requirements on maintenance of spent fuel, and that this fact was neither and the surveillance of ageing. notified nor questioned, became a topic of media interest over many months. In Switzer- - Deregulation of the market for electricity land, the permits for transportation were sus- leads to enormous cost pressures, which pended and the whole situation was investi- must not be allowed to detract from safety. gated in great detail. The Inspectorate used the dynamics of this - The founder generation for nuclear power is situation to ask relevant questions about itself, now of pensionable age and this can lead to its work procedures and its priorities. It allowed a loss of know-how. Valuable pieces of com- itself to be audited by an International Regula- prehensive knowledge concerning cross- tory Review Team (IRRT), consisting of a group connections between various areas of nu- of eleven recognised experts from seven coun- clear safety threaten to become lost. tries. With the benefit of hindsight, the whole process can be seen as a painful, but very in- - In the western world, there are virtually no structive and stimulating exercise in reposition- large new projects in the area of nuclear ing. The IRRT taught us, in particular, that su- power, which leads to a lack of interest in pervision cannot be restricted to a mere universities, research institutes and engi- continuation of expert assessment. During neering firms. Collectively, specialist knowl- appraisal, the focus is on technology (plants, edge is shrinking; recruitment of new staff systems, components), whereas in the con- becomes more difficult. text of supervision, organisational aspects (op- erators and work procedures) become ever - In the near future, hard-wired instrumenta- more important. tion and control technology will have 1998 was also the year in which every coun- reached the end of its life-span. Already to- try, which had ratified the Convention on Nu- day, certain spare parts are not always avail- clear Safety, had to provide an assessment of able.The leap to digital technology for instru- its own position in the form of a report. Swit- mentation and control is unavoidable. New zerland satisfies the requirements of this con- types of event or accident sequences can vention. However, 2 of these requirements led occur because of the possibility of hidden to a variety of discussions, because they could bugs in the software and the concentration not be fulfilled, to date, without encountering of so many functions in the computers. difficulties: The Inspectorate is meeting these challenges - Quality assurance and quality management in an engaged and positive way. It is active on in the Swiss nuclear power plants, and at all fronts in order to continue to carry out its the Inspectorate itself, are not yet of the tasks competently and reliably in the future. standard which one would ideally like them This is evident, e.g., in the establishment and to have attained. precise planning of our internal work proce- dures. - The independence of the Inspectorate, as In 1998 especially, certain of these chal- the Swiss nuclear regulatory authority, is not lenges already became perceptible. For us, it yet sufficiently established in law. This defi- was a year of superlatives: the fewest number ciency should rapidly be a thing of the past of classified events in the nuclear power plants as a result of the Federal Council's intention (only 5), the lowest collective dose for the to- to establish an independent "National tal personnel in the nuclear power plants (only Safety Agency" (NASA). HSK Annual report 1998 Summarising, it can be said that certain chal- lenges, which beforehand were only just be- coming visible, appeared, with astonishing speed, in a concrete form during 1998 and tested our vitality and ability to react. We were shocked, but recovered and reacted in an en- ergetic way. The resulting improvement in ef- ficiency is still in progress. Dr. S. Pretre, Director of the Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate (HSK). | fef t BLMMK I HSK Annual report 1998 Summary General aspects the IRRT recommendations and suggestions The Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate will characterise the future work and the or- (HSK), hereafter called the Inspectorate, ap- ganisation of the Inspectorate. praises the Swiss nuclear installations and supervises their operators. It assesses the Regulatory activity nuclear safety and the radiation protection of Regulation of the Swiss nuclear power plants these plants.Through inspections, and through of Beznau, Gosgen, Leibstadtand Muhleberg, reports received from the operators, the In- as well as the nuclear installations of the Paul spectorate obtains an objective picture of their Scherrer Institute (PSI), was once again in the technical condition with regard to safety, as forefront of the Inspectorate's activity in 1998.