On Liking and Enjoyment: Reassessing Geiger’s Account of Aesthetic Pleasure Íngrid Vendrell Ferran Goethe-Universität Frankfurt* [email protected] ABSTRACT. This paper examines the notion of aesthetic pleasure within the framework of an aesthetics of value. The topic is introduced in sect. 1, while sect. 2 presents "oritz Gei$er%s distinction &etween two kinds of aesthetic pleasure: likin$, which enables us to grasp the aesthetic values of the artwork; and en)o*ment, which is understood to &e an emotional response. +ect. 3 reassesses the main tenets of Gei$er%s account in the li$ht of current research. -n particular - provide ar$uments in favor of Gei$er%s distinction &etween likin$ and en)o*ment, &ut - call into question the claim that likin$ reveals aesthetic values. -n sect. 4, - su$$est that likin$ is a form of feelin$ motivated &* the co$nition of aesthetic value and - distin$uish it from &oth the $raspin$ of values and emotional responses. - conclude in sect. 5 b* brief* summarizin$ m* main claims. KEYWORDS. 2esthetic pleasure; 2esthetic value; 3motion; 3n)o*ment( 4ikin$; Value Feelin$. * Correspondence: Íngrid Vendrell Ferran – Institut f6r 7hilosophie, 8or&ert-Wollheim-7lat# 1 60629 Frankfurt am Main. "etodo Vol. 8, n. 2 (!;!;? @A-: 10.19079/metodo.8.2.207 !;= Íngrid Vendrell Ferran 1. ntroduction 2s is the case with other aesthetic concepts includin$ &eaut* the concept of aesthetic pleasure almost vanished from the aesthetic discourse durin$ the second half of the last centur*.1 An the one hand the si$niDcance of aesthetic pleasure was challen$ed &* those authors inspired &* Erecht and 2dorno%s materialist aesthetics who considered that the main function of art is not to please &ut to move us to social and moral action.! An the other hand the rise of aesthetic co$nitivism after Eeardsle* and Fospers led to a shiftin$ of attention toward the co$nitive powers of art rele$atin$ the notion of pleasure to the &ack$round., -n addition the few contemporar* accounts of aesthetic pleasure that do exist have tended to explain its function in terms close to emotivist and pro)ectionist views ar$uin$ that aesthetic pleasure confers value on those o&)ects a&le to elicit it./ 2$ainst this &ackdrop Gorodeisk* has drawn attention to a &lind spot in contemporar* research &* considerin$ aesthetic pleasure to &e revelator* of aesthetic value. -n this paper m* aim is to advance the de&ate on aesthetic pleasure in the o&)ectivist direction hi$hli$hted &* Gorodeisk*. -n particular - will focus on two main .uestions' What is the place of aesthetic pleasure within the mindG Fow is pleasure connected to valuesG The answers that - will develop in response to these .uestions take inspiration from the phenomenolo$ical tradition. "ore precisel* - am interested in presentin$ and reassessin$ "orit# Gei$er%s >1==;H1<,B? account of aesthetic pleasure. 2ttention will &e paid to a distinction &etween two kinds of aesthetic pleasure' likin$ which ena&les us to 1 For an anal*sis of the historical causes of the decline of &eaut*, which in m* view can also &e applied to the parallel loss of interest in the notion of aesthetic pleasure, see FU3"3I 28@ V38@I344 F3II28 2019. ! EI3JFT 1953, 110 and 2@AI8A 1970, 409. , E32I@+43K 1981 and FA+73I+ 1946. / See GAIA@3-+LK 2019a, 2 and 2019b. "etodo Vol. 8, n. 2 (!;!;? On i!ing and En"o#$ent !;< $rasp the aesthetic values of the work( and en)o*ment which is an emotional response toward the $rasped values. Gei$er%s account is interestin$ in the context of current aesthetics for two reasons. First &* distin$uishin$ &etween likin$ and en)o*ment he oMers us a $ood startin$ point to shed li$ht on the nature of likin$ as an activit* of the mind which is not assimila&le to the cate$or* of emotion. +econd he oMers an explanation of how ever* kind of pleasure relates to aesthetic value. Fowever as we will see Gei$er%s claims are not exempt from controvers*. - will su&)ect his claims to scrutin* examinin$ them in the li$ht of recent accounts. While - will provide further ar$uments in favor of Gei$er%s claim that likin$ is distinct from emotional responses such as en)o*ment - will also call into .uestion the claim that likin$ reveals aesthetic values. Throu$h this framework - will su$$est that likin$ is a form of feelin$ elicited &* the co$nition of aesthetic value and - will distin$uish it from &oth the $raspin$ of values and emotional responses. The aim of this paper is twofold. The Drst aim is historical' m* intention is to oMer a readin$ of Gei$er%s writin$ on aesthetic pleasure which makes his work suita&le for a dialo$ue with contemporar* philosoph*. The earl* sta$es of phenomenolo$ical aesthetics have &een lar$el* ne$lected and are completel* a&sent in man* text&ooks on aesthetics.0 -t is hi$h time to reconsider them to pa* tri&ute to their insi$htful contri&utions and to demonstrate their value for contemporar* research.: The second aim is more s*stematic. - will take 0 5enanzio Iaspa has made the same diagnosis in the case of the 2esthetics of the Graz School >to which authors like "einon$ and Witasek &elon$? >I2+72 2010, =?. For a discussion of phenomenolo$ists workin$ on aesthetics, see E-3"34 1995, 337-50. : Gei$er%s contri&utions to the stud* of empath* and emotional expression as well as his valuable accounts of the role of consciousness in the emotional experience have attracted recent attention (see 253IJF- 2015; JI3+7A 2015; +24-J3 2020; and 538@I344 F3II28 2019). Fowever, his contri&ution to the topic of aesthetic pleasure, which is the focus of this paper, has not cau$ht the attention of current aestheticians, despite receivin$ laudator* remarks such as the followin$: N2mon$ the older thinkers Lant, and amon$ the more recent ones "oritz Gei$er, each dedicated penetratin$ in.uires to it, and the results the* o&tained &elon$ to the &est that has &een achieved in the realm of aestheticsO >F2IT"288 2014, B/?. -n a recent paper, Summa approaches &rie1* the notion of aesthetic en)o*ment in +U""2 (!;!;?. "etodo 5ol. 8, n. 2 (!;!;? !1; Íngrid Vendrell Ferran Gei$er as a startin$ point to advance the de&ate on aesthetic pleasure sheddin$ li$ht on its relation to other aMective mental phenomena at work durin$ the aesthetic experience and examinin$ its speciDc connection with aesthetic value. The paper is structured as follows. +ect. ! presents and discusses "orit# Gei$er%s distinction &etween two kinds of aesthetic pleasure. +ect. , reassesses the main tenets of Gei$er%s account in the li$ht of current research. -n sect. / - present m* view that likin$ is a form of feelin$. - conclude in sect. 0 &* &rie1* summari#in$ the main claims. 2. Geiger on Aesthetic Pleasure 2.1 The Dis%inc%ion Be%)een iking *+e,allen- and En"oymen% *+en.ss- Gei$er%s aesthetics is as he used to put it an Paesthetics of valueQ >Wertästheti!?.B Fe coined this expression to contrast his aesthetics from the more dominant Paesthetics of eMectQ >Wirk.ngs/stheti!? which was concerned mainl* with the ps*cholo$ical eMects of artworks (i.e. with sensations emotions and moods? rather than their artistic values.= Gei$er%s main aim in aesthetics was to reconcile the B Fe also refers explicitl* to aesthetics as “value science” (G3-GEI 1986, 61). = -n the course of his criti.ue of an aesthetics focused exclusivel* on the psycholo$ical eMects of the artwork, Gei$er develops an insi$htful and detailed criti.ue of sentimentalism in the arts, i.e., a criti.ue of the attitude in which we en$age with an artwork with the sole aim of experiencin$ emotions. Gei$er elaborates a distinction &etween two attitudes of aesthetic en$a$ement: Pinner concentrationQ >0nnen!on1en%ra%ion?, which focuses on the emotions that the artwork elicits in us, and “outer concentration” >A.ssen!on1en%ra%ion?, which is concerned with the values of the work. Outer concentration is necessar* for the appreciation of the artwork. However, not all t*pes of inner concentration are reproachable. Fe distin$uishes &etween inner concentration in the emotion >0nnen!on1en%ra%ion in S%i$$.ngen?, which consists in attendin$ the experience of the emotion dissolvin$ the &oundaries &etween the experiencin$ self and the experienced emotion, and inner concentration %o)ard the emotion >0nnen!on1en%ra%ion a., S%i$$.ngen? throu$h which we attend to %he e$o%ion experienced &ut preserve the &oundaries &etween ourselves and the emotion. This second kind of inner concentration mi$ht have an aesthetic function. For a discussion of Gei$er%s criti.ue of sentimentalism, see 538@I344 F3II28 (forthc.). "etodo Vol. 8, n. 2 (!;!;? On i!ing and En"o#$ent !11 su&)ectivit* of the aesthetic experience with the o&)ectivit* of aesthetic values.< -n this context he developed the complex account of aesthetic pleasure in which we can Dnd the distinction &etween likin$ >+efallen? and en)o*ment >+en.ss? that forms the focus of this paper.1; For Gei$er aesthetic values are $iven to us with phenomenolo$ical o&)ectivit*. 2s he o&serves this view does not make the value properties Na&soluteO &ecause it does not impl* that values are permanent properties of the o&)ect &ut it does indicate that we experience aesthetic properties as &ein$ o&)ectivel* present.11 2ccordin$ to Gei$er aesthetic values are immediatel* $rasped throu$h our likin$.1! This likin$ must &e distin$uished strictl* from en)o*ment which is descri&ed as pure feelin$ and excitement and does not contri&ute to $raspin$ the values of the work.