Comparisons of Naval Strength BY SIDNEY M. BALLOU Supreme Court Hawaiian Islands An Address delivered before the NATIONAL CONVENTION of the Navy League of the United States Washington, D. C. April 10-13, 1916 For additional copies, order pamphlet No. 48 from the NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES Southern Building, Washington, D. C. THE NAVY LEAGUE. A SOCIETY TO HELP INSURE THE UNITED STATES AGAINST INVASION. ' I 'HE Navy league is an association of people *• who wish to keep war out of the United States and believe that the surest way to do so is to main­ tain a navy so strong that no nation can get its forces across the ocean to attack us. It has no connection with any business or political organi­ zation of any kind and is neither pro-anything nor anti-anything, but just plain American. The league was organized in 1903, and includes among its membership Hon. Theodore Roosevelt, Hon. Alton B. Parker, Cardinal Gibbons, Bishop John N. McCormick, Jacob H. Schiff, Isaac N. Seligman, Henry Watterson and Joseph H. Choate, and such women as Mrs. William Cumming Story, Mrs. George Dewey, Mrs. Hugh L. Scott, Mrs. Gibson Fahnestock, Mrs. Emma Smith DeVoe, Mrs. Genevieve Champ Clark Thomson, Miss Mabel P. Boardman and Mrs. George Barnett. Its accounts are, and always have been, open to in­ spection on proper application. COMPARISONS OF NAVAL STRENGTH SIDNEY M. BAIXOU The relative rank of the navies of the world is a mixed question of fact and opinion. There should be no ques­ tion as to the facts and not much room for difference of opinion. Nevertheless, the subject is a favorite field of controversy, and diverse conclusions often reached are ex­ plicable only on the supposition that the subject has been approached with a determination that the facts must be made to support a predetermined conclusion. In the hands of partisans all statistics are dangerous, and the multitude of figures that can be used to express the func­ tions of modern battleships afford a wide scope for those that have already made up their minds what the result should be. AVAILABLE; FACTS Prior to the outbreak of the war, the number of ships built and building, together with their main character­ istics, was known with reasonable exactness. No nation whose navy is any practical concern to us had any method of building battleships in time of peace except upon appropriations authorized by its legislature, and no warship ever appeared on the face of the waters whose coming had not been a matter of public record from the date of the appropriation. Writers of imaginary fiction were the only persons able to create fleets of bat­ tleships secretly and by stealth. With regard to the main characteristics of vessels under construction, secrecy was sometimes attempted. Ships of a new type or class were frequently kept under cover as long as possible, and the exact size or arrange­ ment of guns concealed. It must be borne in mind, how­ ever, that this was only a temporary expedient. A na- 1 tion that could keep the plans of a battleship a secret up to the date of actual completion was doing very well. After that a battleship cannot be hidden in a cellar, and there are too many trained eyes to see to make any fur­ ther pretence of concealment worth while. The most conspicuous example of secret plans was the Dread­ nought, but since the date of her completion all her es­ sential features have been public property. Since the beginning of the war, however, it has been possible for the nations at war to lay down ships of an unknown number and size. On the other hand it is improbable that any vessels of large size — battleships or battle cruisers — laid down after that date have been completed. Building programs since the beginning of the war have undoubtedly been extensive. Against the conjectural number of ships started since the war began we may roughly balance the equally conjectural possibility of a general fleet action or other chances of future losses dur­ ing the duration of the war. Losses up to date, how­ ever, are known with reasonable certainty and are al­ lowed for. For the basis of present comparison, therefore, if we confine ourselves to capital ships, we can safely assume that the larger ships laid down before the outbreak of the war are completed. If we compare these with our own ships laid down before the same date we shall get the best comparison available, and this will very nearly represent, especially as to larger vessels, the fighting ships now in commission. In thus comparing present conditions, however, we must emphasize, once for all, that a comparison of con­ ditions in the immediate future would be strikingly dif­ ferent. With many of the belligerents straining their building resources to the utmost, the United States has thus far proceeded at its very leisurely ante-bellum rate. It is only the lack of specific information, and the desi­ rability of getting at least a starting point, that makes 2 present conditions, based on vessels laid down before the war, of any value. METHODS OF COMPARISON When we begin to compare the ships of different navies, our main difficulties begin. The comparison of guns alone can be made on the basis of caliber, of weight of projectiles, of range, of muzzle velocity, of flatness of trajectory, of rapidity of fire, and of length of life, and anyone with a proposition to prove will have little diffi­ culty in picking out the particular feature that will best suit his needs. Guns are but one element of a battle­ ship, however, which in addition should have defensive armor, speed, great radius of action, and a host of minor but desirable characteristics. All this, moreover, con­ cerns only the individual ship. Every navy is composed of a multitude of ships, of every size, class, type, age, and purpose. To be of any value in time of war, each of these ships must be manned by a thoroughly trained crew. PALSB STANDARDS In this complexity it is no wonder that the average citizen seeks for some simple standard of comparison. One sapient statesman figured out that the vessels of the United States navy if strung out in a line would cover 16 miles, while the German navy similarly disposed would cover but 12 miles, wherefore their proportionate strength was as 16 to 12. With equal intelligence he might have added their masthead heights and arrived at a vertical column as a similar basis of comparison. Methods like these we may dismiss briefly as partisan­ ship gone mad. Other false standards, however, are more generally accepted. Too often, for example, the average citizen is prone to seize upon some particular feature of a ship and to exploit it at the expense of all the rest. The elements which seem to bulk largest in the popular minds are the caliber of the guns and the speed of the ship. 3 As to the first, we hear complaints by the score that the Queen Elizabeth has 15 inch guns while our battle­ ships still under construction have only 14 inch guns. To these critics it is incomprehensible that our navy should be so out of date. To them nothing matters but the size of the gun. If a gun is bigger it must be bet­ ter, and we should have the best. In this connection it is seldom that anything is heard of the corresponding disadvantages that go with increased caliber. One would think, foi example, that the number of big guns that a ship could carry would strike the popular mind as being as important as their size, but somehow it doesn't. The other popular criterion of superiority is speed. This is the most spectacular feature of a ship, and the reasons for its popularity are manifest. The ability of anything, from a man to a motor, to move fast, is not only of value to itself but will usually attract a tremendous crowd to see it do it. The singling out of speed as the all important factor sometimes leads to ludicrous results. A recent article reviewed in detail the fate of the unfor­ tunate Blucher, whose twenty-five knots was too slow to enable it to escape its pursuers, and moralized on the like fate awaiting the American navy, whose most recent bat­ tleship, the Pennsylvania, was fully four knots slower. Tt never occurred to the writer to inquire why a Penn­ sylvania should ever wish to escape from a Blucher. The Queen Elisabeth figures largely in this discussion too. It may be remarked in passing that whatever may have been the reason for building this division of twenty- five knot battleships, Great Britain was not enough satis­ fied with the result to continue the experiment with her next class of dreadnoughts, but returned to the more conservative speed of twenty-two knots. The average citizen has got past the stage where he will buy an automobile on the representation that it is the fastest car on the market. He knows he is giving up too much else to get that speed. Some day he will realize that battleships are built on the same principle. 4 STANDARDS OF COMPARISON 1. Displacement The trouble with such standards of comparison is that they pick out one desirable feature of a battleship and neglect all the rest. All battleships are compromises. Upon a given displacement, or total weight, the more guns you have, the less you have left for armor; the bigger the guns the fewer they must be.