Combating Terrorism Center at West Point Objective • Relevant • Rigorous | April 2017 • Volume 10, Issue 4 FEATURE ARTICLE A VIEW FROM THE CT FOXHOLE Defeat by Annihilation Bernard The Islamic State's all-out defense of Mosul Kleinman Michael Knights and Alexander Mello Defense Attorney FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Defeat by Annihilation: Mobility and Attrition in the Islamic State’s Defense Editor in Chief of Mosul Paul Cruickshank Michael Knights and Alexander Mello Managing Editor INTERVIEW Kristina Hummel 8 A View from the CT Foxhole: Bernard Kleinman, Defense Attorney Paul Cruickshank EDITORIAL BOARD Colonel Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. ANALYSIS Department Head Dept. of Social Sciences (West Point) 12 Marriage of Convenience: The Evolution of Iran and al-Qa`ida's Tactical Cooperation Lieutenant Colonel Bryan Price, Ph.D. Assaf Moghadam Director, CTC 19 Fifteen Years after the Djerba Synagogue Bombing Aaron Y. Zelin Brian Dodwell Deputy Director, CTC 25 Counterterrorism and Youth Radicalization in Jordan: Social and Political Dimensions Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour CONTACT Combating Terrorism Center In our April cover article, Michael Knights and Alexander Mello examine U.S. Military Academy the Islamic State’s ongoing defense of Mosul. Despite the group’s use of 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall innovative and lethal tactics such as pairing car bombs and drones, it has West Point, NY 10996 been outfought by coalition-backed Iraqi forces, which liberated eastern Mosul in January. With Is- lamic State fighters now engaged in a final fight on the western side of the Tigris, the authors describe Phone: (845) 938-8495 how the group continues to prioritize mobile defensive tactics to seize the initiative and mount coun- Email: [email protected] terattacks. Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ Our interview is with Bernard Kleinman, an American defense attorney who has been on the defense teams of several high-profile individuals in terrorism cases, including Ramzi Yousef, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Abu Anas al-Libi, and alleged USS Cole mastermind Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri. SUBSMISSIONS Mirroring the global rift between al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State, Kleinman reveals that almost all The CTC Sentinel welcomes submissions. the prominent alleged al-Qa`ida figures in U.S. custody he has had conversations with since 2014 are disturbed by the actions of the Islamic State, which they view as corrupting Islam and illegitimately Please contact us at [email protected]. targeting Shi`a for death. Kleinman reveals his client Ramzi Yousef, who is being held in the “Super- max” facility in Florence, Colorado, recently finished writing a 250-page treatise theologically repu- The views expressed in this report are diating the Islamic State. Kleinman also weighs in on the Guantanamo Bay military tribunal process and the relationship between Iran and al-Qa`ida, which his clients have described as being driven by those of the authors and not of the U.S. a “my enemy’s enemy is my ally” logic. Military Academy, the Department of the That is also the conclusion of Assaf Moghadam who draws on recently declassified Abbottabad Army, or any other agency of the U.S. letters and court documents to argue the relationship between Iran and al-Qa`ida, while historically Government. not without tensions, is best understood as a tactical cooperation that is based on cost-benefit calcu- lations. He argues that despite the intervention of Iran and its proxies in the Syrian civil war, these calculations are unlikely to change anytime soon. Fifteen years ago this month, al-Qa`ida detonated a Cover: A man walks along a damaged street truck bomb outside the el-Ghriba synagogue in Djerba, Tunisia, killing 19, including 16 German and in west Mosul on March 14, 2017, as Iraqi French tourists. Aaron Zelin sheds new light on al-Qa`ida’s first successful international attack after 9/11, drawing on court documents and detention files. Finally, with concern growing over the Islamic forces advanced in the embattled city and State threat to Jordan, Sean Yom and Katrina Sammour assess the social and political dimensions fought Islamic State fighters. (Aris Messinis/ behind youth radicalization in the kingdom. Paul Cruickshank, Editor in Chief AFP/Getty Images) APRIL 2017 CTC SENTINEL 1 Defeat by Annihilation: Mobility and Atrition in the Islamic State’s Defense of Mosul By Michael Knights and Alexander Mello in northwestern Mosul.3 The Islamic State’s defense of Mosul has provided unique With at least one quarter of Mosul still under Islamic State insights into how the group has adapted its style of control, it is too soon to uncover the full story of the liberation fighting to dense urban terrain. While the Islamic State of western Mosul. Therefore, this article will largely focus on the failed to mount an efective defense in the rural outskirts completed battle for east Mosul that raged between October 20, and outer edges of Mosul, it did mount a confident 2016, and January 24, 2017. During that 97-day fight, the Islamic defense of the denser inner-city terrain, including State defended an area of 500 square miles, including 47 east Mosul neighborhoods with an urban area of just under 50 square miles. In innovative pairing of car bombs and drones. The Islamic a previous study of the defensive style of the Islamic State, the au- State continues to demonstrate a strong preference thors observed that Mosul is probably too big for the Islamic State for mobile defensive tactics that allow the movement to mount a perimeter defense capable of excluding a large attack- to seize the tactical initiative, mount counterattacks, ing force due to the group's relatively small numbers.4 The authors and infiltrate the adversary’s rear areas. Yet, while the also stressed the “tactical restlessness” of Islamic State units—the Islamic State has fought well in Mosul, it has also been compulsion of local Islamic State leaders to mount active, mobile out-fought. Islamic State tactics in the final uncleared defenses that were disruptive to attackers but which also led to high northwestern quarter of Mosul are becoming more brutal, levels of attrition within the group’s ranks.5 This update will look at including far greater use of civilians as human shields. what aspects of the Islamic State’s “defensive playbook” remain the same and what aspects have changed to meet the conditions and challenges of defending Mosul. he battle of Mosul is an unparalleled event in the histo- ry of the current war against the Islamic State, not only East Mosul’s Rural “Security Zone” because Mosul is the largest city to be liberated from Operational factors and the geography of Mosul shaped the design the group or because of the unprecedented size of the of the Islamic State’s defense of the city. The bisection of Mosul security forces concentrated against the Islamic State. by the Tigris River (and the likelihood that all five bridges might TIt also unprecedented because, for the first time, the Islamic State be denied to the Islamic State) meant that the group needed to has no nearby sanctuary to which it can retreat. Mosul is the capital build stockpiles of munitions, plus IED and car bomb assembly of the Islamic State in Iraq, and the group draws significant prestige workshops, on both sides of the river. Mosul was always likely to from occupying Iraq’s second largest city. Unlike in Tikrit, Ramadi, be fully encircled during the course of the battle, and in any case, or Fallujah, the Islamic State defenders of Mosul are genuinely cut the rural outskirts are lightly populated with open terrain, making of from escape; they cannot simply mount a temporary resistance them of limited use as long-term defensive bastions (in contrast to and then slip away to nearby Islamic State refuges to fight another the dense palm groves outside Ramadi).a These factors meant that day. Mosul is instead a Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle)1 in which the the Islamic State could not hope to mount a long-lasting defense in group is encircled and cannot hope to achieve a cohesive breakout the east Mosul outskirts. Instead, it employed an economy of force at the end of the battle, as was attempted at Fallujah.2 The end of efort that bolstered small numbers of infantry with extensive de- the Islamic State’s occupation of Mosul is drawing near, and it could fensive IED emplacements and prepared fighting positions, tunnel end with the group mounting a ferocious (and atypical) last stand complexes, and mortars with pre-surveyed defensive targets.6 Some towns were “strong-pointed” to act as breakwaters against the advancing security forces. One example was Tishkarab, a small village nine miles east of Mosul, which held out for several days in Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow at The Washington Insti- mid-October against strong Kurdish forces directly supported by tute for Near East Policy. He has worked in all of Iraq’s provinces, coalition special forces and on-call Apache gunships and fixed-wing including periods embedded with the Iraqi security forces. Dr. Knights has briefed U.S. ofcials on the resurgence of al-Qa`ida in Iraq since 2012 and provided congressional testimony on the issue in February 2017. He has written on militancy in Iraq for the CTC a The terrain in the Fallujah-Ramadi corridor is characterized by dense Sentinel since 2008. Follow @mikeknightsiraq groves and a sprawl of medium-density villages and rural areas. In contrast, the area in the Nineveh plains surrounding Mosul is characterized by relatively open terrain with small, scattered villages. The Mosul-Erbil Alexander Mello is the lead Iraq security analyst at Horizon Cli- highway corridor gradually coalesces into a continuous, built-up area of ent Access, an advisory service working with the world’s leading mechanic garages, scrap yards, and shops as it nears the eastern edges of energy companies.