Theory and Reality SCIENCE AND ITS CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS A SERIES EDITED BY DAVID L. HULL an introduction to the philosophy of science ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• THEORY AND REALITY ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• PETER GODFREY-SMITH The University of Chicago Press / Chicago and London Peter Godfrey-Smith is associate professor of philosophy and of his- tory and philosophy of science at Stanford University. He is the author of Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 2003 by The University of Chicago All rights reserved. Published 2003 Printed in the United States of America 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 1 2 3 4 5 isbn: 0-226-30062-5 (cloth) isbn: 0-226-30063-3 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Godfrey-Smith, Peter. Theory and reality : an introduction to the philosophy of science / Peter Godfrey-Smith. p. cm. — (Science and its conceptual foundations) Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-226-30062-5 (alk. paper) — isbn 0-226-30063-3 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Science—Philosophy. I. Title. II. Series. q175 .g596 2003 501—dc21 2002155305 o The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Perma- nence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1992. For my parents Contents Preface • xi A Note for Those Teaching with the Book • xiii 1 Introduction • 1 1.1 Setting Out 1 1.2 The Scope of the Theory 2 1.3 What Kind of Theory? 5 1.4 Three Answers, or Pieces of an Answer 8 1.5 Historical Interlude: A Sketch of the Scientific Revolution 13 Further Reading 18 2 Logic Plus Empiricism • 19 2.1 The Empiricist Tradition 19 2.2 The Vienna Circle 22 2.3 Central Ideas of Logical Positivism 25 2.4 Problems and Changes 30 2.5 Logical Empiricism 34 2.6 On the Fall of Logical Empiricism 37 Further Reading 37 3 Induction and Confirmation • 39 3.1 The Mother of All Problems 39 3.2 Induction, Deduction, Confirmation, and Explanatory Inference 40 3.3 The Ravens Problem 46 3.4 Goodman’s “New Riddle of Induction” 50 Further Reading 56 4Popper: Conjecture and Refutation • 57 4.1 Popper’s Unique Place in the Philosophy of Science 57 4.2 Popper’s Theory of Science 57 viii Contents 4.3 Popper on Scientific Change 61 4.4 Objections to Popper on Falsification 63 4.5 Objections to Popper on Confirmation 67 4.6 Further Comments on the Demarcation Problem 71 Further Reading 74 5Kuhn and Normal Science • 75 5.1 “The Paradigm Has Shifted” 75 5.2 Paradigms: A Closer Look 77 5.3 Normal Science 79 5.4 Anomaly and Crisis 82 5.5 Wrap-up of Normal Science 84 Further Reading 86 6Kuhn and Revolutions • 87 6.1 Considerable Upset 87 6.2 Revolutions and Their Aftermath 88 6.3 Incommensurability, Relativism, and Progress 91 6.4 The X-Rated “Chapter X” 96 6.5 Final Thoughts on Kuhn 98 Further Reading 101 7 Lakatos, Laudan, Feyerabend, and Frameworks • 102 7.1 After Structure 102 7.2 Lakatos and Research Programs 103 7.3 Laudan and Research Traditions 108 7.4 Anything Goes 110 7.5 An Argument from History That Haunts Philosophy 113 7.6 Pluralism and the Ramblings of Madmen 115 7.7 Taking Stock: Frameworks and Two-Process Theories of Science 117 Further Reading 121 8 The Challenge from Sociology of Science • 122 8.1 Beyond Philosophy? 122 8.2 Robert Merton and the “Old” Sociology of Science 122 8.3 The Rise of the Strong Program 125 8.4 Leviathan and Latour 128 Further Reading 135 9Feminism and Science Studies • 136 9.1 “Science Is Political” 136 9.2 The Man of Reason 137 Contents ix 9.3 The Case of Primatology 139 9.4 Feminist Epistemology 141 9.5 Science Studies, the Science Wars, and the Sokal Hoax 144 Further Reading 148 10 Naturalistic Philosophy in Theory and Practice • 149 10.1 What Is Naturalism? 149 10.2 Quine, Dewey, and Others 150 10.3 The Theory-Ladenness of Observation 155 Further Reading 162 11 Naturalism and the Social Structure of Science • 163 11.1 Science as a Process 163 11.2 Kitcher and the Division of Scientific Labor 167 11.3 Social Structure and Empiricism 169 Further Reading 172 12 Scientific Realism • 173 12.1 Strange Debates 173 12.2 Approaching Scientific Realism 174 12.3 A Statement of Scientific Realism 174 12.4 Challenges from Traditional Empiricism 180 12.5 Metaphysical Constructivism 181 12.6 Van Fraassen’s View 183 12.7 Representation, Models, and Truth (Optional Section) 186 Further Reading 189 13 Explanation • 190 13.1 Knowing Why 190 13.2 The Rise and Fall of the Covering Law Theory of Explanation 191 13.3 Causation, Unification, and More 194 13.4 Laws and Causes (Optional Section) 200 Further Reading 201 14 Bayesianism and Modern Theories of Evidence • 202 14.1 New Hope 202 14.2 Understanding Evidence with Probability 203 14.3 The Subjectivist Interpretation of Probability 205 14.4 Assessing Bayesianism 208 14.5 Scientific Realism and Theories of Evidence 210 14.6 Procedural Naturalism (Optional Section) 214 Further Reading 217 x Contents 15 Empiricism, Naturalism, and Scientific Realism? • 219 15.1 A Muddy Paste? 219 15.2 The Apparent Tensions 220 15.3 Empiricism Reformed 221 15.4 A Last Challenge 227 15.5 The Future 230 Glossary • 233 References • 243 Index • 255 Preface This book is based mainly on lectures given at Stanford University during the last eleven years. So the book is a distillation of lectures, but not only of lectures. It also bears the influence of innumerable comments, questions, and papers by students over that time, together with remarks made by col- leagues and friends. The book is written primarily for students, but it is intended to be ac- cessible to a fairly wide audience. I assume no background knowledge in philosophy at all in the reader. My primary aim is to introduce some of the main themes in the philosophy of science, while simultaneously telling an accessible and interesting story about how the field has developed in the last one hundred years or so. In telling this story I have been led to describe the connections between philosophy and other disciplines, and the chang- ing intellectual climate in which theories of science have been offered, in more detail than many introductory books do. I have also tried, in some places, to capture some of the atmosphere of the debates, and the person- alities of the protagonists. Another aim of the book is the outline and defense of a particular point of view, but I have concentrated that discussion mostly in the final third of the book. Philosophy of science seems to me to be still in a state of consid- erable ferment. That poses a choice for the author of a book like this; one can either abstract away from the disorder and uncertainty, and lay down one particular vision, or one can use the disputes to tell a story about the field—how did we get to where we are now? I have mostly chosen the latter approach. This feature of the book is partly due to the inspiration of John Heilbroner’s classic history of economic thought, The Worldly Philosophers. For comments on this work I am very grateful to Fiona Cowie, Michael Devitt, Stephen Downes, Richard Francis, Michael Friedman, Lori Gruen, Tania Lombrozo, Denis Philips, J. D. Trout, Allen Wood, and Rega Wood. xi xii Preface Two anonymous referees for the University of Chicago Press also made helpful criticisms. For detailed and exceptionally useful comments on entire near-final drafts, resulting in numerous improvements, I am indebted to Karen Ben- nett, Kim Sterelny, and Michael Weisberg. Other improvements resulted, as always, from the insight, good sense, deft touch, and unique perspective of David Hull, the editor of the Science and Its Conceptual Foundations series. At the University of Chicago Press, Susan Abrams was constantly enthusiastic about the project and did a great job throughout. It is a rare pleasure to work with an editor like Susan. I am also grateful to Stanford University for much financial and intellectual sup- port over the last eleven years. This support has included several grants, in- cluding most recently a Martha Sutton Weeks Fellowship. Finally, as this is a book written primarily for students, this seems an ap- propriate place for me to express my enduring gratitude to the four funda- mental mentors who taught, guided, and encouraged me when I was a stu- dent: Kim Sterelny, Michael Devitt, Stephen Stich, and Philip Kitcher. A Note for Those Teaching with the Book The book is organized chronologically, especially until chapter 10, and fol- lowing the chronology is probably the most appropriate way to teach a course using the book. However, there is also a way to use the book in a course that follows a more thematic organization. Approached this way, chapters 1 and 2 are background; chapters 3, 4, 10, and 14 form a block focused on issues about evidence, testing, and theory choice; chapters 5– 11 discuss scientific change and the social organization of science, along with the interaction between these topics and epistemological questions; chapters 12 and 13 address issues more on the metaphysical than the epis- temological side of the philosophy of science. The book might also be used, of course, as a supplement to lectures and readings with a very different or- ganization.