Philosophy Today DOI: 10.5840/philtoday2019827279 Not More of the Same: Michel Serres’s Challenge to the Ethics of Alterity CHRISTOPHER WATKIN Abstract: Much French philosophy of the late twentieth and early twenty-first cen- turies has been marked by the positive valorization of alterity, an ethical position that has recently received a vigorous assault from Alain Badiou’s privilege of sameness. This article argues that Badiou shares a great deal in common with the philosophies of alterity from which he seeks to distance himself, and that Michel Serres’s little-known account of alterity offers a much more radical alternative to the ethics of difference. Drawing on both translated and as yet untranslated works, I argue that the Serresian ontology of inclination, along with his conceptual personae of the hermaphrodite and the parasite, informs ethical and political positions that offer a distinctive ethics and politics that present fresh insights about the relation between the singular and the universal, the contingency of market exchange, and the nature of violence. Key words: Michel Serres, alterity, difference, ethics, parasite t has pleased more than one historian of recent French philosophy to characterize the twentieth century in terms of a preoccupation with alterity and difference. Foremost among such historians is Vincent Descombes,I whose influentialModern French Philosophy foregrounds the theme in its original French title.1 Descombes notes the positive ethical charge accorded to alterity in this period by those philosophies that resist any attempt “to translate the other into the language of the same,” that is, “[t]o temper the brutal element of existence, to absorb the heterogeneous, to give meaning to the senseless, to rationalize the incongruous.”2 Prominent among Anglophone assessments of this trend in recent French thought is Todd May’s 1997 Reconsidering Difference. May identifies difference as a “pattern” that has “emerged in the French philosophy of this generation, of the generation running roughly from the mid to late sixties up to the present,”3 © Philosophy Today, Volume 63, Issue 2 (Spring 2019). ISSN 0031-8256 513–533 514 Chris Watkin prominent among which are Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, and Jean-Luc Nancy. What is common to these thinkers, May argues, is a shared problem of how to “valorize” difference, or in other words how to code it ethically. Indeed, he evokes an “obsession with the other” in this period,4 and he echoes Descombes in his judgment that “[t]o cast the issue in terms common to many Continentalists, the problem is how to avoid reducing difference to the logic of the s am e .” 5 Whatever important dissimilarities there are between Levinas, Derrida, Deleuze, and Nancy, May argues, they all share a positive valorization of difference and they all resist reducing alterity to the same. In the early 2000s, however, the tide decisively turned against alterity and difference in some quarters, and no single volume more succinctly or more polemically inveighed against the positive valorization of otherness than Alain Badiou’s Ethics. Whereas the philosophers of difference saw alterity as the key to a radical ethics and politics, Badiou argued that according positive ethical charge to alterity and difference forecloses any true ethics. Badiou’s own position is not that we need less alterity than the philosophers of difference would like, but that we already have much, much more: “Infinite alterity is quite simplywhat there is,” 6 and “[t]here are as many differences, say, between a Chinese peasant and a young Norwegian professional as between myself and anybody at all, including myself. As many, but also, then, neither more nor less.”7 For Badiou, then, alterity and difference are neither philosophically interesting nor ethically privileged. Badiou’s own proposal is radical: “the whole ethical predication based upon recognition of the other should be purely and simply abandoned.”8 All the philo- sophical interest, and indeed the ethical import, for Badiou is not on the side of the other but of the same, where the same is understood not as what is but as “what comes to be” in a truth.9 This means that “[t]he only genuine ethics is of truths in the plural—or, more precisely, the only ethics is of processes of truth, of the labor that brings some truths into the world.”10 The ethics of truths is “indifferent to differences”11 and so, as Badiou memorably notes, the truth has no dreadlocks.12 So it is that we are faced today with two major philosophies of sameness and difference, rhetorically antagonistic and each with its attendant ethics and poli- tics. On the one hand we have the various philosophers of difference—Deleuze, Derrida, Nancy, and Levinas prominent among them—who, each in their own way, positively code alterity and give it a prominent place in their ethics. On the other hand there is Badiou’s philosophy of the same, for which it is sameness, not alterity, that carries a positive ethical charge. It is not my purpose in these pages to arbitrate between these two broad tendencies. Indeed, it is my argument that to seek to do so would risk missing something very important that they share, something even more important than their differences. What Badiou and his antagonists have in common is the as- sumption that sameness and otherness are fundamentally and originally distinct, Not More of the Same: Michel Serres’s Challenge to the Ethics of Alterity 515 and that the two terms can unproblematically receive contrasting ethical values. Badiou’s own valorization of sameness over a ubiquitous and uninteresting infinite difference does not challenge the distinction between identity and alterity on which the philosophies of difference rely. In fact, there is a series of striking similarities between the philosophers of difference and his own thought. For Badiou, differ- ence is banal, trivial and ubiquitous, in the same way that, for the philosophers of difference, the reduction of the other to the same in Aristotelian logic, in language, and in politics is ubiquitous and simply what “there is,” understood as a Heideg- gerian es gibt. The philosophies of difference and Badiou’s philosophy of the same also share the assumption that only one of the two terms (sameness or difference) can carry a preeminent positive ethical value, differing only on the small matter of whether it is sameness or difference that receives this unique positive coding. Once again, just as the philosophers of difference claim that alterity is only ever one infelicitous totalization away from being reduced to the same, for Badiou truths require their subject to maintain a vigilant, persevering fidelity if they are not to be dissolved into the endless circulation of opinion or into self-interest.13 In short, Badiou’s disagreement with the philosophers of difference only makes sense in the context of the ample common ground that they share with his own philosophy of the same. Serres’s Ontology of Inclination and Orientation What we find in the thought of Michel Serres, by contrast, is a more radical critique and transformation of the ethics of alterity than Badiou is able to offer.14 Unlike Badiou, Serres questions not merely the privilege of the same over the other but the very nature of the distinction between those two terms, a distinction that subtends—and unites—Badiou’s own position with that of his antagonists. The rest of this article will explore Serres’s break not only with the philosophy of difference but with the very opposition between, and contrasting ethical charge accorded to, sameness and alterity, a contrasting charge upon which both Badiou and his antagonists rely, and which they jointly perpetuate. We can begin to gain a sense of just how radically Serres departs from the orthodoxy of sameness and alterity if we consider his account of existence, which approximates neither to Badiou’s ontology of inconsistent multiplicity about which nothing can be said, nor to an ontology of radical alterity or incommensurability for which “every other is wholly other.”15 His account of existence is presented over the course of his many books in a series of figures that intentionally resist reduction either to sameness or to alterity as they are conceived by Badiou and his antagonists, figures of inclination, orientation, and asymmetry, of parasites and multiplicities, of limping, falling, and drifting. 516 Chris Watkin Consistent across many of Serres’s discussions of existence is the motif of inclination:16 everything inclines in an asymmetrical way, spinning, leaning, or drifting. This, he maintains, is the basic condition of all existence, from atoms and stars through snail shells and human bodies (the left breast is statistically larger than the right, he informs us) to languages, manufactured objects, and cultures. Indeed the universe itself came into being, according to a theory to which Serres refers on multiple occasions, as a rupture of symmetry:17 The stars turn and advance, oriented, like particles around the nucleus of an atom. Crystals and molecules are lateralized, with highly refined symmetries and asymmetries. Direction or orientation comes neither from men nor from their preferences, from their inclinations, but from the inanimate world that precedes the living and from the living that precedes culture. Things lean to one side: force fields, boreal auroras, twisting turbulences, cyclones, spots on the planet Jupiter . the universe was born, it is said, from spontaneous symmetry breaking. Direction traverses the immensity of the sky, enters the box of details, and rides on the arrow of time.18 Serres insists that the motif of inclination is no abstract metaphysics or specula- tive theory, and that it does not rely on a philosophical intuition or axiom like Badiou’s inconsistent multiplicity.