FMFRP 12-27 ThePattern of War U.S. Marine Corps PCN 1O122700 00 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, DC 20380-0001 15 May 1989 FOREWORD 1. PURPOSE Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 12-27, The Pattern of War, is published to ensure the retention and dissemination of useful information which is not intended to become doctrine or to be published in Fleet Marine Force manuals. FMFRPs in the 12 Series are a special category: reprints of historical works which are not available elsewhere. 2. SCOPE This reference publication addresses the importance of studying military history and detecting patterns which have existed in the past and still exist today. The subject of this reference is one which should always be top priority of any military professional. 3. CERTIFICATION Reviewed and approved this date. BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS M. P. SULLIVAN Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia DISTRIBUTION: "TJ T" THE PATTERN OF WAR LIEUT. GENERAL SIR FRANCIS TUKER K.C.LE., C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E. JVIth eleven skeicli-niaps in tiLe text CASISELL AND COMPANY LTD. LONDON, TORONTO, MELBOURNE SYDNEY Lt.-Gen. Sir Francis Tuker commanded the Fourth Indian Diviinion of the Eighth Army in the victorious campaign which carried them across North Africa and ended in Italy at the Gothic Line. At the time of writing this book he was G.O.C, in C. Easenui Command, India. Dedicated to those who sometimes feel homesick for the old free life of the Desert and especially to John Blundell, a brave man who abides there L.E.T. L.iI.T. Gallipoli, 1915 Normandy, 1944 The author'sthanks are due to the Editor of the " United Service Journalof India "for permission to include Chapters XII and XIII; also to Mr. Guy Wint, Miss A. Knighton and Miss E. Roscher for their help in editing and preparing the manuscript for publication. CONTENTS PAGE IntroIuctiori . I Chapter Military Criticism . 4 IIThe Nation and its Fighting Services to IllThe Power of Manceuvre IVThe Decline of the Power of Manauvre 30 \'TheEclipse of the Power of Manceuvre 43 VIFallacy of a Linear Theory of War 50 VIIThe Return of the Classical Pattern of War . 56 VIIIMalaya and Burmah. 64 D.Notes on the Russian Campaign . 74 Gazala to El Alamein: Feb.—Oct., I9Lp 78 X Tunisia—Europe, and Siege Operations 92 XI An Introduction to" Icarian Geography" 102 XII Nuclear Energy and War . 120 XI'VEpilogue . '5' Index . 155 vu SKETCH MAPS PACE Graziani Sidi Barani . TheBattl f Tobruk, Rommel, Nov.—Dec., 194X 22 Map to illtrate Marshal Saxe's Plan for the holding of Pol. ci . 39 The Dcseifrom Alcxandria to Aghcila 57 Malaya . 67 Arakan . 70 Burmah . 72 Poland . 76 Gazala to amein, May—October, 194.2 8 Tunisia . 85 Rommel 1orrnandy, '944. 97 ix INTRODUCTION SOMEwere surprised, in 1915,thatthe war on the Western Front developed into a war of linear stagnation :they were surprised in 1939—40thatwar became a war of manceuvre. This s imli book sets out to show five things. The fist, that there is and always has been a traditional patternf war, a pattern that is to be seen not only in the form in v.'liich warIre manifested itself throughout such wars of manauvre as those of the i8th century in Europe, but far back ihrough the ages, to the days of Hannibal and earlier. From this, too, we can see a quite astonishing consistency in the manuer in which battles developed and were fought. The second, that itis therefore possible for a soldier to forecast of what nature the next war will be, whether it will be of this traditional pattern or of one less mobile and inspiring. The third, that only by a close study of his own profession, and a very fair knowledge of the society, national and inter- national, and of the world in which he lives, will the soldier be able to make a sufficiently clear forecast. The fourth, that by this study of Military Science he can help his nation to prevent war ever again occurring. The fifth and last, that the nation has, therefore, a duty towards him and itself to encourage him to make this study of Military Science. Throughout thi: book the reader will see how little real study we soldiers have made of war in the past thirty years.What names can we ncall of well-known, modern soldier-writers? One was J. F. C. Fuller, and he left our army of his own free will, for he was not satisfied ;Liddell Hart, soldier, civilian, military critic and historian, has influenced considerably our study of war and encouraged others to pursue the learning THE PATTERN OF WAR of Military Science.Both have done great service.Ought they not to have been able to do that service as well inside the army as outside of it?Would it have mattered if their vigorous writing and their fresh theories found some of us in disagree- ment? These two—and perhaps a couple more—are indeed all of whom we have heard much.It is a sad commentary on our lack of interest and enterprise, both in the army and in the nation.We are too fond of believing that it is the German or the Frenchman who knows all that isto be known about making land warfare.It is an expensive method of learning war to get to know it at second-hand, for in this way we come to know only of those things that other nations have already learned ;by the time we have mastered them they have passed on to other and newer things.They have produced next year's model. We have our own methods of making land war; we have had to make it often enough in the past ;we will have our own methods for making it in the future.But it is just as well to be aware of how we will make it, for it costs us very dearly each time we enter war without that knowledge. I hope there will never again be war.Later in this book the reader will see why I believe that there are grounds for this hope.I belong to a generation of soldiers whose lives have been made a nightmare by these two awful periods of horror and death.I am certain that only those who have personally looked upon a stricken bombed area or a fully- harvested battlefield can possibly conceive the abomination of it all.To keep the peace in the Empire was all that we who joined the army before 1914hadexpected to have to do.We were sadly mistaken, and many of us know that it was careless- ness and self-deception on the part of our'nation that threw us into the maelstrom.Too many of us accepted that careless- ness at its face value, we were equally deceived by the nation's self-deception, and thought there would be no need to take our profession scriously."It will never happen again," some thought.We have tried to stop "it" from happening by ignoring "it ".Wehave failed.That is our lesson.Let 2 INTRODUCTION us face the issue squarely and stop "it" from happenir again by knowing all about it and being ready for it. The atom bomb burst in August, 1g45.No thinking oldier could have been surprised at that.What is to be its effect on the operations of war?Let us try to forecast as well as we can at this stage what the effect will be, and how war, if there is ever to be another war, will be fought.We will talk to the physicist about this. If the reader finds these pages of sufficient interest to read to the last, let him satisfy himself whether I have clearly shown the things that I set out to show, and whether I have persuaded him that wc must continue, and with greater care and industry, in the study of the Science of War. LUCKNOW, .November, 1915. F. S. T. 3 I MILITARY CRITICISM H'/wever appeals to authority applies not his intellect but his memory. (Leonardo da Vinci.) BEF 0 R E opCning my argument I must say a few words on the subject of criticism. No military writer can fail to criticise if he is to get at the truth.He must start with an analysis and then, by discussion of the facts and motives that he has discovered, pass on to criticism.From that point he is to advise a better way of doing things, both in the present and in the future.Person- alities do not matter to him except in so far as tI1e abilities and character, planning and actions of the commanders affect the purpose of his examination.It follows, therefore, that names only concern him where they "docket" in history the particular type of operation that he is studying. So it is with the present study.It is the operations which concern me and not the men who fought them.Only by taking that attitude can I write at the present time, while the scene is close to us and memory honestly serves. In our army it is held as somewhat out of place to criticise yet, in our life within the great British democracy criticism is held to be necessary, common and usual.We soldiers have yet to strike the mean; we have lost much of good and caused real frustration by suppressing the honest comment of the few students of war we possess.Criticism has got to be encouraged and those who have something useful in this way to offer must feel reassured that even if what they say is against the policy or views of our hierarchy they will not themselves suffer in their careers for saying what they believe to be true.Officers of today join the army for a living, and have no private income with which to protect their livelihood and provide for their 4 MILITARY CRITICISM families.If our treatment of the honest and skilled dissident is not to be lit'eral, then the army will be filled with more time-servers th '-ithepast and will stagnate, to the great waste of thei.tion's treasure and, later, of itslife.Surely we have learned our lesson in this last calamitous struggle.