The Black American Lobby for Africa and The Caribbean NEW U.S. POLICY ON SOUTH AFRICA STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS UNCOVER DEVELOPING ALLIANCE On the following pages of this special edition are printed the verbatim goal we as Americans proclaim universally to endorse, the fundamental right texts of State Department memoranda which describe recent exchanges and of self-determination . Since 1915, not once has South Africa vacillated in its preparation for exchanges between American and South African foreign determination to deny blacks in Namibia and at home these basic political policy officials. rights. Thus, the aggrieved African populations, seeing no alternative to violence, have requested that western political and economic pressure be ap­ Over the last four and a half years, at one level or another, virtually every plied to South Africa in hopes that the scope of the ongoing killing might be nation in the world has played some role in seeking a negotiated termination reduced . While traditional western pressure has been too feeble to make a of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. The Carter Administration difference, the current administration has applied none at all. Unsurprising­ together with Great Britain, France, West Germany and Canada, carefully ly, South Africa remains unsobered and bent on its wrongful course. These crafted an independence implementation plan that won approval from all documents tell us something about why this is so. the parties concerned save South Africa. It was hoped in January of this year that the Reagan Administration would move early to apply its full resources Concluding this introductory note, the evidence here and elsewhere sug­ not only to achieve South African assent to the plan for Namibian in­ gests that the interests of black South Africans (they are scarcely mentioned) dependence but further to provoke movement toward full democracy within have been subordinated to the objective of restoring South Africa to interna­ South Africa itself. The documents revealed herein, public actions of the ad­ tional respectability and a role in the Western alliance. The evidence further ministration, my own talks with African foreign ministers and the presidents suggests that on the question of Namibia, the administration is much more of the South West Africa People's Organization and the African National Con­ interested in giving South Africa the time it needs to install the government gress of South Africa have led me to know with a special certainty that the of its choice than pressuring hard for United Nations supervised elections current administration has moved in quite an opposite direction. now. Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO, said to me recently in Nairobi, "We are prepared for elections now under the plan the U.S. helped to negotiate Mindful that the disclosure of sensitive policy materials is not a matter but the U.S. is now helping South Africa to stall." I was reminded of a to be taken lightly, I nonetheless felt it necessary to encourage broad public remark a Reagan Campaign aide made last year: "The problem with Reagan debate by making the documents available to the Washington Post last May. is that all he knows about southern Africa, is that he's on the side of the Central to the concern of Afro-Americans, themselves no strangers to whites." True or not, most Africans believe that. I do as well. repression, are the interests of a long suffering twenty million black South Randall Robinson Africans and one million black Namibians, peoples who simply aspire to the Executive Director Secretary of State Haig and South African Foreign Minister Assistant Secretary of State for Roelof Botha. African Affairs Chester Crocker. The entire texts of the State Department documents obtained by Trans­ ed against making success of P.W. Botha's program a condition of Africa are reproduced here verbatim, including a number of obvious spelling U.S./ African relations. Crocker responded with view that this is not a condi­ and typing errors found in them, for the benefit of our membership, the Con­ tion but reflects U.S desire to support positive trends. In response Pik Botha gress and other readers. went more fully into reasons for deep SAG distruct of U.S. Botha reiterated view that, as result of pressure from African states in UN , and influence of They include: 1) a memorandum of Assistant Secretary of State Chester State Department, USG has backed away from initial recognition of impor­ Crocker's meetings with South African Foreign Minister Pik Botha and South tance of its interests in southern Africa (read South Africa). He doubted African Defense Minister Magnus Malan in Pretoria; 2) a State Department whether, given domestic pressures and views of such African states as summary of major points relating to southern Africa (overview of Asst. Sec. Nigeria, U.S. could continue any policy favorable to South Africa, which Crocker's first official trip to Africa and London, April 6-23); 3) a memoran­ would not provoke constant criticism. dum from the Director of the Office of Southern African Affairs, Paul Hare, to Chester Crocker regarding the May 12 Contact Group Meeting; 4) Secretary In response, Crocker replied that present Administration would have Crocker's "Scope Paper" for Secretary of State Alexander Haig to prepare more backbone in face of pressure than previous one. U.S. Has many diverse him for his meeting with Pik Botha on May 14; 5) a South African listing of interests and repsonsibilities, but will stand up for what we think right. Our the points which the South African Government believes to be the basis for objective is to increase SAG confidence. U.S. relations with South Africa; 6) a South African prepared document on Toward end of discussion, in context of Angola issue, Both again came U.S.-South African nuclear relations. back to question of trust. He said he is suspicious of U.S. because of way (NOTE: Both 5 and 6 were presented to Haig by Botha during their May 14 U.S. dropped SAG in Angola in 1975. He argued that SAG went into Angola meeting) with USG support, then U.S. voted to condemn in UN. Cited many examples of past USG decisions that didn't inspire confidence - Vietnam, Iran, USG 1) Memorandum of Pretoria meeting failure to support moderate governments in Africa, while aiding those with leftest rhetoric. Alluding to Chad, Botha asserted that African leaders MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION became so desperate for help against Qadafi that one even approached SAG privately, as last resort, to ask for help . Botha admitted that SAG can't yet pass judgement on present Administration. He pleaded for consistency, PARTICIPANTS: South Africa: "When we say something, let's stick to it." Foreign Minister Pik Botha Crocker addressed trust issue, saying that new Administration is tired of Defense Minister Magnus Malan double think and double talk. Despite rocky start in US/SAG relations, im­ U.S. provement is possible. Reagan election victory represents enormous change in US public opinion on foreign policy reversing trend of post-Vietnam years. Assistant Secretary-designate Crocker Alan Keyes, SIP SAG View of Regional Situation: DATE & PLACE: April 15116, 1981, Pretoria During first day's session Botha discussed at length situation in southern SUBJECT: Discussions with SAG Africa and Africa at large. He cited economic, food and population problems to support view that Africa is a dying continent because Africans have made AF, 10-McElhaney, SIP-Keyes, AFIS COPIES TO: a mess of their independence. Botha asserted belief that cause isn't race, but fact that new nations lack experience, cultural background, technical training. US-Africa Relations: Referring to South African past experience in helping and training blacks in neighborhing states, Botha discussed the need for peaceful co-existence Botha opened first day's discussion by expressing unhappiness over what between South Africa and its neighbors. Until they recognize they're making SAG perceives as backsliding by Administration from view of South Africa a mess of their independence, South Africa can't help them. South Africa is taken during U.S. presidential campaign. Reagan campaign statements pro­ willing to help those who admit they need its help. duced high expectations in South Africa. But, administration, in response to On this basis Botha presented vision of southern Africa's future, in con­ views of allies, such as UK and Germany, and to influence State Department text of "Constellation of States" concept. He appealed for USG support for professionals, has disappointed SAG expectations. USG handling of visit by South Africa 's view of region's future, involving a confederation of states, military officers example of this. Botha raised issue of trust, referring to each independent, but linked by a centralizing secretariat. SAG doesn 't ex­ earlier "McHenry" duplicity on issue of SWAPO bases. pect U.S. support for apartheid, but it hopes there will be no repeat of Mon­ However, he affirmed that it means a great deal to SAG to have good rela­ dale's "One man, One Vote" statement. SAG goal is survival of white values, tions with U.S. and that SAG understands U.S. problems in maintaining not white privileges. friendly relations with black African states. To begin second day's discussion, Botha argued that central issue in southern Africa is subversion. Noting Crocker noted that, though he hadn't come to discuss South Africa's internal that what ANC does, South Africa can do better, Both stressed need for affairs, it was clear that positive movement domestically would make it agreement on non-use of force. If regions starts to collapse, fire will spread, easier for the U.S. to work with SAG. U.S.