The politics of virtue in Plato's "Laws" Item Type text; Dissertation-Reproduction (electronic) Authors Armstrong, John Melvin, 1967- Publisher The University of Arizona. Rights Copyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author. Download date 23/09/2021 19:19:41 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288866 INFORMATION TO USERS This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer. The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction. In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book. Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order. UMI A Bell & Howell Information Company 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Aibor MI 48106-1346 USA 313/761-4700 800/521-0600 THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE IN PLATO'S LAWS by John Melvin Armstrong Copyright © John Melvin Armstrong 1998 A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the Graduate College THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA 1998 DMI Nxjunber: 9901683 Copyright 19 98 by Armstrong, John Melvin All rights reserved. UMI Microform 9901683 Copyright 1998, by UMI Company. All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 9 THE UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA ® GRADUATE COLLEGE As members of the Final Examination Committee, we certify that we have read the dissertation prepared by John Melvin Armstrong entitled Politics of Virtue in Plato's Laws and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy ' ' Dat^ omas Christiofio Date / ' Paul Woodruff /1 Date Date Date Final approval and acceptance of this dissertation is contingent upon the candidate's submission of the final copy of the dissertation to the Graduate College. I hereby certify that I have read this dissertation prepared under my direction and recommend that it be accepted as fulfilling the dissertation requirement. J\y\yv\a^ Dissertation Director Julia Annas Date 3 STATEMENT BY AUTHOR This dissertation has been submitted in partial fulfillment of requirements for an advanced degree at The University of Arizona and is deposited in the University Library to be made available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this dissertation are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of source is made. Requests for permission for extended quotation from or reproduction of this manuscript in whole or in part may be granted by the copyright holder. SIGNED: \ 4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I have learned much from each member of my committee. Paul Woodruff taught me to appreciate better the political climate in which Plato wrote, especially the struggle between oligarchs and democrats in Greek cities of the fifth and fourth centuries, and the influence of rhetoric in political decision-making. I have also learned from Paul's clear-headed readings of Platonic texts, and hope that my own interpretations reach a similar standard. Thomas Christiano taught me that political philosophy's basic questions are among the most difficult to answer in a coherent and philosophic^ly satisfying manner. He pushed me to test and clarify Plato's political and ethical ideas with a degree of ngor unfamiliar to most Platonic scholarship. ViTiether or not I have achieved that rigor, I am inspired by Tom's philosophical tenacity. Julia Annas has been my teacher and mentor for six rewarding years. I have spent many delightful hours listening to her lectures, discussing ancient philosophers with her in informal reading groups, studying her books and articles, writing comments on her recent papers, debating with her via e-mail, being questioned by her in examinations, and conversing with her in her office, in the hall, in restaurants, and at conferences. She generously made time to read with me texts of Cicero, Epicurus, Aristotle, Plato, and most recently Alcinous. When I have given her drafts of my papers, including dissertation chapters, she invariably returned comments within a week, and often within a day. She has always been encouraging of my work, and I have always appreciated her advice. At this point it is difficult to know just how extensive Julia's influence has been on my approach to philosophical scholarship. I am deeply grateful for her conscientious oversight. I sincerely thank the Department of Philosophy at the University of Arizona for the collegial and stimulating atmosphere that I have been privileged to enjoy as a graduate student. I also thank the Joint Program in Ancient Philosophy at the University of Texas at Austin for graciously hosting me during the 1995-96 academic year. I am in debt to David Bradshaw, Daniel Graham, and Martha Nussbaum for their helpful comments on chapter 3. I also thank Christopher Bobonich for responding to my occasional questions about the Laws, and for the excellence of his published work on Plato's late ediical thought. My parents. Brent and Gloria Armstrong, have generously supported me in all of the ways that parents can. So too have my parents-in-law, Joseph and Barbara Bentley. I thank Joanna and Samuel Armstrong for welcoming me home after long hours in the library with cheers, hugs, and sometimes with questions about the dissertation's progress. I have a special debt of gratitude, though, to my wife, Carol Bentley Armstrong. She has been a loving and thoughtful companion and friend through these graduate school years and before. Her confidence in me has been a source of daily sustenance. I hope that these chapters are worthy of the support that she especially has given me. 5 To Carol 6 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT 7 PREFACE 9 CHAPTER 1: THE PURPOSE OF INSTITUTIONS 13 LI INTRODUCTION 13 1.2 FROM VIRTUE TO STABILITY 16 1.3 THE REPUBLIC AND STATESMAN 23 1.4 THELAW5 30 1.5 CITIZENSHIP 37 1.6 UNANIMITY AND FRIENDSHIP 50 1.7 STABILITY AND HAPPINESS 60 1.8 CONCLUSION 67 CHAPTER 2; VIRTUE AND CONVENTIONAL GOODS 69 2.1 VIRTUE AND VALUE 69 2.2 DEPENDENCY 72 2.3 SUFHCIENCY 79 2.4 PLEASURE AND INTELLIGENCE 83 2.5 CONCLUSION 90 CHAPTER 3: GODLIKENESS 92 3.1 PLATONISTS AND SCHOLARS 92 3.2 MYTH AND EXCUSE 96 3.3 TRUE VIRTUE 100 3.4 GOD AS INTELLIGENCE 108 3.5 GOD AND THE CITIZEN 119 3.6 CONCLUSION 133 CHAPTER 4: RATIONAL PERSUASION 135 4.1 INTRODUCTION 135 4.2 DEFINING RATIONAL PERSUASION 140 4.3 PERSUASION IN THE LA 151 4.4 OBJECTIONS 173 4.5 CONCLUSION 182 EPILOGUE 186 REFERENCES 187 7 ABSTRACT This dissertation identifies and explains four major contributions of the Laws and related late dialogues to Plato's moral and political philosophy. Chapter 1. I argue that Plato thinks the purpose of laws and other social institutions is the happiness of the city {polls). A happy city is one in which the city's parts, i.e. the citizens, are unified under the rule of intelligence {nous). Unlike the citizens of the Republic, the citizens of the Laws can all share the same true judgments of value, and this unanimity explains the city's unity. Plato thinks that aiming at the city's happiness is justified, moreover, because a unified city contributes to the universe's order. Chapter 2. In the Laws Plato holds that the sick, poor, ugly, weak, but virtuous are happy, and that health, wealth, beauty, and strength benefit the virtuous but harm the vicious. Only in the Laws does Plato commit himself to all these claims simultaneously, and I explain how the ethical psychology of the Laws permits Plato to maintain them coherently. Chapter 3. I argue that, in the Laws, becoming virmous is the same as becoming like God. Becoming like God does not require escape from the world of change as it does in the Theaetetus, however. Rather, becoming like God requires bringing "measure" or appropriate order to the world of change, especially to those entities over which we have the most control—our own souls. In the Laws, citizens achieve this order as they learn to be just and to understand the nature of reality. Chapter 4. Unlike the Republic and Statesman, the Laws holds that obedience of the citizens to their laws should be effected, if possible, with rational persuasion. I argue that Plato wishes such persuasion to educate the citizens of the reasons for the laws.