Case: 19-1081 Document: 65 Page: 1 Filed: 09/04/2019 Nos. 2019-1081(L) & 2019-1083 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT NATIONAL VETERANS LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant - Cross-Appellant. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in case no. 16-745, Judge Ellen S. Huvelle REPLY BRIEF FOR CROSS-APPELLANT JOSEPH H. HUNT Assistant Attorney General MARK B. STERN ALISA B. KLEIN Attorneys, Appellate Staff Civil Division, Room 7235 U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20530 (202) 514-1597 Case: 19-1081 Document: 65 Page: 2 Filed: 09/04/2019 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................ 1 ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 3 I. The Summary Judgment Order Should Be Vacated For Lack Of Little Tucker Act Jurisdiction. ............................................................ 3 A. There Is No Legally “Correct” PACER Fee That Could Form The Basis For An Illegal Exaction Claim Under The Precedents On Which Plaintiffs Rely ................................................................................................... 3 B. Plaintiffs Fail To Show That Any Statute Expressly Or By Necessary Implication Gives PACER Users A Damages Remedy ............................. 7 II. The Judiciary Did Not Unlawfully Expend PACER Fee Revenue .................... 13 A. All Of The Expenditures At Issue Here Were “Necessary” To “Provide Access To Information Available Through Automatic Data Processing Equipment.” ................................................................................................... 13 B. Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Avoidance Arguments Are Baseless ................ 18 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 22 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE Case: 19-1081 Document: 65 Page: 3 Filed: 09/04/2019 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page(s) Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996).................................................................................... 10, 11 A.H. Bull S.S. Co. v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 95 (Ct. Cl. 1952) ......................................................................................... 11 Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879 (1988) .......................................................................................................... 10 Clapp v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505 (1954) ................................................................................................ 10, 11 Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ............................................................................... 2, 7, 12 D’Apuzzo, P.A. v. United States, No. 16-62769, 2019 WL 2642696 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2019), appeal docketed, No. 19-2311 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 27, 2019) ............................................... 7, 9 Eastern Conn. Citizens Action Grp. v. Powers, 723 F.2d 1050 (2d Cir. 1983) ........................................................................................... 20 Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ........................................................................ 1, 3, 7, 10, 11 Federal Power Comm’n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974) .......................................................................................................... 19 International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) .......................................................................................................... 20 Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019) ...................................................................................................... 12 Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) .......................................................................................................... 20 ii Case: 19-1081 Document: 65 Page: 4 Filed: 09/04/2019 National Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974) .......................................................................................................... 19 Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ..................................................................................... 2, 7 Skinner v. Mid-Am. Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212 (1989) .......................................................................................................... 19 Sprague S.S. Co. v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 674 (Ct. Cl. 1959) ....................................................................................... 12 Sullivan v. City of Augusta, 511 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2007) .............................................................................................. 20 United States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012) .............................................................................................................. 10 United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392 (1976) .......................................................................................................... 12 Warth v. Department of Justice, 595 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1979) ............................................................................................. 8 Statutes: Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)(B) ......................................................... 8 Judiciary Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-515, § 404, 104 Stat. 2129, as amended by the E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899 ............................................................................................................. passim 26 U.S.C. § 7422 ................................................................................................................... 10 28 U.S.C. § 612...................................................................................................................... 14 28 U.S.C. § 612(a) ................................................................................................................... 4 iii Case: 19-1081 Document: 65 Page: 5 Filed: 09/04/2019 INTRODUCTION I. Plaintiffs fail to come to grips with the fundamental problems that beset their attempt to invoke the Court’s Little Tucker Act jurisdiction. As an initial matter, they cannot satisfy the basic prerequisite for an illegal exaction claim. Plaintiffs acknowledge that, to maintain an illegal exaction claim, a PACER user must show that “the value sued for was improperly paid, exacted, or taken from the claimant[.]” Response Br. 21 (quoting Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. Cl. 1967)). And plaintiffs implicitly admit (by their silence) that no PACER user can make that showing. As our opening brief explained, the premise of this suit is that the fee revenue collected by the Judiciary over a period of six years was excessive in the aggregate. But even assuming that the fee revenue was excessive in the aggregate (which it was not), there would be no legal basis to treat a fee charged as excessive as to any particular PACER user. Congress gave the Judicial Conference broad latitude to distinguish among users in setting PACER fees, which the Judicial Conference exercised through a variety of fee waivers and exemptions that evolved over time. With respect to any given PACER user, there is no “correct” fee that could form the basis of an illegal exaction claim. That is unsurprising, because Congress never intended to make the Judiciary’s collection or expenditure of fee revenue the subject of second-guessing in court at the behest of a PACER user. Instead, Congress reserved to itself the responsibility to oversee the collection and expenditure of such revenue. Thus, in addition to Case: 19-1081 Document: 65 Page: 6 Filed: 09/04/2019 plaintiffs’ threshold failure to show that the fee charged to any particular class member was excessive, plaintiffs also fail to identify any statute that provides, “either expressly or by ‘necessary implication,’ that ‘the remedy for its violation entails a return of money unlawfully exacted.’” Norman v. United States, 429 F.3d 1081, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Cyprus Amax Coal Co. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). The E-Government Act has no private enforcement mechanism, and there is no basis to infer one. The proceedings conducted by the district court— which required the Judicial Conference to disclose its communications with Congress, and then declared invalid various expenditures that were made pursuant to the Judiciary’s specific budget requests—are unprecedented, and fly in the face of the special solicitude that Congress has shown the Judicial Branch. II. If this Court reaches the issue, plaintiffs are equally wrong to assert that the Judiciary, acting under Congress’s oversight, has been unlawfully expending PACER fee revenue for more than a decade. All of the contested expenditures were for services that provide “access to information available through automatic data processing equipment,” as specified in Section 404(a) of the Judiciary Appropriations Act, 1991, as amended by the E-Government Act. Although plaintiffs contend that the aggregate fee revenue collected was greater than “necessary”