RECLAIMING ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS SETA Policy Report SETA | Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research | October, 2009 | www.setav.org | Report No: 2 Reclaiming Israeli-Syrian Talks Ufuk Ulutaş 1 S E T A POLICY REPORT SETA Policy Report CİHAN O c t o b e r, 2009 | Report No: 2 RECLAIMING ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS Ufuk Ulutaş UFUK ULUTAŞ Ufuk Ulutas is the Coordinator of the Middle East Program at SETA Washington D.C. He has taught classes on world history at Ohio State University, and worked as a Graduate Research Associate at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies. He previously held the Samuel M. Melton Fellowship in Jewish Studies, and is the current holder of the George M. & Renée K. Levine Fellowship by the Melton Center for Jewish Studies. He received his B.A. in Political Science and Public Administration from Bilkent University in Ankara, and his M.A. in modern Middle Eastern history from Ohio State University. He is a Ph.D. Candidate at Ohio State University and is finishing his dissertation on the immigration of Turkish Jews to Israel during the inter-war years. 2 2009©All Rights Reserved SETA | FOUNDATION FOR POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RESEARCH Reşit Galip Cd. Hereke Sokak No: 10 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TÜRKİYE Phone: +90 312.405 61 51 | Fax: +90 312.405 69 03 | www.setav.org | infosetav.org RECLAIMING ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION | 6 II. A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT | 7 II. B. GEOGRAPHY AND DEMOGRAPHICS | 9 III. A. PAST INITIATIVES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND PEACE PLANS | 11 III. B. TURKISH SPONSORSHIP | 13 IV. A. SYRIAN DEMANDS: THE LINE OF 4 JUNE 1967 | 15 IV. B. SYRIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN TRACK | 16 V. A. ISRAELI DEMANDS AND CONCERNS | 17 V. B. DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS | 18 VI. TURKEY, UNITED STATES AND THE ROLE OF THE THIRD PARTIES | 20 VII. A. AMERICAN-SYRIAN RELATIONS & ITS IMPLICATIONS ON THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN TRACK | 21 VII. B. ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE AND ITS REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS | 22 VIII. CONCLUSION | 24 3 S E T A POLICY REPORT 4 RECLAIMING ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS ABSTRACT The Israeli-Syrian track has been an important component of the Arab-Israeli peace talks due to its integral role in reaching comprehensive peace in the Middle East. The latest round of indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria was initiated under the sponsorship of Turkey on May 21, 2008, and by the end of 2008 both sides were ready to start the direct talks. However, in protest of Israeli aerial and ground offensive in Gaza in December 2008, Syria halted the indirect talks with Israel. Several factors, including the lack of American endorsement; Olmert’s weak prospect in Israel due to the ongoing corruption investigation; approaching early elections, and the rise of rightist parties in Israel, topped by the Israeli offensive in Gaza, rendered the conciliation efforts futile. The Syrian side has been consistently clear about their principal demands from their Israeli counterparts: “the line of 4 June 1967.” While security concerns have been shaping Israeli demands from Syria in the peace negotiations. Many in Israel consider the Golan Heights as Israel’s first line of defense against Syria and see retaining of the water sources in the Golan as strategic and existential. The Iranian threat has been a crucial factor motivating Israel to reconsider the peace talks with Syria; on the other hand, Syrian determination to end their international isolation has made Syria a willing party for the peace talks. While Syria prefers a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace that include Israeli-Palestinian track side by side with the Israeli-Syrian track, Israel wants to deal with the Palestinian question and peace with Syria separately. Israeli-Syrian peace has the potential to be a turning point in the history of the Middle East, on the condition that it produces a viable solution for the border disputes and security concerns and that both sides comply with implementation of the solution. While facilitating the end of decades-long hostilities between Arab states and Israel, it could also have a positive impact on Iranian-American and Iranian-Israeli relations. Consequently, it could prevent a serious armed conflict between Iran and Israel in the Middle East. Third parties will have to play a more active role during all stages of the peace process: indirect talks, direct talks, and implementation of the agreement. While such countries as Turkey could bridge the gap between the two countries in earlier stages and lay the foundations of an agreement, the U.S. involvement into the process would be critical in later stages. Having Israel and Syria comply with the terms of the agreement would be as much important as bringing them to the table and having them sign the agreement. 5 S E T A POLICY REPORT RECLAIMING ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS I. INTRODUCTION The Arab-Israeli conflict consists of several interrelated disputes of different multitudes and complexities. One could argue that the dispute between Israel and Syria is relatively more straightforward; and reaching a solution for it is relatively more doable when compared to other disputes that constitute the backbone of the Arab-Israeli conflict, such as Palestinian statehood, the Palestinian refugee problem, the West Bank and East Jerusalem settlements issue, and the final status of Jerusalem. The Israeli-Syrian track has been an important component of the Arab-Israeli peace talks due to its possible facilitating effect on the solution of other components; some policy makers, including the U.S. Middle East special envoy George Mitchell, have started lately to attribute to it an integral role to play in reaching comprehensive peace in the Middle East.1 The latest round of indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria was initiated under the sponsorship of Turkey on May 21, 2008, and by the end of 2008 both sides were ready to start the direct talks2. However, in protest of Israeli aerial and ground offensive in Gaza in December 2008, Syria halted the indirect talks with Israel. Since December 2008, two major developments which would have a direct effect on the future of the halted Israeli- Syria peace talks occurred: one negative and one positive. On June 29, 2009, Barack Obama, who had hinted that he would embark on a new and constructive Middle East diplomacy, was inaugurated as the 44th president of the United States. In Israel on the other hand, a Likud-led rightist coalition composed of ultra-nationalist, religious Zionist parties and the “leftist-centrist” Labor Party, was formed under the premiership of Benjamin Netanyahu, and the controversial, ultra-nationalist Avigdor Lieberman became the new Foreign Minister. Obama’s presidency has indeed brought a new momentum to the relations between the United States and some Middle Eastern countries, including Syria. George Mitchell has visited Damascus twice and underlined Syria’s key role for peace in the Middle East. The United States also announced that it will send an ambassador to Syria after a four- year hiatus since the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005.3 The amelioration of relations between Syria and the United States and a strong emphasis on Syria’s role in the Middle East hinted at an American 1. “Mitchell meets Assad: Syria has a significant role” in Hebrew, Yediot Aharonot, (June 13, 2009) 2. Zvi Barel, “Week before Gaza op, Israel and Syria were ready for direct talks”, Haaretz, (February 23, 2009) This was confirmed by the Turk- 6 ish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. 3. See Barry Schweid, “U.S. Withdraws Ambassador From Syria,” Associated Press, Febru ary 16, 2005, and “Obama Will Restore U.S. Ambas- sador To Syria”, The Washington Post, (June 24, 2009) RECLAIMING ISRAELI-SYRIAN TALKS willingness to broker an agreement between Israel and Syria with an ultimate aim of achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Since the suspension of the indirect talks, both Damascus and Tel Aviv have made accusatory statements regarding one another, complaining that they do not have a partner for peace.”4 However, both countries also stated their varying amount of desire to resume the peace talks. According to Damascus, the talks should start again as indirect talks, preferably under Turkish sponsorship and American supervision, and can transform into direct talks only if Israel pledges to end its occupation of the entire Golan Heights. Therefore, central to the Syrian willingness to start direct talks with Israel is the 695 sq mile (ca. 1800 sq km) strategic plateau, two-thirds of which has been occupied by Israel since the Six Day War in 1967. According to Damascus, the talks should start again as indirect talks, preferably under Turkish sponsorship and American supervision. For Tel Aviv, Syrian insistence on indirect talks is merely a strategy to extricate Syria from the international isolation it has been subjected to for several years. In Deputy Foreign Minister David Ayalon’s words, “Assad just wants peace process, not peace.”5 Therefore, Tel Aviv currently favors direct talks initiated without preconditions. The current government has announced that it is not bound by the pledges given by Olmert government, making the restart of the talks where it was left almost impossible. In other words, the Golan Heights, from which Olmert was considering seriously to withdraw, is seemingly not on the negotiation table for Israel. This unwillingness to compromise on the Golan Heights is an anticipated move for the rightist Israeli government, since all political parties that formed the coalition, with an exception of the Labor, had taken staunch positions on the Golan in their party platforms and promised their constituencies not to give up on it.