Tatalovi}, S., Military and Political Aspects..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 166—190 166 Military and Political Aspects of the Croato-Serbian Conflict SINI[A TATALOVI] Faculty of Political Science, University of Zagreb Summary The author deals with the political and military aspects of the conflict be- tween Croatia and Serbia. Starting from global political circumstances in which this conflict emerged and developed, he describes the political goals of the conflicting parties, their strategies and military organization as well as the stages of the war in Croatia. After this war, nothing has been the same in Croatia. Croatia has, much sooner than expected and with fewer victims, realized its political goals. Besides the international recognition and the establishment of its authority on almost entire state territory, Croatia has become a major military force. However, the war in Croatia has significantly hindered democratic processes which, in turn, has stood in the way of its taking part in the European integrational processes. Serbia is the loser of this war in every, primarily military respect. The consequence of the Serbian instigatory politics in Croatia has not only been Serbian exodus from Croatia, but the socially unenviable position in which the remaining Serbs in Croatia find themselves. By becoming proponents of Serbian global politics and failing to bring their interests in line with those of Croatia, the leadership of the seditious Croatian Serbs accepted the role of an instrument of global national politics. As Serbian national politics was losing ground and giving up on previous goals - the creation of a great national state - Serbs in Croatia became victims of this politics. Introduction The Croato-Serbian conflict, which culminated in the war that was fought in Croatia, is specific in many ways. It is yet to be fully re- searched and the findings should be made widely available, particularly to those who can use the experience of this war to help prevent future con- flicts. The experience of the war in Croatia might be beneficial to other countries helping them to define their defense strategies and develop their defense systems. It is on these lines that we shall discuss the basic char- acteristics of the Croato-Serbian conflict and war in Croatia by analyzing its four aspects: political, military-strategic, organizational and operational, on both belligerent parties. Social changes in the former Yugoslavia, particularly the events that took place in the late sixties and early seventies, the 1974 Constitution, the democratic changes in Croatia and Slovenia, the introduction of politi- cal pluralism and the multi-party system and the new political forces in power, all this threatened the political achievements of the so called Tatalovi}, S., Military and Political Aspects..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 166—190 167 “fraternity and unity”. Social changes in SFRY, which were directed to- wards democratization and national and republic independence, undermined socialism as the basis of the multinational federation. This is why dogmatic forces, especially those in the JNA1 and the federal administration, felt threatened and therefore strongly opposed any democratic process in order to preserve the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a centrally or- ganized federation, in which they could maintain their positions. This is clearly seen in what Veljko Kadijevi}, the then Federal Secretary of Na- tional Defense, said: “The moment when the multi-party system was intro- duced in Yugoslavia and the way in which it was done marked the end of Yugoslavia within its up-to-then borders. We had, as I said earlier, clearly and publicly foreseen this. The meeting of the military leadership with the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Croatia in Zagreb one month prior to the multi-party elections in Croatia provided a clear ex- ample of such forecasts. We told them straightforwardly that they - the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Croatia - would allow ustashas to come to power in Croatia. There were some reactions, but they did not get too excited”2 After the multi-party elections in Slovenia and Croatia in 1990, and particularly after the declaration of their independence in June 1991, when it became clear that there was little left of former Yugoslavia, the federal government aided by the JNA started the war, first against Slovenia, and shortly after that against Croatia. In the war against Croatia the JNA was joined by paramilitary forces formed by rebel Croatian Serbs. Even before the war started this had been announced by the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)3 at a rally at Vo}in in Western Slavonia early in 1991 when he said: “If a war breaks out between the Croatian state and 1When the Yugoslav League of Communists dissolved, the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) lost the ideological grounds on which it had been built, and by the break-up of SFRY it lost both its material and geographic basis. This made its existence questionable. Since it involved 150,000 people, out of which 50% were professionals, and the majority being Serbs, Montenegrins and Yugoslavs, their existential fear can be easily understood. Many of them were prepared to engage in a war in order to preserve SFRY and keep their positions. 2Kadijevi} Veljko, Moje vi|enje raspada, Politika, Beograd, 1993, p. 92. 3Serbian Democratic Party was founded in Croatia in Knin on February 17, 1990. In the first democratic Croatian elections in 1990 the party won 5 seats in the Parliament, but soon withdrew from the Croatian Sabor (parliament). The party leadership encouraged Croatian Serbs not to accept the Croatian government and instead support efforts for territorial secession of “Serbian” areas from Croatia and the establishment of Serbian autonomies in Croatia (“SAO Krajina” - Knin, December 22, 1990; SAO Western Slavonia - August 13, 1991, SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem - February 26, 1991), which were later called the “Republic of Serbian Krajina”. Tatalovi}, S., Military and Political Aspects..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 166—190 168 the Serbian people, it will be a war between the Croatian state and the JNA.”4 In 1980s the strategy of silence and non-resistance to efforts to pre- serve the socialist centralized federal state, as advocated by the Serbian nationalist leadership, was continuously applied in Croatia. However, the process of democratization started in Croatia in the late eighties, and this was soon followed by the establishment of over fifty political parties. Most of them were constituted on national principles. In the first democratic elections, which were held between April 22 and May 17, 1990, the Croa- tian Democratic Union (HDZ)5 won. This party managed to fully express the basic aims and interests of the majority of Croats in Croatia and Croatian emigrants. The elections led to a new parliamentary structure with a HDZ majority. The HDZ's inauguration ceremony was charged with national feelings, which led to varied reactions both in Croatia and world- wide, among which prevailed those which suggested possible dangers in- volved in the practical moves of the new government. This was followed by some political moves due to which the new Croatian government expe- rienced attacks from various sides. Political forces outside Croatia which favoured the preservation of the SFRY did not support it, and in Croatia the threats by Croatian rebel Serbs and dogmatic communists were getting more serious and overt. Their dissatisfaction was increased by the new Croatian spirit, the new free approach to history, especially World War II, and the presentation of the new Croatian identity in the media.6 Political goals of the belligerent parties Serbian political goals In the late eighties Serbian global national policy came into open with the idea of “a great Serbian state which will realize the dream (once sac- rificed for Yugoslavia) of all Serbs living together in one state. This ac- counts for the contradictory ideas of the Serbian state - a strong Yugoslav federation (overtly) and a great Serbia (covertly).7 With this as their 4Vjesnik of January 21, 1991, p. 6. 5Croatian Democratic Union was founded in Zagreb on June 17, 1989; its program was published on November 22, 1989, and its first national convention, which took place on February 24-25, 1990 lead to different responses in Croatia and the international community. After the Convention, the leader of the Croatian Social Democratic Party, called HDZ a “party of dangerous intentions”. 6See: Tatalovi} Sini{a, “Peaceful Solutions of Conflicts in Croatia: Case Study of Gorski Kotar”, Peace and the Sciences, No. 6/1996, pp. 38-39. 7Popov Neboj{a (ed.), Srpska strana rata - Trauma i katarza u istorijskom pam}enju, Republika, Beograd, 1996, p. 41. Tatalovi}, S., Military and Political Aspects..., Politi~ka misao, Vol. XXXIII, (1996), No. 5, pp. 166—190 169 starting point, Serbian nationalist politicians, the leadership of the JNA and the leadership of rebel Serbs in Croatia defined their political goals in several variants: 1. To prevent the possible independence of the Republic of Croatia, thus maintaining it in the new Yugoslav federation by making use of the existing constitutional position of Croatian Serbs (that of a constitutive nation); 2. If the first goal proves unattainable, a part of the Croatian territory following the line Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica is to be invaded with the assistance of the JNA, structured as a state and joined with other “Serbian states”; 3. If the second goal proves unattainable, with the assistance of the JNA and the local Serbs the largest possible portion of the Croatian terri- tory is to be invaded, put under the protection of the international com- munity for as long as possible, that is, until the conditions for its annexa- tion are fulfilled; 4.