The Perfect Bikini Body: Can We All Really Have It? Loving Gaze as an Anti-Oppressive Beauty Ideal Forthcoming in Thought: A Journal of Philosophy (please cite the final version) Abstract In this paper I ask whether there is a defensible philosophical view according to which every body is beautiful. I review two purely aesthetical versions of this claim. The No Standards View claims that every body is maximally and equally beautiful. The Multiple Standards View encourages us to widen our standards of beauty. I argue that both approaches are problematic. The former fails to be aspirational and empowering, while the latter fails to be sufficiently inclusive. I conclude by presenting a hybrid ethical-aesthetical view according to which everybody is beautiful in the sense that every body can be perceived through a loving gaze (with the exception of evil individuals who are wholly unworthy of love). I show that this view is inclusive, aspirational and empowering, and authentically aesthetical. As soon as the summer season approaches, the internet is inundated with articles and slideshows with such titles as: “37 Totally Perfect Bikini Bodies. Rule No.1: there are no rules”1 or “9 Stunning Bodies That Shatter Society’s Stereotypes About the ‘Perfect’ Body”.2 These popular articles are ultimately grounded in the feminist imperative of dismantling sexist and oppressive aesthetic norms that harm women3 in a myriad of ways, among which: damaging their self-esteem and affecting their psychological and physical health, exposing 1 https://www.buzzfeed.com/kirstenking/all-your-perfect- imperfections?utm_term=.aoxkvwvz2#.qwJzDJD9G Last accessed on 02/16/2017. 2 https://mic.com/articles/108394/9-sexy-girls-in-swimsuits-proving-how-fatkinis-are-reinventing-the-bikini- body#.MsTnXo4x0 Last accessed on 02/16/2017. 3 In this paper I focus on the Western context, because it is the one I know best, and I focus on women, because it seems to me that on average women of all color, ability, sexual orientation and class are more harmed by conventional standards of beauty than their male counterparts. This focus, however, should not be interpreted as implying that non-Western women, or men from everywhere, are not harmed by current prevailing aesthetic ideals. 1 them to discrimination in the professional and romantic sphere, and objectifying them and reducing their value to their outward appearance. There are at least three different ways of interpreting this feminist imperative. The most extreme is a form of aesthetic nihilism, which prescribes that we abnegate aesthetic evaluations of each other.4 According to this view, what we really mean by “everybody is beautiful” turns out to be, paradoxically, that nobody is. While this is a defensible position in the debate about how we ought to aesthetically assess one another’s body, it does not seem to be a plausible interpretation of the kind of ideal that is implicitly endorsed in these articles. Here I cannot provide detailed textual evidence, but I submit that they all aim to encourage readers to appreciate some sort of aesthetic value that lies in human bodies. Far from abstaining from judgment, they enthusiastically and vocally present the portrayed women as beautiful. But a separate and more interesting question is whether aesthetic nihilism is a view worth defending. My answer here is more tentative. Beauty is a fundamental human value, and reserving aesthetic assessment only for objects or animals would entail a great loss: don’t we want to meaningfully proclaim that our beloved partners or children are beautiful? Furthermore, we are psychologically prone to making these assessments: it is very unlikely that we could ever teach ourselves not to, and I am wary of ideals that go against our ingrained psychological propensities. Thus, in this paper I will focus on two other interpretations of the anti-oppressive imperative that is behind these popular articles. A more radical one—call it the No Standards View—states that everybody is beautiful, and thus it eliminates appeal to any specific 4 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this interpretation. 2 standard of beauty. A more moderate one—call it the Multiple Standards View—encourages us to widen our standards of beauty. I argue that both approaches are problematic. The No Standards View is problematic insofar as it preserves maximal inclusivity at the cost of being insufficiently aspirational and empowering. I argue that beauty is a positional good: if everybody were equally beautiful, we would stop caring about beauty. The Multiple Standards View is problematic for the opposite reason: it preserves the aspirational and empowering character that we want for an ideal, but only for some women—those who qualify as beautiful—thus losing its ethical, anti-oppressive impetus. My solution is that an anti-oppressive ideal of beauty cannot be purely aesthetical, but needs to incorporate some ethical elements. I draw from the experience of loving a person: when we love someone, our very perceptions change: we see them, literally, in a different way from other people. When we say that everybody is beautiful, we mean that, insofar as everybody is potentially lovable, everybody can be looked at with a loving gaze. The Loving Gaze view succeeds in differentiating some people from others: the more beautiful we are inside, the more beautiful we will appear outside. At the same time, the discriminating criterion is not based on morally irrelevant and oppressive features. Therefore, the Loving Gaze view is superior to both the No Standards and the Multiple Standards View because it is both inclusive and aspirational, while remaining genuinely, if not exclusively, aesthetical. 3 1. No Standards View Suppose that we embrace the idea that, in order to have a perfect bikini body, you just need to have a body and wear a bikini,5 because every body is maximally, and thus equally, beautiful as it is.6 What kind of aesthetic ideal lies behind this claim? Sherri Irvin has recently proposed a sophisticated articulation of this view (Irvin, MS). Irvin starts by reviewing the overwhelming evidence of harm inflicted by conventional standards of beauty to those who fail to satisfy them. She then argues that we have ethical reasons to reject those aesthetic standards and look for alternative ones. She proposes an original model of aesthetic practice that she calls aesthetic exploration. In short, aesthetic exploration involves two dispositions: a tendency to approach an object carefully seeking it out its aesthetic affordances with the specific intent of finding pleasure in them, and a tendency to do so with a sense of curiosity and adventure, “a willingness to encounter and celebrate the unique and surprising, a willingness to tolerate and persist through moments of experience that are jarring” (Irvin MS, 16). Qua practice, aesthetic exploration can be intentionally cultivated and pursued, thus falling under the honorable tradition of exercising indirect control over attitudes that may be implicit and thus escape voluntary direct control.7 5 I am grateful to Natalie Ashton for noticing that this specific phrase suggests an alternative interpretation of the “perfect bikini body” idea: everyone has a right to be comfortable on the beach and wear what they want, independently from what they look like, and from what onlookers think or feel. I agree this is one position present in the debate, and it is worth keeping it in mind. However, the slideshows and articles linked above make it clear that they are presenting an alternative aesthetics, either one according to which “we are all beautiful” and “beauty knows no boundaries”, or one according to which fat bodies can be stunning. My argument concerns these aesthetic ideals. 6 A second, less extreme, variant of the view is that every body, qua human body, surpasses a certain threshold and qualifies as beautiful, but, after that, one body can be more or less beautiful than others. I consider this second variant at the end of the section. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for prompting me to clarify this point. 7 There is a growing literature in moral psychology dedicated to this topic. In aesthetics, Anne Eaton defends an analogous approach in the more restricted context of negative attitude toward fat bodies. In (Eaton 2016), she pursues an explicitly Aristotelian strategy of changing one’s taste via habituation and imaginative engagement with representations. 4 Everybody is beautiful, according to Irvin, insofar as “living human bodies, all of them, do have very rich affordances by virtue of their colors, textures, ever-shifting forms, complex structures, capacities for movement, and so forth. The human body – every human body – is an incredibly replete aesthetic object” (op. cit. 21). Thus, “all bodies can afford positive aesthetic experiences if approached through an appropriate appreciative practice” (cit. 29). Irvin’s view is very appealing, and it encourages us to engage in an enriching activity. But can it function as the feminist ideal of bodily beauty that we are looking for? I worry that the very strength of this view, its inclusivity, is also its major weakness: according to this view, nobody can fail short of the ideal, provided they are gazed at in the appropriate way. Assume for the time being that this is desirable. Is this view as aspirational and empowering as the ideal we are looking for? I am afraid not. First, insofar as the view asserts that everybody is maximally, and thus equally beautiful, we lose the aspirational nature of the ideal. This is why I called it “No Standards” view, as opposed to “One-Maximally-Met-Standard” view: when everybody meets the standard, there is no need to appeal to it, because it does no work of weeding the non- beautiful from the beautiful.