Space and Time Partitioning with Hardware Support for Space Applications

Space and Time Partitioning with Hardware Support for Space Applications

SPACE AND TIME PARTITIONING WITH HARDWARE SUPPORT FOR SPACE APPLICATIONS S. Pinto1, A. Tavares1, and S. Montenegro2 1Centro Algoritmi, Universidade do Minho, Guimaraes, Portugal 2Aerospace Information and Technology, Universitat¨ Wurzburg,¨ Germany ABSTRACT they were able to get a reduction on SWaP-C. As space domain typically shares the same basic needs Complex and critical systems like airplanes and space- of aeronautics, they rapidly concluded that IMA strat- craft implement a very fast growing amount of functions. egy could be spun-in to the space domain. The prob- Typically, those systems were implemented with fully lem was that the use of generic platforms altogether with federated architectures, but the number and complexity of several COTS-based components with different critical- desired functions of todays systems led aerospace indus- ity and from several suppliers, imposed integration chal- try to follow another strategy. Integrated Modular Avion- lenges namely in terms of reusability and safety. The ics (IMA) arose as an attractive approach for consolida- introduction of STP [3, 4] for separation of concerns tion, by combining several applications into one single between functionally independent software components generic computing resource. Current approach goes to- was the solution to achieve higher level of integration, wards higher integration provided by space and time par- while maintaining the robustness of federated architec- titioning (STP) of system virtualization. The problem is tures. By containing and/or isolating faults, STP ap- existent virtualization solutions are not ready to fully pro- proach eliminates the need to re-validate unmodified ap- vide what the future of aerospace are demanding: perfor- plications on an IMA system, because the guaranteed iso- mance, flexibility, safety, security while simultaneously lation it provides limits re-certification efforts only at the containing Size, Weight, Power and Cost (SWaP-C). partition level. This work describes a real time hypervisor for space ap- Virtualization technology has been used as an implemen- plications assisted by commercial off-the-shell (COTS) tation technique to provide STP. Over the last few years hardware. ARM TrustZone technology is exploited to several works have been proposed in the aerospace do- implement a secure virtualization solution with low over- main [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Some of them fol- head and low memory footprint. This is demonstrated lowing a (software-based) full-virtualization approach, by running multiple guest partitions of RODOS operat- while others implementing para-virtualization. Between ing system on a Xilinx Zynq platform. both approaches there is a trade-off between flexibility and performance: full-virtualization incurs in a higher performance cost, while para-virtualization incurs in a Key words: Space and Time Partition; Virtualization; higher design cost. Apart from performance and flexi- TrustZone; Real-Time; Embedded Systems; ARM. bility, safety and, more recently, security became impor- tant requirements that are driving the development of cur- rent and next generation of safety-critical systems. Re- 1. INTRODUCTION search and industry focused so their attention on pro- viding hardware support to assist and secure virtualiza- tion from the outset. Intel, ARM and Imagination/MIPS The market of complex and critical systems like cars, introduced their own COTS technologies, and naturally airplanes and spacecraft have experienced unprecedented several hardware-based solutions have been proposed growth over the last few years and is expected to continue [13, 14, 15, 16, 17], although none of them specifi- growing exponentially for the foreseeable future [1]. The cally designed for the aerospace domain. Among exis- number and complexity of desired functions evolved in tent COTS technologies, ARM TrustZone [18] is gain- such a way that fully federated architectures, where each ing particular attention due to the ubiquitous presence function is implemented in its own embedded controller, of TrustZone-enabled processors in the embedded sec- become completely impracticable. Naturally, industries tor. The problem is existent TrustZone-based solutions rapidly tried to find other alternatives, and aeronautics pi- [13, 14, 16] not only fail in providing ability for running oneering the shift from traditional federated architectures an arbitrary number of partitions (they mainly rely on to an IMA [2] architecture. By combining several ap- a dual-OS configuration), but also they (i.e., TrustZone- plications into one generic powerful computing resource, based solutions) were not designed taking into considera- tion the real time requirements of safety-critical systems. Our work goes beyond state-of-art presenting a secure virtualization solution assisted by COTS hardware. A CPU distinctive aspect of our hypervisor is the use of ARM (non-secure) TrustZone technology to assist and secure real-time virtu- DMA alization for space. This is demonstrated by running sev- eral unmodified RODOS OS partitions on a hybrid Xilinx ZC702 platform with really low overhead and low mem- AMBA Interconnect ory footprint. Furthermore, with the recent announce- ment of ARM about their decision to introduce TrustZone Non-Secure Secure FlashFlash SRAM technology in all Cortex-M and Cortex-R processors se- FlashFlash Peripherals Peripherals ries, we strongly believe this solution as more than an isolated implementation for a specific platform. From Secure World Non-Secure World our point of view, it will also provide the foundation to drive next generation virtualization solutions for middle and low-end space applications (e.g., small satellites). Figure 1. TrustZone hardware architecture INC 653 partitioning. The hypervisor was implemented 2. RELATED WORK as an extension to the embedded Linux kernel with some parts located into the kernel while others implemented as system processes. Several optimization techniques were The idea beyond implementation of STP through virtual- used to alleviate the trap-and-emulate overhead, however ization in the aerospace domain is not new, and the first despite those efforts the prototype still showed a con- attempts to start exploiting this technology were proposed siderable performance degradation. Authors promoted some years ago. reusability in detriment of performance, in order to not XtratuM [5] [6] was one of the first well known hypervi- modify certified flight software from previous missions. sors implemented to meet the safety critical requirements The hypervisor was the first known implementation tar- of aerospace domain. Implemented in its original form geting dual-core LEON4-based platforms. [5] as a Loadable Kernel Module (LKM) for x86 architec- RodosVisor [11, 12], developed by Tavares et al., is tures, it naturally evolved to be independent and bootable. a bare-metal hypervisor supporting both full and para- The result was XtratuM 2.0 [6], a type 1 (bare-metal) hy- virtualization, alongside with real-time capabilities. The pervisor which employes para-virtualization techniques hypervisor is able to execute several applications accord- and a strong effort in redesign to be closer to the ARINC- ing to the IMA model, running on a Xilinx FPGA board 653 standard. XtratuM was ported to reference platforms with built-in PowerPC core. It is an ARINC 653 quasi- for the spatial sector like LEON2 and LEON3, and re- compliant hypervisor, since it implements ARINC 653 cently it was extended with multicore support under the services but, not strictly following the APIs standard. A MultiPARTES project [7]. distinctive aspect of RodosVisor is its object-oriented ap- Steven VanderLeest start by developing an early proto- proach and the possibility of customization using gener- type of an ARINC 653 implementation using the vir- ative programming techniques. tualization technology of the open source Xen hypervi- There are also other relevant academic and commercial sor along with a Linux-based domain/partition OS [8]. virtualization solutions, and Gu and Zhao [20] survey The hypervisor, called as ARLX (ARINC 653 Real-time a number of them for a variety of embedded domains Linux on Xen) [9], was later extended with more safety (not just for aerospace). They basically review hyper- and security capabilities, basically by applying formal visors based on Xen, the Kernel-based Virtual Machine analysis techniques as well as certification. A distinctive (KVM) and L4. Several works trying to make use of aspect of ARLX was its innovative approach to multicore COTS-hardware to assist virtualization have been pro- processors, by scheduling the I/O system partition in one posed [14, 15, 16, 17], but none of them was specifically core and all the guest partitions on remaining cores. More designed for the aerospace domain. recently, in [19] Steven VanderLeest (with cooperation of Big Players like Xilinx, Mentor Graphics and Lynx Soft- ware) introduced some ideas of how to address the future of avionics. He basically proposes the use of what we al- 3. ARM TRUSTZONE most have already implemented: secure virtualization de- ployed on heterogenous multicore platforms (HMP). He conducted his discussion around the Xilinx Zynq Ultra- TrustZone technology refers to security extensions avail- scale+. able in all ARM Application-processors (Cortex-A) since ARMv6 architecture. These hardware security exten- Hyunwoo Joe et al. [10] presented a prototype of a type 2 sions virtualize a physical core as two virtual cores, pro- (hosted) full-virtualized

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